Skyring
Established Member
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- Oct 18, 2005
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Many years ago, as a computer programmer, I happened upon Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography. It's a fairly dense handbook about codes and cyphers, encryption and decryption. The sort of thing only a true nerd would write. Or read. I devoured it, bought my own copy, bought his other books, subscribed to his website.
I'm no expert in security, but Bruce is, and he knows where the bodies are buried. He has a lot of fun exposing software programs that promise computer security but fall short. He shows how expensive gizmos can be bypassed. He dives into the politics of security and why some things - such as air transport - attract a lot of attention but others, such as cinemas and public transport don't.
Anyone ever gone through a detector of any sort to get on the Tube? Or visit Hoyts? And yet these are places where hundreds of vulnerable people congregate. Hell, the security lines at any big airport will have a big jet's worth of people just standing around with unscreened bags, undies that haven't been scanned, laptops that are hiding in briefcases, liquids in containers greater than 100ml...
Anyway, Schneier knows his stuff. He can be checked and he comes out solid. If anything, he is a bit more alarmist than the general security industry, which is saying something. I remember reading a book he wrote about identity theft in 2000, and that was long before it became a common phrase.
He is scathing about these full-body scanners, has been for years and has repeatedly pointed out their shortcomings and the politics behind them. You are right to be skeptical of the average journalist seeking a good headline or an "armchair expert" pontificating. But if you want to criticise Schneier with one-liners and cheap talk, it tells me that you haven't done any research.
What do I think should be done? I don't know. But I do know what shouldn't be done, and that is to fight the next war as if it were the previous one. There's no magic bullet that guarantees security and the target is always moving. What works best is intelligence, unpredictability and good risk assessment, and none of that applies to the TSA. Spending billions of dollars on machines that sometimes detect suspicious bulges in underwear is a poor spending choice.
If I were spending security money, I'd be increasing surveillance outside the security zone. Look at what people are doing when they get out of taxis, see who arrives together, see what they do before entering the security line, see what they do afterwards. Just pick up on the patterns and the exceptions.
As a night cabbie, I soon got to know what to look for. Everyone is different, but they follow similar patterns. The businessmen going to and from the airport, the late night drunks, the old ladies with their shopping and doctor's appointments. But every now and then there's someone who acts a bit out of the ordinary, and they are the ones to keep an eye on, because they can mean big trouble. The most dangerous are the ones who know the system, know where the security cameras are located, what the driver's options are, when he's likely to have a bag full of money, when he's vulnerable.
They study the system, they work out how to beat it, they practise their roles. They know the rules, but they don't play by them. They, like hijackers, are the Liars and Outliers.
