Another update from me after these
previous posts… last week I finished a multi-crew cooperation course and an airline qualification course (aka jet orientation course). It was one week in the classroom, followed by nine 4 hour details in a fixed base 737-300 sim. These were split with a training partner, 2 hours as pilot-flying, 2 as pilot monitoring. Also worth noting that there would be no RNAV (GPS) use - all the navigation would be VOR and NDB tracking and vertical profile management would be either hand flown or LVL CHG; no VNAV allowed...
Up to this point, my training had all been single pilot operation culminating with the IR test in an unpressurised twin-engine piston driven aircraft (the
Diamond DA42) with a cruise speed of about 140KTAS, so an operating ceiling (without oxygen) of 10,000ft. I was now transitioning to a multi-crew jet capable of cruising 4 times faster and 4 times higher, as well as being about 25 times heavier, with inertia and momentum etc that we’d never really had to consider before.
Week one in the the classroom, and was split between technical and non-tech. We started with a rundown on the ‘profiles’ we would be flying; (precision and non-precision approaches, single engine approaches, twin and single engine go-arounds, engine failures after V
1, rapid decompressions & emergency descents… the list goes on!) followed by revision of the SOPs, memory items, etc etc.
Then three days all about CRM and flight deck management… we looked at the roles of pilot-flying and pilot-monitoring, situational awareness, capacity, stress, decision making models, human error, the 'swiss cheese model’, communication and more.. Lots of focus on the coughpit authority gradient… it will and should always exist to a degree, but with low-hour pilots it is often exaggerated. We also looked at a few incidents where CRM played a part in the outcome. The Asiana SFO crash was talked about, as was QF32.
Into the sim for week two, and the first 5 details were using the automation; autopilot and auto thrust. We looked at the different AP/AT modes, the differences between a jet and what we had been flying, experimented with the inherent momentum and inertia, experienced the pitch-power couples (as JB has alluded to in the past there is a huge pitch up moment when you spool up the engines, which can get away from you - it doesn’t take long to get to the stick shaker and stall if you’re not careful). Then we started introducing failures (minor and major), and how to identify them and how to deal with them in the two-crew environment. The week finished with a line-orientated flight training (LOFT) exercise from Manchester to Stansted and return.
Week two was broadly similar, but we were hand flying. Automation was only to be used in the cruise and when setting up for the approach. As PF, capacity is dramatically reduced when hand flying, as the focus is on flying accurately & smoothly, energy management, getting it trimmed etc etc as opposed to using the automation and monitoring it. In turn, the PM’s workload goes up - it was a challenging week. Hand flying a single engine procedural ILS approach to minimums followed by a go-around and diversion in a heavy jet that is so much more reluctant to accelerate/slow down/turn than I was used to was not much fun! Realistically, it would be a pretty bad day at the office if that scenario came up for real, but we need to consider the unexpected, and they wanted to test our capacity…which they really did!
The week finished with a LOFT exercise from Prestwick to Manchester. Reasonably straightforward SID and brief cruise at FL170, followed by a STAR and hold into MAN. The ILS was under maintenance which meant a VOR-DME approach, but the weather was allegedly above minima so in we went. Of course, the runway lights were nowhere to be seen at minimum, so we carried out a missed approach & go-around, and got reports of further deteriorating cloud base and visibility. We discussed fuel, how long we could hold for and where we could/should go if needed... the weather at Leeds was great, but lo & behold, the airport was closed due to a bomb scare (the scenarios these instructors come up with!?!) but Liverpool was OK. Quick fast forward to closer to the decision time and off to Liverpool it was... just as I was briefing the "cabin crew” - also played by the instructor - about the diversion we had a low engine oil pressure followed by failure which lead to a shut down. Run the memory items, call for the checklist, re-brief the approach for single engine ops, adjust the approach speeds for flaps 15, check the increased landing distance against available RW length, review and agree on the decision to divert, and then vectors to Liverpool and in on the ILS, single-engine.
Finally, when I thought it was all over, just for sh!ts and giggles, a hand-flown take off to 4000ft with engine failure just after V
1….
Fun times overall, with good exposure for what is hopefully to come... job interviews and type ratings are up next, hopefully in the next few months...