Okay. You seem to think that loyalty businesses run very differently to how loyalty businesses actually run.
This is helpful as it clarifies where the impasse is. You think all loyalty programs are the same — my guess would be because of your professional background in a non-airline loyalty program (as you cannot stop pointing out). You mistakenly think Bakers Delight's loyalty program is simply a variation on Qantas' loyalty program. That's why you say 'It is virtually impossible to consider the revenue and profit of a loyalty business as disconnected from its parent.' This statement is not even remotely correct.
Indeed, that's how Aeroplan operated from 2002 to 2020 and how IAG Loyalty operates today (Finnair and IAG Loyalty are not part of the same group and do not share overall ambitions). Those are not examples of loyalty merely being a 'separate legal entity' — they are entities entirely disconnected from their 'parent'. The key difference between the two types of loyalty program is that, for Bakers Delight, their only commercial relationship is with the bread baking arm of the company, while, for Qantas Loyalty, the flying divisions are not even the biggest purchaser of their points (the banks are) and the flying divisions are not the sole redeemer of points (they can be redeemed for an ever-expanding range of non-flying purchases).
Loyalty are not making decisions on the availability of CR independent of QF's Revenue Management, and that QF will be looking at this holistically, not just through a Loyalty lens.
What you miss is that Loyalty and the flying divisions are in competition with each other. Indeed, the media reports surrounding the release of Classic+ revealed as much — the flying divisions were unhappy with the rate Loyalty had negotiated with them to purchase classic award seats (Loyalty was stealing margin from International, in particular). The response was the release of fewer seats to Loyalty. The introduction of Classic+ was an attempt to bridge the impasse — more seats but at higher internal purchase rates. But Loyalty had to take a hit to earnings projections for it. There is nothing holistic about this dynamic — it is simply the end result of a negotiation between different parts of the business, each with their own KPIs.
But a points whale living in Boston, for example, can easily expand QFFs customer footprint, at margin, without adding materially to that intractable problem.
Ahh, now I see where you're mistaken about the US market. You think the Boston points whale will be acquiring Qantas points to redeem on AA flights between BOS & JFK. They won't do that — they have better options — unless Qantas Loyalty decides to sell the points to US banks for a loss (ie less than they will get from AA).
Instead, the decision to lean into the US market will add to the intractable problem in that:
- those 'disloyal' Australian churners (the ones you thought Qantas had discarded) will acquire US cards and come back into the program through the backdoor of the US market, having acquired the points at even lower cost given all the financial engineering possible in the US system (this is what already happens in the Canadian and, increasingly, the UK market); and
- the Boston points whale will sell their points to a broker who will then use them to purchase seats for a 'disloyal' Australian customer, taking that premium cabin, international redemption away from a 'loyal' Australian customer (this is what already happens in a huge number of markets).