Ask The Pilot

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Yep, it's not as if you can throw the burning objects out the window, eh?
Having a disposal system built into the aircraft could become necessary! Open the inner door - place offending article (or passenger) into chute - close inner door - open remotely controlled outer door - shut outer door - someone else's problem now!
 
started it because anything to do with these batteries is relevant to flying.
A timely reminder given the new restrictions on powerbanks some airlines are introducing on the weekend.

 
With the near miss at MDW yesterday, I was just wondering at that point in the landing sequence, would it generally be more the pilot monitoring looking ahead more broadly as it would be pretty close to where the pilot flying would be flaring and touching down?
 
It sounds like a sensible captain in the DFW situation could have just said "I disagree, but I'm happy to take the more cautious option that you have suggested".
All the paperwork you could possibly need was carried on the aircraft. You just need to stop, pull the books out, and prove it one way or the other. Sadly some people aren't even prepared to be proven right, or wrong.
With the near miss at MDW yesterday, I was just wondering at that point in the landing sequence, would it generally be more the pilot monitoring looking ahead more broadly as it would be pretty close to where the pilot flying would be flaring and touching down?
In visual condtions, you're both looking ahead much of the time. The flare actually involves looking at the far end of the runway, so someone crossing should be pretty obvious. People who look close in, tend to underflare, and drive into the ground. That's a real issue in reduced visibility.
 
What is the trick in reduced visibility to prevent underflare? Look to an invisible point that you imagine or just use instruments?
Be aware of it, and look out as far as you can. Or, preferably, do an auto land.

You can’t flare on the instruments, though it may be possible with a HUD.
 
With the Cyclone being close to the airport in Brisbane in the next few days and assuming the airport remains open. I was wondering what new or enhanced risks a cyclone brings and what controls you would enhance when landing and taking off to mitigate the risks?

I am not sure of the details with qf 1 in 1999 in Bangkok but I think aquaplaning was an issue.
How would you avoid similar issues in Brisbane?
 
With the Cyclone being close to the airport in Brisbane in the next few days and assuming the airport remains open. I was wondering what new or enhanced risks a cyclone brings and what controls you would enhance when landing and taking off to mitigate the risks?
Whilst the cyclone may be unusual for Brisbane, the crews flying there would see bad weather in all sorts of places, so it's possibly less unusual for them. Operations within the limits, with no attempts to extend them, should see things happen safely, though perhaps not expeditiously.
I am not sure of the details with qf 1 in 1999 in Bangkok but I think aquaplaning was an issue.
Whilst aquaplaning ultimately became part of the problem, it really started going wrong before they even left Sydney. It was a classic case of management (in this case pilot management) not listening to the line pilots. You just know you're being scammed when you hear the words "resistant to change".

Basically they had a couple of ideas, all based on reducing costs, but which came with some negative aviation connotations. Firstly, reducing reverse thrust use back to idle only, was based on reducing wear within the engines. Use of flap 25 was supposedly based on flap track wear. Both of these would mean more energy had to be dissipated by the brakes, but the newish (then) carbon brakes supposedly wore better if actually used a bit harder. With F25 the aircraft was also a bit less stable on approach than it was with F30. None of this was really an issue on a nice day to a long runway, but sadly it was being pushed (quite forcefully) as being useful in all cases. There was quite a bit of push back from many of the Captains, who were, of course, resistant to change.

Reverse thrust, generally, does very little. It's more a case of getting rid of residual forward thrust than it is of producing real negative thrust. But, they didn't even consider its blast effect on wet runways, which tended to get the water out of the way of the tyres, so that they could sit down and not aquaplane. F25, gave a faster approach speed, and aquaplaning is affected by speed. The faster, the more likely. And the biggest issue of all was that this was being pushed via the training department as the 'standard' way of doing things. It was a classic failure of management.

Many years later, it had a rebirth, with idle reverse and reduced flap being their preferred option, but this time they were smart enough not to push too hard. I started with the assumption that I wouldn't use it, but may have relented on the day if the conditions suited me.
How would you avoid similar issues in Brisbane?
Don't go there....
 
Whilst the cyclone may be unusual for Brisbane, the crews flying there would see bad weather in all sorts of places, so it's possibly less unusual for them. Operations within the limits, with no attempts to extend them, should see things happen safely, though perhaps not expeditiously.

Whilst aquaplaning ultimately became part of the problem, it really started going wrong before they even left Sydney. It was a classic case of management (in this case pilot management) not listening to the line pilots. You just know you're being scammed when you hear the words "resistant to change".
I take it that the management pilots are experienced? If so, why did they push this?

And am I correct in guessing that after the BKK mishap that said pilots had the Teflon Effect applied to them?

And what about the guys on the day (or night)? How did they fare out of this?
 
I take it that the management pilots are experienced? If so, why did they push this?
There is a theory to the effect that anyone who is actually any good at aviation, avoids any office job like the plague. And them might be experienced, but they lose touch with the day to day.
And am I correct in guessing that after the BKK mishap that said pilots had the Teflon Effect applied to them?
Of course.
And what about the guys on the day (or night)? How did they fare out of this?
I don't know the details. They all continued flying, and the Captain actually flew OJH on its final trip to the desert.
 
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