legroom
Established Member
- Joined
- Nov 2, 2012
- Posts
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Why would a systems require a PIN for an upgrade to be valid and as I noted earlier (clause 16.1.12), if you change your PIN, your upgrade requests have to be re-logged ?
I'm sure my banks do not require my PINs to deduct fees & charges whenever they are due.
Asking for PIN is unwise (nobody else does that); so is the linking of upgrade requests to the PINs.
Maybe this time QF would wise up and modernise its IT security for a change.
Maybe it is not hurting them on the bottom line yet (too few frauds ??), but it certainly does not appear to be "world best".
Most, if not all, my bank accounts will email me on the OLD address whenever I change to a new address. So, that is technically feasible already.
Further, they would insist on a SMS code before you could modify your contact details including changing the mobile phone for that SMS. In other words, you would have to be notifed.
I'm sure my banks do not require my PINs to deduct fees & charges whenever they are due.
Asking for PIN is unwise (nobody else does that); so is the linking of upgrade requests to the PINs.
Maybe this time QF would wise up and modernise its IT security for a change.
Maybe it is not hurting them on the bottom line yet (too few frauds ??), but it certainly does not appear to be "world best".
......To be perfectly honest, when you look at many FF programmes around the world, relative account security is quite poor. I'm not saying this is ideal, and a tighter system of security would be good. I'd also like QF to have some system during any customer service interaction that would not require one to give their PIN (e.g. lodging an upgrade over the phone).
Most, if not all, my bank accounts will email me on the OLD address whenever I change to a new address. So, that is technically feasible already.
Further, they would insist on a SMS code before you could modify your contact details including changing the mobile phone for that SMS. In other words, you would have to be notifed.
That would not be effective if the thief changed the email address, burned the points, then changed it back.
They could also possibly hack into the target email account, remove the notification email, and no one is the wiser.
That would leave an e-trail of sorts (if Qantas logs all such changes and emails sent), which may be useful except possibly in the second case which would be much more difficult for Qantas to check.
Such a measure would have hardly helped the OP in this case, as she had checked her account that same afternoon. Not much different to getting an email (possibly delayed delivery) and then notifying closer to the time, except possibly the proximity of her notification to the event may have prompted Qantas to take much more imperative action.
That said, the idea is not without merit at the very least it may just start a trail.