no more pre-flight inspections on the 737-800

[cmon0005]

I personally believe they are putting a lot of trust into their sensors, which they themselves can and do fail from time to time.

I guess the thing is, that most other airlines do it this way with no problem, (including J* and DJ)...

I just wish for their own sake that the engineers stopped shooting themselves in the foot all the time and do what m'ment/manufacturer/safety regulator says and save the remaining jobs that are left, also above all to make sure the airline survives in a sustainable form going forward thus ensuring they all still have a job into the future.

 

[bigjobs]

I dont think AS261 isd a fair analogy - the issue causing the demise of AS261 would not have been picked up on an "in service" maintenance check. The elevator screw on MD80s arent checked routinely prior to every flight....

QF are not proposing to stop maintenance altogether....

no, the jackscrew was merely the 'broken component' ... the 'eureka part'. you don't honestly thing that AS261 fell from the sky because of that jackscrew alone, on that day ...

you're right, QF are not proposing to stop maintenance altogether and that's not what I stated. this is an incremental change, with additive effects in a wildly complex, tightly coupled, dynamic, imperfect and constrained system.

 

[reductionist]

Yet flying is 62 times safer than driving.

I think the point was that, when it happens, engine failure in your car may be less life threatening than engine failure on an aircraft.

 

[drewbles]

have a read of the AS261 disaster for an example of how this is a 'safety' issue, and I don't mean what happened on the day. you've got to go back years to see the changes that the regulators, airlines, government and other players made for a variety of reasons. This is a classic example of incremental change in a complex system that has an additive effect over time leading towards collapse of the system at some point in time.

Not really relevant here though. AS261 was a problem with scheduled maintenance intervals, not walk-arounds between flights. Jackscrews on MD-80/717 birds have a certain schedule for being checked for lubrication, and ultimately, being replaced.

The Jackscrew on these a/c are also one of the few parts that are not redundant. This was a failure of maintenance procedure during down-time, not a 5 minute pilot or engineer check (You can't see the jackscrew without a hoist and tools).

no, the jackscrew was merely the 'broken component' ... the 'eureka part'. you don't honestly thing that AS261 fell from the sky because of that jackscrew alone, on that day ...

you're right, QF are not proposing to stop maintenance altogether and that's not what I stated. this is an incremental change, with additive effects in a wildly complex, tightly coupled, dynamic, imperfect and constrained system.

Whilst crashes are a series of events, this crash was 100% attributed to failure of the jack-screw. The lug nut that held the jack screw in place helped keep the plane in the air, however, it was doomed the second the jackscrew was threaded. They had no control over the rear control surfaces, and they had no realistic way to descend. A poor safety culture and poor maintenance were the events that lead up to this. This single component failure did result in the loss of all on board (there was nothing they could do once it failed).

 

[Alanslegal]

Routine inspections pick up faults. Plain and simple. At $.07 extra per ticket, I'd even pay a levy.

So would most of us.

All that needs to happen is for one single passenger per flight to pay the 7c for an inspection..think about it...

But what happens if I do not want to pay that $0.07 ? In the scheme of things, its nothing .... but if I feel super comfortable knowing that planes are inspected by the manufacturer's books and the process is approved by CASA ... then why should I need to pay more? Its the principle, not the cost at times.

 

[mannej]

no, the jackscrew was merely the 'broken component' ... the 'eureka part'. you don't honestly thing that AS261 fell from the sky because of that jackscrew alone, on that day ...

you're right, QF are not proposing to stop maintenance altogether and that's not what I stated. this is an incremental change, with additive effects in a wildly complex, tightly coupled, dynamic, imperfect and constrained system.

Can you tell me how a pre-flight walk around would have averted a crash, considering that the parts in question were not visible from the outside of the plane. You would also throw Air Midwest 5481 into that bucket.

Same for the engine failure quote - would a pre-flight walk around stop it from occurring?

My opinion is reserved on this one.

 

[docjames]

no, the jackscrew was merely the 'broken component' ... the 'eureka part'. you don't honestly thing that AS261 fell from the sky because of that jackscrew alone, on that day ...

you're right, QF are not proposing to stop maintenance altogether and that's not what I stated. this is an incremental change, with additive effects in a wildly complex, tightly coupled, dynamic, imperfect and constrained system.

Not really relevant here though. AS261 was a problem with scheduled maintenance intervals, not walk-arounds between flights. Jackscrews on MD-80/717 birds have a certain schedule for being checked for lubrication, and ultimately, being replaced.

The Jackscrew on these a/c are also one of the few parts that are not redundant. This was a failure of maintenance procedure during down-time, not a 5 minute pilot or engineer check (You can't see the jackscrew without a hoist and tools).



