Diverting the thread a little - back to the Asiana crash at SFO a while back.
There have been new pictures released by the NTSB and new video of the incident as well.
NTSB Releases New Photos, Video Of Asiana Airlines Crash: SFist
There is also a report saying that the captain was "stressed" prior to the landing for various reasons.
Pilot of Asiana 214 stressed by San Francisco approach
What is worrying for me is the old "Asian cultural norm" of someone not being able to speak their concerns because of loss of face. It seems this had a bearing on the incident in SFO.
I know you can't comment, JB, on other airlines' training procedures of course, however aviation articles I've read in recent years suggest that this is a problem that all the major Asian airlines have addressed, and if someone believes there's a problem then they should "speak up" regardless of seniority / rank etc. I would have thought a "premium" carrier such as OZ would have addressed these issues too. I guess even if they have, sometimes that ingrained culture of a person will take over regardless of how much they've had something drummed into them in training.
Another interesting article.
Asiana crash pilots knew speed was low, hesitated | Reuters
Speaking up can be a problem in any society. It comes up with overbearing people, when juniors may be afraid to speak up, and it can also be seen in scenarios in which there is a very large experience gradient in the coughpit. Some countries seem to have much more of an issue with it that others. In Australia, we almost have the opposite, with the "tall poppy" syndrome seemingly making it easy for people to make themselves heard. Even so, it's been a training subject for at least two decades, and many command trainees have failed because of the way they interact with their coughpit crew.
I find it very hard to believe that the training captain did not take over. He was, of course, the real captain, and ultimately responsible. His student was well and truly out of his depth, and it should all have been given away at about 500' (at which point the aircraft was in about the right position and speed, but at IDLE). At that point it no longer filled any version of 'stable' and the approach was beyond saving.
However, I am wondering what this part means: "Two other Asiana pilots told investigators that the trainee pilot had been in class with them in April, and they warned him that if the autothrottle went to "hold," it wouldn't automatically re-engage in a descent."
And why would other trainees be the source of this info? Sounds like 'we told him, he knew...not our fault'. It does come out of hold by itself in most cases.
What exactly is the auto-throttle? Is it the same as the (in this case) 2 throttles that control each engine, and what does it mean if it goes into HOLD mode? How does this thing work in layman's terms?
The auto throttle automatically controls the engine thrust levers. It has many modes. At take off it will command the preset power setting (and then automatically go into 'hold'). After take off, it will come out of hold, and select climb thrust when commanded. In the cruise it maintains a set mach number. On descent, (there are a number of modes), but normally it will initially go to idle, and may later on directly control speed. It's normal for many mode changes to occur during a flight. Hold can be forced by simply moving the levers and then holding them at any position....the auto thrust will recognise that you're doing something and go to hold mode (in which case it is awake, but not moving the levers).
The Airbus system is similar, but it does not have a thrust lever servo, so the levers are not moved in concert with the auto thrust demands. I consider this a very poor system, as it further disengages the pilots from the system.
The trainee was totally overloaded, and I doubt that he even heard the comments about speed. Amazing, the admission about being stressed by a visual approach....
"Premium" carrier...nothing to do with it.
There are many facets to this accident.
In part, US ATC has some blame to bear. They have a very nasty habit of placing aircraft in high energy situations for their own (ATC's) convenience.
The trainee had just come from the A320. When stressed people will often revert to previous types. This is something that the instructors have to be aware of and react to. On the Airbus, if you turn off the flight director (there is only one switch, so it turns it off for both pilots), the auto thrust will immediately revert to 'speed' mode. This seems to be what the trainee expected. Additionally, he was used to thrust levers that don't move, so having the levers sitting in one position wouldn't have felt strange to him...whereas they're always gently moving in a Boeing when engaged in 'speed' and on approach. Also, because the Boeing levers are moved as a matter of course, you become used to the positions that they are in, and can quite accurately place the power without looking at the gauges. Idle should have just felt wrong....