Just finished reading QF32 and was wondering with all the degradations in the electric systems on the A380 on that flight, how different would of the situation been on the B747 ?
I assume apart from because its not FBW aircraft your controls would of just been heavier ? Would a pilot face less time running through checklists on the systems to work out what was or wasnt working ?
I just got the picture a lot of time was spent by the FO running through checklists of multiple errors more so then trying to get a picture of the damage to the system.
Matt (FO) was a pretty busy boy. I think it's fair to say that Airbus never envisaged a need to do that many checklists, and the system had trouble with some parts of it. In particular, there was a level of 'circular' checklisting going on. One item would tell you to do something, and the very next would either cancel that, or tell you the opposite. I know him quite well, and he's very professional, and very experienced. I can't begin to imagine just how overwhelmed a 'cadet' FO would be in the same circumstances (and yes, I know 'cadets' aren't in A380s, but many airlines have them in the smaller members of the family, and they could be every bit as demanding). Some/many checklist items would ultimately have to be either cancelled, or ignored. It's worth noting that at the start of the Boeing checklists, it specifically says that the checklists are for the management of single failures, and that complex or compounding emergencies may require mixing checklists, or even simply falling back to system knowledge, and making it up as you go.
It is very difficult to say how a 747 would have handled the same level of insult. The engines are FADEC, so it's not impossible that the same sort of mode degradation would have happened (though there's only one mode reversion, not two). Manual manipulation of the thrust levers is easier in the 747 (in part because it is done all the time). I don't think the 747 would have been so restrictive with regard to the fuel dump, though if the wing was electrically dead, it would still have been problematic. Loss of the single hydraulic system associated with #2 would have barely mattered (and it isn't associated with the landing gear at all). I don't think the 747 braking would have been affected at all. Leading edge devices would not have been available, but trailing edge should have been unaffected. There would have been a minor level of degradation of all flight controls, but it may not have even been noticeable.
Control laws wouldn't have changed ('cos the 747 doesn't have them). Control loading would be the same as usual, though perhaps with a little more input required for any given result. As the loads vary from aircraft to aircraft anyway, I'd expect the variation to fall within that minor load difference anyway.
I know that RdC is big fan of the Airbus, but I'm not convinced that an identical event on a 747 would have been as hard to handle. I don't think anyone will volunteer to test that for you though.