Whilst crashes are a series of events, this crash was 100% attributed to failure of the jack-screw. The lug nut that held the jack screw in place helped keep the plane in the air, however, it was doomed the second the jackscrew was threaded. They had no control over the rear control surfaces, and they had no realistic way to descend. A poor safety culture and poor maintenance were the events that lead up to this. This single component failure did result in the loss of all on board (there was nothing they could do once it failed).

+1 --> what drewbles said.

The discussion and the engineers are focussing on pre-flight walk around inspection. Not systemic maintenance which caused the failure of the MD80's jack-screw.

AS261 isnt relevant to this discussion.

If it is, I presume that means you dont fly DJ/JQ/multiple other airlines??

 

[bigjobs]

Can you tell me how a pre-flight walk around would have averted a crash, considering that the parts in question were not visible from the outside of the plane. You would also throw Air Midwest 5481 into that bucket.

Same for the engine failure quote - would a pre-flight walk around stop it from occurring?

My opinion is reserved on this one.

Where have I suggested a pre flight walk around would pick that up or prevented that crash? What I have suggested is that this decision is part of a wider complex and dynamic system. the decision will have additive affects that we cannot comprehend. this is an example of incremental change that leads ultimately to outcomes (pleasant or unpleasant) that we can not foresee. I neither support or disapprove of the decisions of QF or the union. I don't care either way. What I am suggesting is that this is an example of incremental change in a system (organisation QF) that is beset my many competing priorities - not the least of which is commercial at the moment.

At the time of the AS crash the manufacturer had no reports of fatigue problems in 95 million flight hours across some 2300 planes.

in the 60's Douglas recommend that jackscrew assemblies be lubricated every 300 to 350 flight hours. for a whole variety of justifiable reasons (to those who made them at the time) at the time of AS261 the interval for jackscrew lubrication and inspection had moved to 2550 hours. This change did not occur in one leap, it occurred incrementally and was driven my many factors (economic requirements of AS to keep aircraft flying, the regulator, deregulation of industry, manufacturer changing list items for inspections - even eliminations of B checks ... 96 saw AS remove the jackscrew assembly from their A list items and put it on a 'task card' specifying lubrication every 8 months ... (8 mths = 2550 flying hours) ... this list goes on)

the jackscrew is merely the 'broken component' ... another discussion we can have is how we search for these broken components and then say that's what made the plane fall from the sky. this is simply not true. there have been incremental, small, gradual changes all of which have additive effects. There is simply no way that either QF or the union can say with certainty that these checks need to be done by this person or that person to ensure the safe operation of the aircraft.

all I am saying is that this is part of a gradual shift and movement that is driven by multiple goals.

 

[bigjobs]

+1 --> what drewbles said.

The discussion and the engineers are focussing on pre-flight walk around inspection. Not systemic maintenance which caused the failure of the MD80's jack-screw.

AS261 isnt relevant to this discussion.

If it is, I presume that means you dont fly DJ/JQ/multiple other airlines??

re read what I have posted ... of course I fly those other airlines.

 

[harvyk]

I guess the thing is, that most other airlines do it this way with no problem, (including J* and DJ)...

I just wish for their own sake that the engineers stopped shooting themselves in the foot all the time and do what m'ment/manufacturer/safety regulator says and save the remaining jobs that are left, also above all to make sure the airline survives in a sustainable form going forward thus ensuring they all still have a job into the future.

True, then again QF does have an enviable safety record (in terms of fatal crashes), and has been around a lot longer than both DJ and JQ combined.

 

[bigjobs]

Not really relevant here though. AS261 was a problem with scheduled maintenance intervals, not walk-arounds between flights. Jackscrews on MD-80/717 birds have a certain schedule for being checked for lubrication, and ultimately, being replaced.

The Jackscrew on these a/c are also one of the few parts that are not redundant. This was a failure of maintenance procedure during down-time, not a 5 minute pilot or engineer check (You can't see the jackscrew without a hoist and tools).



Whilst crashes are a series of events, this crash was 100% attributed to failure of the jack-screw. The lug nut that held the jack screw in place helped keep the plane in the air, however, it was doomed the second the jackscrew was threaded. They had no control over the rear control surfaces, and they had no realistic way to descend. A poor safety culture and poor maintenance were the events that lead up to this. This single component failure did result in the loss of all on board (there was nothing they could do once it failed).

it was 100% the jackscrew because that's how we investigate accidents ... we look for the broken part.

