Midair collision between Helicopter and CRJ (AA5342) at Washington (DCA)

[Quickstatus]

(Assuming you meant visual separation not clearance

Thank you - edited.

What is the procedure for verifying (by ATC or by the pilots) that what they are seeing is what they are supposed to be seeing

If pilots can see a taxiway as a runway, i can imagine they can see something other than what they are supposed to see.
....

it’s a control zone under their control, not a pilot wish zone

Unless ATC wants the pilots to request visual separation at DCA?
What is the benefit to the pilot to request a visual separation and what is the benefit to the ATC to approve same?
Has DCA ATC ever refused "visual separation"?.

 

[markis10]

Thank you - edited.

What is the procedure for verifying (by ATC or by the pilots) that what they are seeing is what they are supposed to be seeing

If pilots can see a taxiway as a runway, i can imagine they can see something other than what they are supposed to see.
....



Unless ATC wants the pilots to request visual separation at DCA?
What is the benefit to the pilot to request a visual separation and what is the benefit to the ATC to approve same?
Has DCA ATC ever refused "visual separation"?.

Visual separation helps with traffic flow put simply. At Bankstown which at times has been the busiest tower in the southern hemisphere it’s generally all visual, otherwise we would not get 1600 movements a day. Inbound traffic was given details of other inbound traffic but not details of departing or training circuit traffic. I would normally give an expected sequence number ie IEU, traffic is a MU2 reported at prospect before you joining downwind, expect to be no2 to that aircraft, report sighting.

 

[moa999]

Another NTSB update.
Seems the Blackhawk may not have been receiving all ATC Comms, including that the CRJ was circling to 33.
And that there were issues with the instruments in the helo.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/Feb.14.2025_Briefing_Mid-air_Collision%20near%20DCA.pdf

 

[OATEK]

Another NTSB update.
Seems the Blackhawk may not have been receiving all ATC Comms, including that the CRJ was circling to 33.
And that there were issues with the instruments in the helo.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/Feb.14.2025_Briefing_Mid-air_Collision%20near%20DCA.pdf

Yes, discussed here as well. Also speculation that CRJ saw or were aware of the Blackhawk in the last few seconds and pulled the nose up.

 

[Quickstatus]

2 seconds before collision :
CRJ Last recorded RA 313 feet, 9 deg pitch up, 11deg left bank. Descending at 448ft/min

1 Second before collision
CRJ pitched up 9deg with elevators at max deflection

At the time of collision:
BH RA 278 feet stable for previous 5 seconds
Pitch 0.5deg nose up, left roll 1.6deg

BH primary altimeters are barometric altimeters whose data are not recorded in the FDR. Barometric pressure adjustment is also not recorded by the FDR
The pressure altitude data in the FDR is corrupted/bad so unable to be used to derive the barometric altitude.
GPS data including altitude is not recorded .

BH can transmit ADS-B out but it was not transmitting

BH CVR does not include ATC message to "pass behind CRJ " - apparently the transmission was stepped on

Please advise if incorrect

 

[p--and--t]

'Bad data' possibly used by Black Hawk crew before Washington DC crash

Preliminary analysis of voice recordings and other black box data recovered from the crash site showed the helicopter pilot and her instructor read aloud conflicting altitudes before the collision.

www.abc.net.au

 

[jb747]

2 seconds before collision :
CRJ Last recorded RA 313 feet, 9 deg pitch up, 11deg left bank. Descending at 448ft/min

1 Second before collision
CRJ pitched up 9deg with elevators at max deflection

This needs context. What is the normal “on speed” pitch angle for the CRJ? Whilst 9º sounds like a lot, I’ve flown aircraft that used 12º on approach. The elevators at full deflection tells a story, but you’re not going to get much of a pitch rate at approach speed. The sink rate is somewhat less than a normal approach (call it 700 fpm).

BH primary altimeters are barometric altimeters whose data are not recorded in the FDR. Barometric pressure adjustment is also not recorded by the FDR
The pressure altitude data in the FDR is corrupted/bad so unable to be used to derive the barometric altitude.
GPS data including altitude is not recorded .

