jb747 you have been quite critical of Airbus's approach to "dumbing down" the pilot/aircraft interaction by putting some much control into the aircraft systems. This is by comparison to your previous experience (747/767). I was wondering if in pilot circles there is any discussion of the 787 and whether Boeing have followed Airbus's approach or have continued to follow their own approach which you favour.
I was just prompted looking at the new photos of the ANA 787 to wonder whether this revolutionary new aircraft was revolutionary just in construction or revolutionary from the ground up.
Remember that Boeing have done a FBW airliner before...the 777, and the only discussion of that aircraft in pilot circles is invariably positive.
Airbus have not necessarily put more control into the aircraft systems. For instance the A380 fuel system is fully automated. Nevertheless, it behaves in a very similar manner to that in the 747-400. The only reason for the full time automation there is because it is constantly pumping small amounts of fuel around, and pilots would very quickly become tired of that game. It's really much the same with most of the subsystems. The only point of real divergence is the interface with the pilots....
Note that the 777/787 still use what most people would call 'old fashioned' control columns, when they could just as easily use sidesticks. So, why did Boeing forgo the smaller, lighter, option? It isn't as if it takes most pilots long to become used to it, nor are the columns needed any more to allow the pilots to apply greater force to the controls. Perhaps the answer is that joysticks provide NO feedback to either the pilot flying,
or to the non flying pilot. In a 767/747 any attempt by an FO to over rotate could be easily countered, simply by limiting how far you allowed the control column to come aft. You didn't have to 'take over'. Nor did you have to push a button (where is it) in the scant moments you had available to allow you to take the controls. If one looks at AF447, you have to ask if it would have continued its plunge (!) if either of the pilots not flying had any idea that the PF was holding full backstick. Without leaning forward and actually looking at the other pilot's control, there is no way to tell.
It's much the same with the thrust levers. When in manual mode, they work like any other aircraft. BUT, you can certainly tell that they don't want you using them that way, because the controls are very unbalanced when you do. Basically that means that the joystick is close to you, and is very light, whilst the thrust levers are a long reach, and quite heavy. But, at the same time they are quite sensitive, which means that they are difficult to manage smoothly. They can be quite non intuitive. For instance, if you were to need more power just after take off, pushing them to the TOGA detent would give you what you expect. But, in many cases of derated takeoffs, pulling them back to the CLB detent would also give an appreciable increase in power. In Boeing, the thrust response is always in the direction the levers are pulled/pushed.
Failures. The aircraft does not respond to some failures at all gracefully. For instance, if you lose two air data computers (of the three), one pilot will lose all of his data. The system allows either of the pilots to select their displays to the third, but it will not allow BOTH pilots to select the same source. A Boeing will....but it will give you an EICAS warning if you do select the same system. (QF30 ended up on a single source.) And, just to make it more fun, the next consequence of that failure is that the autopilots, auto thrust and flight directors will also cease working. The aircraft also drops to alternate law II. And because there is no aileron trim available to the pilots, the aircraft will almost certainly be grossly out of lateral trim (which has the effect of making it even harder to fly). So, we're going to take most of the data needed to fly from one of the pilots, and simultaneously make the aircraft much harder to fly for the other. I'm really at a loss to understand why Airbus have this 'thing' about taking the flight director away as soon as there is almost any form of failure. Losing it in a Boeing is pretty much unheard of.
The upshot of all of this is that the aircraft can go from being quite easy to fly, to being extremely hard, as a consequence of relatively minor failures. Obviously, many of the design decisions were made by engineers (with virtually no consultation with pilots), and with an overriding belief that 'it will not happen'. Not only will 'it' happen, but it will happen way sooner than they think.
Another issue is something that's akin to what seems to exist around Apple computers. Fan boys. I have no issue will people who like the Airbus way of doing things, but, they sadly also assume a dismissive attitude to anyone who is at all critical of AB. If they are being nice, you'll be told that you need to 'embrace the Airbus philosophy'...almost as if it is a religion. If less nice, you'll be told that you are a Boeing 'holdout'.
And on your original question...I think that any pilot of ANY previous Boeing aircraft would feel immediately at home in a 787.
Actually, something else that drives me nuts about the Airbus....ergonomics. In the lead in blurb in the manuals it says that the coughpit is designed to be clean and uncluttered. What this actually translates to is rows of IDENTICAL switches, with dramatically different functions. Boeing overhead panels tend to look like a bit of a hodge podge because many different switch designs are used, and their alignments and colours are also varied. AB, on the other hand will give you switches that are identical in all but function, within inches of each other. Good example is the passenger oxygen, and the emergency electrical configuration....a pair that it's best to get the right one if you ever need either.
He did see my point.