 

[drewbles]

it was 100% the jackscrew because that's how we investigate accidents ... we look for the broken part.

How does failure on behalf of an airline to implement a manufacturers recommendation translate to an airline having a crash from failure to do a pre-flight walk-around?

What i'm getting at is AS261 is not relevant to your original argument. You're perfectly welcome to your opinion on the company negating to do pre-flight inspections, but AS261 is not at all associated with this argument.

 

[mannej]

it was 100% the jackscrew because that's how we investigate accidents ... we look for the broken part.

Again, what is the relevance in relation to this topic?

The part in question is not visible during a pre-flight walk around is it?

 

[moa999]

As described above I suspect the 7c pax/ $14 per flight is a load of hogwash.....

Even at say $100 grand (including on costs, and I suspect it is a lot more).
Working 5 days, 8 hr shifts at roughly $500/day means you need to inspect 35 aircraft each day in 8 hours....

white.. big... tail... engines... looks ok.

 

[bigjobs]

Again, what is the relevance in relation to this topic?

The part in question is not visible during a pre-flight walk around is it?

its got nothing to do with the jackscrew or its visibility.

my point is about the gradual change, the incremental shift and the additive effects. this small change in practice will have ramifications that are unknown, additive effects that cannot be foreseen. while we argue about who should do what inspection and when, there is a much wider implication in relation to overall safe operations and their continuance.

stop talking about the jackscrew, that has nothing to do with my point. my point is the gradual shift and change in practice, regime, inspections and defence against unwanted outcomes driven by the multiple goals of the organisation.

 

[moa999]

If its a safety issue, the unions should be approaching CASA and gettting this done mandotarily on all Australian airlines, even those international ones not flying into Australia

If not proven as a safety issue, then why should Qantas be burdened with additional costs that its competitors aren't...Its the additive effect of all of these small issues that has helped drive QFi to the ground, and ultimately will also impact QFd

 

[docjames]

my point is about the gradual change, the incremental shift and the additive effects. this small change in practice will have ramifications that are unknown, additive effects that cannot be foreseen. while we argue about who should do what inspection and when, there is a much wider implication in relation to overall safe operations and their continuance.

.

I think your point is better made without reference to the AS accident.

I think someone else may have posted earlier in the thread - unless we know what (safety-related) issues are currently (were previously) being picked up by engineers, and missed by pilots, I dont think there's enough data to suggest the new process is inferior. Nor is there data to suggest it's not inferior. That sort of info would be closely guarded within QF - but my suspicion is that if it supported the union stance, they'd have gone with "engineers picked up x number of pre-flight issues" rather than the nebulous $0.07 arguement.

 

[bigjobs]

If its a safety issue, the unions should be approaching CASA and gettting this done mandotarily on all Australian airlines, even those international ones not flying into Australia

If not proven as a safety issue, then why should Qantas be burdened with additional costs that its competitors aren't...Its the additive effect of all of these small issues that has helped drive QFi to the ground, and ultimately will also impact QFd

it only becomes a safety issue if an unwanted outcome occurs ...

I think your observation about the additive effects of these imposts is accurate. These just add to the complex nature of the system.

 

[bigjobs]

I think your point is better made without reference to the AS accident.

I think someone else may have posted earlier in the thread - unless we know what (safety-related) issues are currently (were previously) being picked up by engineers, and missed by pilots, I dont think there's enough data to suggest the new process is inferior. Nor is there data to suggest it's not inferior. That sort of info would be closely guarded within QF - but my suspicion is that if it supported the union stance, they'd have gone with "engineers picked up x number of pre-flight issues" rather than the nebulous $0.07 arguement.

if they state 'engineers picked up X number of pre flight issues' everyone would be jumping up and down about how unsafe the airline is I reckon. What we all want to think and believe is that QF is a safe airline and reliable ... of course the reality is that every plane flies with faults and defects

 

[harvyk]

if they state 'engineers picked up X number of pre flight issues' everyone would be jumping up and down about how unsafe the airline is I reckon. What we all want to think and believe is that QF is a safe airline and reliable ... of course the reality is that every plane flies with faults and defects

Obviously simply stating 'engineers picked up X number of pre flight issues' would not be the way to go, as you're right, ppl (esp unions) will see that in a negative light and proof that jobs need to be brought back to AU...

Whilst you have ppl like us who love to know the technical aspects as well as the raw numbers when it comes to aviation, the general public do not care, and if an airline was to release something along the lines of "we did not fly x number of flights based on safety reasons" the general public (esp the nervous fliers) are likely to think that ever 1 safety issue is indicative of a problem with an airline (esp when certain news co's go on the warpath against that airline)