In large part, actual instrument readouts are irrelevant, as they were supposed to be “visual”.

 

[Quickstatus]

In large part, actual instrument readouts are irrelevant, as they were supposed to be “visual”

Sure, but with all actors apparently accepting an extremely narrow margin of minimum separation and at night...

 

[elanshin]

Very insightful video here

Edit: listened the whole way through, lots of insight into the situation regarding NVG, visibility in general, routes, comms and the personnel flying that night.

 

[RSD]

Very insightful video here

Edit: listened the whole way through, lots of insight into the situation regarding NVG, visibility in general, routes, comms and the personnel flying that night.

Many many thanks for posting that - it gives far more insight than pretty much everything else out there put together!

The really telling thing is at 49:30 - the guy being interviewed says "100% that could have been me - I don't think putting me in that situation changes anything".

 

[OATEK]

Many many thanks for posting that - it gives far more insight than pretty much everything else out there put together!

The really telling thing is at 49:30 - the guy being interviewed says "100% that could have been me - I don't think putting me in that situation changes anything".

The only negative that stood out for me was the determination of the copter pilots to request visual separation. And the big take-out safety wise was ATC not holding them short as the ex-army pilot sais happened many times to him.

 

[elanshin]

The only negative that stood out for me was the determination of the copter pilots to request visual separation. And the big take-out safety wise was ATC not holding them short as the ex-army pilot sais happened many times to him.

I think its hard to categorise the visual separation as "negative" if it had been the standard procedure for decades.

You could make a case that the procedures and protocols themselves were at fault, but its harder to say the problem is the pilots requesting visual separation if that is "routine".

The whole HAINS point hold was interesting as well as the possibility of the lack of general feedback - in that he never knew what the hold was for at the time, but in hindsight now deduced it was for 33 landings. Or the RA/TA that were triggered and if ATC ever passed that information on.

 

[RSD]

I think its hard to categorise the visual separation as "negative" if it had been the standard procedure for decades.

You could make a case that the procedures and protocols themselves were at fault, but its harder to say the problem is the pilots requesting visual separation if that is "routine".

The whole HAINS point hold was interesting as well as the possibility of the lack of general feedback - in that he never knew what the hold was for at the time, but in hindsight now deduced it was for 33 landings. Or the RA/TA that were triggered and if ATC ever passed that information on.

Indeed - and it was probably in the procedures that pilots could request visual separation - if so not really the pilots fault for requesting what they are allowed to request.

It very much sounds like due to the different radio channels, lack of underlying information being given, and other reasons have led to nobody really having the big picture of the whole "mess" that it had become.

 

[elanshin]

Indeed - and it was probably in the procedures that pilots could request visual separation - if so not really the pilots fault for requesting what they are allowed to request.

It very much sounds like due to the different radio channels, lack of underlying information being given, and other reasons have led to nobody really having the big picture of the whole "mess" that it had become.

Also the person in the interview if i understood correctly is about as senior as it got in the division for the flying crew and was an instructor. So if he didn't know many of these things then no-one did.

 

[OATEK]

I still see the request for visual separation as a negative - not trying to blame, but more in the "we always do that" when the army flyer said the crew was so safety conscious. A small part of a bigger problem, but that is my view.

I get it that the whole tragedy was set in motion by the comms issues, and seeming failure to ensure the copter understood they were crossing the path of the CRJ. I am sure this will all come out in the wash.

 

[justinbrett]

I just think it's backwards - while it sounds better to have a "no solicitation rule" for vis sep, in practice the rules in place here work better - both aircraft gets traffic, if one confirms sighting, they can be told to maintain sep with the other aircraft (which they can reject), and the other aircraft gets told vis sep is assigned to the other pilot.

ATC is in a better position to see when vis sep is appropriate or not, and not every traffic call is going to lead to a vis sep instructions.

But there's a lot of things wrong with FAA rules, this is just one.