Ask The Pilot

[jb747]

After the "loud bang" did you commence the descent immediately or did you run through other procedures first ?

There was a extremely loud bang. Basically a dull thud, like door being slammed. The aircraft rocked and rolled a little (not far, a few degrees), and the autopilot disconnected. The FO had been flying the sector, and he grabbed the controls. First thought from both of us was that an engine had 'let go'. I looked inside to see which engine, and I distinctly remember all four showing a nice stable 1.57 EPR. At this point there had been no warnings (other than the autopilot, which had been cancelled). A short period later (one second, five seconds, I have no idea), the EICAS came up with "DOOR 2 RIGHT". Basically that's an impossibility, as the doors are physically larger than the hole they are seated in, but obviously something had happened. I started to pull up the synoptic display for the doors, but before I could do so, I saw the cabin pressurisation data "pop up" on the upper EICAS. This is normally hidden, but appears automatically if the cabin exceeds 10,000 feet.

At this point, without understanding the how or why, I realised that we were having a depressurisation event, and I yelled 'depressurisation, masks on'. The checklist consists of only a few items, and they are done from memory. Mask, communications (can we talk to each other), isolation valves are closed (one possible cause of a depressurisation is a duct leak, and that will isolate it), passenger oxygen on. 22 seconds after the bang, with the FO still manually flying (he'd tried to engage an autopilot again, but without success), I pulled the thrust levels to idle, and selected the speed brakes up. I also selected 10,000 feet and flight level change on the MCP (even without the autopilot that commands the flight director).

I declared a Mayday as we left our cruise altitude. We still didn't really know what was happening, but it couldn't be good. Another airline transmitted right over the top of my call!..so I did it again, and a Cathay flight came up, relayed the message, and told everyone else to shut up.

Bernie (FO) had the aircraft in a nice stable descent. Looking back at the EICAS, it was now alive with messages, most of which made no sense. Failures generally have some sort of relationship to each other, but many of these were from totally unrelated systems. Looking at the cabin, it had totally depressurised. I decided to reopen the isolation valves, as closed they shut down one of the packs. The problem obviously wasn't the duct, so whilst a third pack wasn't going to make much difference, it couldn't hurt. About now, a couple of messages appeared, warning us of low crew and passenger oxygen pressure. Whilst it might sound callous, I wasn't concerned about the passenger oxygen, as we were already doing all we could, and the worst that would happen (in the very short term I was considering) is that someone might have a sleep. The crew oxygen was ominous though, because if we had a sleep, with the autopilot disengaged, things probably wouldn't go well. Because of that, we elected to accelerate by about 20 knots (normally with a structural issue, you come down at the speed things happened or less). The synoptic for both systems was showing about 50 psi, which looked like a valid reading (it goes blank when not valid, or sensor u/s), and was nothing like the 1800 psi that's normally shown.

Somewhere around here I just wound the heading bug in the direction of Manila.

Looking inside again, because the messages made so little sense, I pulled up the raw data for the major systems...engines, hydraulics, electrics..and all seemed reasonable. I was particularly interested in the #3 engine, as whatever had happened was near it.

At some point Bernie gave the autopilots another go, and this time the L system engaged.

Approaching 10,000 feet the cabin crew were told to 'commence their follow up duties'. At this point we had some feedback from the cabin...which was more or less, 'nobody has been hurt, the door is shut, and there is a hole in the floor'.

We obviously had a few things happening. We had to tidy up the EICAS / checklists as best we could. We were obviously diverting, and whilst initial decision was Manila, we had to look at that again, and get ourselves set up to actually do it. And we needed to get the aircraft weight down to something reasonable. So, having skimmed through the checklist and taken care of what looked immediately important, we moved on to the fuel dump, and planning for the landing. I gave my checklist to the SO, and got him to look again at all of the messages, so see if there was anything we could resolve (actually, nothing was ever corrected...).

I was still happy having Bernie flying the aircraft as it left me free to manage the failures, and to set up our arrival. Unfortunately, part of the failures had frozen my CDU (the box the access the FMC though) so it became necessary to take over from Bernie so that he could do the programming. His side was reluctant too, but he eventually got it to accept Manila.

