A few points.
1. Who is flying the aircraft.... Any abnormal landing will always be carried out by the Captain. Prior to that though, it is up to them how they manage the flying. If the aircraft is proving difficult to control, then that is likely to be the priority over checklists, and it's likely to be the Captain flying. But, if the aircraft's behaviour is relatively benign, then it makes sense to let the FO fly, the the Captain can run the checklists. There is no set rule, and it will vary day to day. The FOs can be considered to be voice activated autopilots, and they allow the Captain to get his head around whatever has happened, come up with a plan, and to talk directly to those involved.
2. QF30 was managed that way for a couple of reasons. At the time the bottle let go, Bernie was first to grab the controls (his sector anyway!). That let me concentrate on what the displays were saying. A few seconds later when it became evident that we needed to go down, there was no reason to take it off him, plus part of my flight displays had failed. Any changes I wanted made, I just instructed him to do. I took over after I had completed as much of the checklist as possible, because I wanted him to check what I'd done, and also to attempt to load some FMC data for the diversion, as my computer wouldn't accept anything. The fact that he had more hours on the 747-400 is irrelevant...and doesn't count my FO hours on the aircraft anyway.
2. ......and who is on the radio. In normal operations, the pilot not flying does all of the radio, and the PF does anything that affects the flight path. But, in an emergency, when checklists have to be done, it's quite normal for the radio to be taken over by the PF. That means that the checklists aren't interrupted...the PNF can totally tune the radio out. That is standard Airbus procedure, but common sense anyway. In this instance, I think the Captain has been doing the flying, whilst the FO did everything else.
3. Cameras. Some more cameras would be nice, but I don't think they're 'game changers' either. If anything, I'd like to be able to see the leading edge of the wing. Mostly cameras would be good for seeing what the loaders are up to, when on the ground.
4. You can't feel a hull breach!
5. It's very hard to say how quickly the cabin climbed, but it may not have been quite as rapidly as you'd expect. The hole isn't that large, it was partially blocked, and at least one pack was pumping air into the cabin as quickly as it could. The upshot of that is that the crew most likely got bang, roll, fire warning in quick succession. But, the cabin warning may not have appeared for a minute or so later. It doesn't sound to me as if she is wearing a mask in the first few radio calls, nor is the profile as rapid as you'd expect if being driven by a depressurisation. So, the turn/descent may have been driven initially by the engine failure/fire, and need to get down for Philly.
6. Information about the window and passenger would not have been immediately available. Not a great deal you could do other than limit the speed.
7. Handling multiple emergencies is a complex game, and there aren't any rules. You try to deal with whatever you consider to be the most important first. You may not even get to some of them. Try not to make it worse. In this instance she has obviously decided to get on to the ground without any delay. I think that was originally driven by the fire, but later probably by the damage and injuries. All I'm seeing is an excellent execution of a really difficult event.