The 2 little mini wings or whatever they are at the back, don't remember seeing them before. Maybe I've just blindly looked past them, even when walking under the tail of the one at the museum in TLS....
The horizontal tailplanes? Wouldn't fly well (or at all) without them. They have a similar area to an entire 737 wing, so if you can't see them, you'll need more help than Specsavers is likely to give.
Basically it's just a box ticking exercise for a regulator that doesn't care. You'll get no worthwhile rest in such a seat, but it's cheaper than having a proper crew rest setup.
In the days of FEOs, all of the SOs had to hold a restricted FE licence, so that they could sit in for him during rest periods. You were generally restricted to being in his seat for just the cruise part of the flight, though I recall being there once for landing when the FEO became ill. And each few months when your licence came up for renewal in the sim, there was an extra session for the SOs in the engineer's seat. It was a great way of learning more about the systems, from people who could take them apart, and put them back together again.
I don't know the details of the 757, but they're very much mini 767s, and I have at least one 11 hour sector in the 767. I wouldn't be surprised if it had equally long legs. It was a great aircraft, that was intended to replace the 737. Such a pity that didn't come to pass.
Did FOs and Captains also need to have the same (restricted?) FE license and associated FE knowledge? Or would it be possible for a Captain to get a promotion from say a 737 without FE station to a 747 classic with FE station and not have any formal training on how to do the FE's job on that aircraft?
QF MEL-DPS pre-CoVID was the same flight crew up and back on a 737.
In the time frame of the 747 Classics, it wouldn't have been possible for someone to get a 747 command in QF without having been on it previously. In any event, all of the captains knew the aircraft even better than any SO, so their knowledge wasn't an issue.
The captains didn't have to keep up a current licence, but that doesn't mean that they didn't understand every switch and knob on the panel. The way issues were managed on the classic basically had the captain turning around so that he could monitor whatever the engineer was doing, and the SO would keep an eye on the FO. Worked well. And they kept a really good eye on the SOs when they were on the panel.
There are some somewhat crazy legacy flight rules that exist on the 737. These are left overs from the '89 dispute, when CASA let the companies impose a wish list of flight time and duty rules, with no regard to the safety implications. They've been very lucky not to have had that bite them too hard since.
That's what they said that they were doing - seemed a bit odd to me. I did see a note in the galley on the way up saying "Tech crew resting 1930-2100 - do not disturb"
From back in 2004 - interesting reading. A bunch of contributing factors including fatigue...
www.atsb.gov.au
I find it sad that a company in which safety was once the prime motivator, has fallen into this trap. It's really the frog in boiling water scenario. You get away with it, until you don't. Tired pilots make very silly mistakes. This incident was 20 years ago, but unless things have improved dramatically since I left (and I'm sure that's not the direction its gone), it's basically quicksand, waiting for someone who can't get themselves out. The business side of the company will simply say that that's they way everyone else works so they have to go the same way to compete. It's somewhat like Boeing, who used to make the best products, until the business side shoved the engineering side, aside.
The comparison with Boeing is sadly very true. BP also used to be a shining example of a company that put engineering before profits etc, but that all started to change in the early 2000's, and then the BP Texas City disaster - which is now the textbook example of what happens when organisational culture in high consequence industries gets pushed aside by the cultural direction coming from the very top. Then Deepwater Horizon followed just a few years later...
I was a 747 Classic FO when it happened. Thankfully (though forgotten by the public now) Qantas were not involved in it at all. Attempts by various parties, on both sides of the dispute, tried to drag us into it, but there was no reason for us to have any involvement at all. At the time, the relationship between QF management and the pilots was quite decent. The story has changed over the years, and it's fair to say that the union was ill advised, but it was much more a lock out (Joyce style) than a strike. One side had even come to a negotiated settlement, and the airline reneged on it. Australia was extremely lucky not to have a major accident in that period. I recall seeing some quite amazing events from the various people who were brought in from overseas. One that comes to mind was the 737 that took off from Melbourne 27, going to Sydney. We were lined up, and waiting on 16. And we waited. And waited. And eventually asked what was going on. The reply was that the 737 hadn't contacted anyone, and instead of turning right at about 5 miles was still heading 270 after about 25 miles. I don't know how that resolved itself....presumably they eventually worked out which way to Sydney.
I know a few people who took that route. One retired to Penang. Effectively the availability of these people kick started a number of Middle East airlines, and of course they're now slowly killing off much of the competition.
www.9news.com.au
It helps if you follow the correct line. The nose in guidance system only starts working from 30m out. As for the ground crew…no comment.
No camera. But the same aerobridge can accommodate multiple aircraft types. For instance, when VA had the A330 parked on the end of T2 it used bay 44 lead in lines. The 737 uses bay 44A lead in lines.