At this point, the nasty part of the event was essentially over. We still had a number of issues that could affect the landing (autobrakes, and antiskid), plus we weren't sure what the flaps would do, but basically we had a aircraft that was behaving, and which we could land. We elected not to fly in cloud any more than we had to simply because our flight instruments had degraded and we were now operating on one single source of air data. That pretty much chose the runway for us, as 24 Manila required an ILS approach in rain, whilst 06 was clear and we could approach visually.

We continued the fuel dump to well below max landing weight. With no anti skid we didn't want any excess weight. The dump was secured by the SO at just over 20 miles to run, and about 30 tonnes remaining. Landing itself was quite normal. There was a quite noticeable 'burble' through the elevator (disturbed air flow?), but nothing of consequence. Stopped about 3/4 of the way down the runway.

 

[bossreggie]

I declared a Mayday as we left our cruise altitude. We still didn't really know what was happening, but it couldn't be good. Another airline transmitted right over the top of my call!..so I did it again, and a Cathay flight came up, relayed the message, and told everyone else to shut up.

Would you mind explaining this a little more please?

What do you mean transmitted over the top of your call?? Why did the Cathay flight tell everyone to shut up? I had thought that there was a different channel/frequency for emergencies??

When you declare a Mayday, what is the process?? Who usually responds? Did the company in Australia have any idea of the situation whilst you were still airborne??

Thanks a lot JB747

Boss

 

[jb747]

QF30

Can you tell us what the process was after you got it on the ground?
- how long to get everyone off the a/c?
- what did you do immediately afterwards? walk thru cabin, walk around aircraft? Then was it to a "holding room" in the airport, to a hotel? How long until you were flown out of MNL etc. Basically a timeline from wheels down, everyone's safe to being back in Australia.

- how did you handle the media attention?
- what would you have done (now do) differently?
- were any restrictions put on you afterwards by QF / CASA / any other (eg. no flying for x days etc)?


So perhaps some of the non-directly inflight aspects, but more looking at "the aftermath" I guess.

Thanks for this thread and for all the time you've spent on it.

Edit: I should add, the answer might take a while to put together, so no need to answer urgently!

We stopped on the runway, and sort of held our breath for a few seconds. We'd landed on the reciprocal of the duty runway, and more or less ended up amongst the departing aircraft. I had thought of just taxying clear, but ultimately elected to block the runway, and after 3 minutes (cool down) shut down the engines. As we couldn't see any reason not to, we started the APU and got the air conditioning back on line. Within only a few minutes a Cathay vehicle arrived carrying some engineers, followed very closely by a tug. After discussing it with them we decided the aircraft could be towed, and so they hooked up and slowly towed it to the international terminal....followed by a bunch of emergency vehicles.

As we approached the gate the normal doors call was modified to 'with the exception of door right 2, disarm the doors'.

I did a runner downstairs as soon as the bridge was attached, and that's where the picture of me looking at the hole came from.

The passengers initially disembarked into the boarding lounge. The cabin crew had a few unaccompanied minors that they had to keep track of. Someone thought to go back and get a few crates of soft drink for the passengers. I had a chat to as many as I could (as did Bernie and Paul). The Manila QF airport manager co-opted staff from Cathay to help, and it was only about an hour later that he had the first people onto buses to hotels.

Somewhere about here, I thought I'd better ring the Chief Pilot, and his secretary informed me that he was very busy....needless to say he rang me back in moments.

Once the last of the passengers were gone to their hotels, we caught our bus to the crew hotel (which also had a lot of the passengers). Needless to say, my phone ran pretty hot for the rest of the afternoon.

That night, the QF 128 was flown out of HK empty, and picked up everybody except about five of the crew (not enough seats). Even though they weren't going, all of them came out to the airport and helped with the passengers. All told...on the ground in Manila for about 12 hours. I even got the interview with the local ATSB done...

Back home...it was all a bit surreal. I wasn't going to say anything to the media, but must admit I was very annoyed by the lack of quality shown in most of the reporting (though I will admit that some tried).

QF were very good. Basically, they needed to see everybody (crew) fairly soon for the investigations, but once that was done just told everyone to go away, and come back when they felt up to it. Counselling was provided as needed. In my case, I flew again after 10 days, and I think everyone was back within a month. I came back too soon, and after about a month said so, and took some more time off. How it will affect you is very personal...and ranges from no issues, to lots.

 

[jb747]

Would you mind explaining this a little more please?

