Sydney to Macau $99(+160) each way.

[fortymilliondaggers]

Still a bargain.

 

[straitman]

No, there was not a 767-100

I thought the 5 AN 767-200s with the 3-crew flightdeck were the only ones built that way. I believe the first 31 767-200s Boeing were to build were originally to be built as 3-crew flight deck, but Boeing offered the purchasers to convert them to the 2-crew config at a slight increase in cost and about a 1 month deliver delay. It is my understanding that all other customers except Ansett accepted Boeing's offer to change them to 2-crew config and Ansett was the only airline that took delivery of the 3-crew config. The other customers who had theirs converted included United, AA, TWA, Delta, Air Canada, and China Airlines.

Ansett did eventually change their fove 3-crew aircraft to the standard 2-crew config.

Apparently their 767-200 Simulator was able to be converted between 2 and 3 crew config even for a long time after they converted the aircraft.

NM,

We were both correct in a round about way. See below for what I was attempting to explain in an abbreviated form:

Three-Crew to Two-Crew Conversion.

Boeing had been applying pressure to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for several years to be allowed to build wide-bodied aircraft with two person rather than three person coughpits. The FAA agreed with Boeings request in July 1981 just one month prior to the first roll out and twelve months prior to anticipated first delivery. This required Boeing management to make a critical methodology decision well into the production phase. As the change had been anticipated, preliminary studies had already been completed with regard of a two-person coughpit. It was quickly established that production was effected on the first thirty airplanes as they had all been built or partially built with a three-crew coughpit. Airplanes number thirty-one and subsequent would not be affected and could be built with a two person coughpit. A special task force was convened to look at available options. Once again Boeing utilized its well-structured management techniques with engineers quickly narrowing the options down to two workable alternatives. Modify the airplanes on the production line or build them as per the original design configuration and modify them after rollout. Each proposal had significant merit and also considerable disadvantages.
Boeing immediately notified customers of the availability of the change, the cost increases and the expected delays, with only one airline electing to accept the aircraft in its original configuration.
The task force concluded that to modify the airplanes on the line had the advantages of using a traditional modification system. Parts that needed modification could be easily recognized and that part of the installation halted. This procedure also had the advantage that parts were only installed once and so reduced the possibility of loss of design security. This procedure was used regularly, though on a much smaller scale, throughout the normal process of building an airplane.
To continue building airplanes to completion and then modify them had the advantage of continuity of ideas, and of the project over all. The major drawback was the delay of the first thirty aircraft although this would occur using either process. Attacking the problem using this method would not cause disruption to the production line and consequently not impact on the projected learning curves.
The decision was made to complete a postproduction modification program. This involved running an entirely separate project, with its own scheduling requirements and its own learning curves. This method proved to be successful with all of the affected aircraft being completed within one month of schedule.
Over the next few years 767 production continued successfully although at a much slower rate than foreseen by Boeing. Market forces including the rapid expansion of Airbus Industries and the internal US market moving from direct connection flights to the hub system necessitated the slowdown.

References.


Kerzner, Harold. 2001. Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and Controlling 7th Ed, New York, John Wiley & Sons Publishing. pp526 – 47

Boeing Site (online) (cited 5th May 2002) Available from < redirect (Reference no longer valid)