What do you mean transmitted over the top of your call?? Why did the Cathay flight tell everyone to shut up? I had thought that there was a different channel/frequency for emergencies??

Only one person can transmit on a frequency at a time. Multiple transmissions are garbled. So, it's always good manners to listen before you talk. Some nationalities are particularly bad at not doing so....

I guess you're thinking of 121.5 (aka 'guard'). It is normally used for automated transmissions by beacons. Emergencies are normally declared on whatever the operating frequency is. ATC can move you, or more likely the other aircraft, to another frequency, but initially, you just want the problem out there.... Cathay told everyone to 'shut up' because, for the next few minutes at least, normal comms had no priority; sadly there are some who just don't recognise that.

When you declare a Mayday, what is the process?? Who usually responds? Did the company in Australia have any idea of the situation whilst you were still airborne??

You simply say "Mayday, mayday, mayday, qantas 30, qantas 30, qantas 30, position..., explosive decompression, descending to..." and you can add other details later. Once you've declared that emergency, you're basically saying that you're no longer obeying the rules, and will do whatever you need to do. Other aircraft hearing it should try to copy the details, but won't respond unless there's no ATC response, when generally they will try to relay the message to ATC for you.

The aircraft automatically transmits data to the company, and in this case sent the EICAS messages to Sydney within seconds of them appearing. Later on, the SO did speak to engineering on the sat phone, but the company had largely worked out for themselves what was happening, and where we would go.

 

[Major]

What was your cruise level and approx. how long did the the descent to FL100 take ?

 

[harvyk]

The aircraft automatically transmits data to the company, and in this case sent the EICAS messages to Sydney within seconds of them appearing. Later on, the SO did speak to engineering on the sat phone, but the company had largely worked out for themselves what was happening, and where we would go.

I take it that where you'd go and what you'd do would be pretty much down to yourself and your crew with them giving advice only if requested?

 

[reductionist]

At some point Bernie gave the autopilots another go, and this time the L system engaged.

What's the "L system"?

Great post, thanks!

 

[reductionist]

I came back too soon, and after about a month said so, and took some more time off. How it will affect you is very personal...and ranges from no issues, to lots.

Would also be interested in hearing a bit more about this if you can talk about it. I'm curious as to how the incident affected you and what it was like returning to work.

 

[jb747]

What's the "L system"?

There are three autopilots. All three are used simultaneously for automatic landings, but in normal operations, only one is in use. They are effectively the same, but the L and C systems use information and control inputs from the captains side, whilst the R system uses the FO's side. The R system was flying the aircraft, but it disconnected immediately because the FO's aileron cables were cut by the debris.

 

[jb747]

L C R.....left centre right.

 

[bossreggie]

Would you mind explaining this a little more please?


Only one person can transmit on a frequency at a time. Multiple transmissions are garbled. So, it's always good manners to listen before you talk. Some nationalities are particularly bad at not doing so....

I guess you're thinking of 121.5 (aka 'guard'). It is normally used for automated transmissions by beacons. Emergencies are normally declared on whatever the operating frequency is. ATC can move you, or more likely the other aircraft, to another frequency, but initially, you just want the problem out there.... Cathay told everyone to 'shut up' because, for the next few minutes at least, normal comms had no priority; sadly there are some who just don't recognise that.


You simply say "Mayday, mayday, mayday, qantas 30, qantas 30, qantas 30, position..., explosive decompression, descending to..." and you can add other details later. Once you've declared that emergency, you're basically saying that you're no longer obeying the rules, and will do whatever you need to do. Other aircraft hearing it should try to copy the details, but won't respond unless there's no ATC response, when generally they will try to relay the message to ATC for you.

The aircraft automatically transmits data to the company, and in this case sent the EICAS messages to Sydney within seconds of them appearing. Later on, the SO did speak to engineering on the sat phone, but the company had largely worked out for themselves what was happening, and where we would go.

Thanks JB747.

If you are ever free in MEL and would like a single malt... PM me. My treat!!

Boss

 

[AaronBradford]

Forgive me if it's already been covered - 200+ pages I'm not going to read just for one reply.

You mention that the company will be monitoring EICAS. How do they do this exactly? Do they have computers showing your instruments (ie, attitude indicator etc) and flight details, or are there only alerts when certain thresholds are exceeded or certain situations are detected? Is there a department dedicated to this?

 

[Major]

After you moved the thrust levers to idle, how does the aircraft behave ?

I assume the forward motion stops the acft from dropping like a brick but do you need a nose down attitude to reach 10,000 ft quickly ?

 

[jb747]

Forgive me if it's already been covered - 200+ pages I'm not going to read just for one reply.

You mention that the company will be monitoring EICAS. How do they do this exactly? Do they have computers showing your instruments (ie, attitude indicator etc) and flight details, or are there only alerts when certain thresholds are exceeded or certain situations are detected? Is there a department dedicated to this?

The aircraft data links lots of engineering information at various times. It also downlinks any alerts.

 

[jb747]

After you moved the thrust levers to idle, how does the aircraft behave ?

I assume the forward motion stops the acft from dropping like a brick but do you need a nose down attitude to reach 10,000 ft quickly ?

Closing the thrust levers, with the autopilot disengaged, causes the aircraft to pitch down. The attitude for a normal cruise is about 2.5 degrees nose up. For a glide descent at about 290 knots with the speedbrakes extended it's about 2.5 degrees nose down. Not much of a pitch change.

 

[Simo]

JB,

Wow wot a very comprehensive report on your incident.

 

[Sifor]

I always love reading first hand accounts. Below is a link to one of your interviews that I found quite interesting.

Episode 6: John Bartels & QF30 : Flight Podcast

 

[Major]

Thanks JB for the lesson in crisis management.

IMHO this is the best thread on this forum. I have enjoyed every post, particularly today's posts on QF30. Your recall is clear, concise and detailed.

I even went back and reread your posts.

Many thanks for your contributions

 

[jb01]

Looking back at the EICAS, it was now alive with messages, most of which made no sense. Failures generally have some sort of relationship to each other, but many of these were from totally unrelated systems.

Are the EICAS messages displayed in some kind of priority listing? Or is it up to you to filter through them and determine what to take action on first?
In the simulator is it really possible to determine exactly how the plane will react? There must be an infinite amount of scenarios anyone could dream up, but come face to face in a real-life situation like this, there's obviously not an oxygen bottle exploding scenario in the sim to determine exactly what other systems will be affected. (well not before QF30 anyway!)

In the heat of the moment, did your mind just switch into action as if you were in the sim, or did it feel completely different being that it was a real life situation with actual people in the cabin?

Thanks JB747 - I really appreciate the openness in discussing what is no doubt an event that will stick with you forever.

 

[jb747]

Are the EICAS messages displayed in some kind of priority listing? Or is it up to you to filter through them and determine what to take action on first?

The EICAS does have a priority system, but I've managed to forget it now. But, like the Airbus ECAM, they're only ever really reliable in fairly simple scenarios. The Boeing manual even makes a point of this at the start of the section on checklists, pointing out that complex emergencies (i.e. multiple overlapping problems) may not be covered, and may require parts of multiple checklists, or simply have to be done from system knowledge.

In the simulator is it really possible to determine exactly how the plane will react?

The aircraft flight simulators are not system simulators. They respond as they have been told to respond, but are not normally capable of predicting the aircraft response in unusual situations. So, come up with something new, and there is no guarantee that the sim will respond accurately. For instance, there was a particular sequence of air data issues that I've seen in the AB, which when the same failures were selected in the sim, gave a totally different result. The sim has since been reprogrammed to behave as the aircraft, but this will be an ongoing thing for the life of the sim.

There must be an infinite amount of scenarios anyone could dream up, but come face to face in a real-life situation like this, there's obviously not an oxygen bottle exploding scenario in the sim to determine exactly what other systems will be affected. (well not before QF30 anyway!)

And for that reason I'm not a fan of practicing compound emergencies, for anything other than management practice. The chances of any practiced sequence actually happening is tiny. I prefer practicing the small components, and then leaving them to you to put together (lego style) as needed on the day.

In the heat of the moment, did your mind just switch into action as if you were in the sim, or did it feel completely different being that it was a real life situation with actual people in the cabin?

I don't know. We knew it wasn't a sim but in many ways it was similar. Just keeping working through the issues until you can land. Don't be in too much of a hurry to do so. Land when you are ready, the aircraft is ready, and the people on the ground are ready for you.