Ask The Pilot

[lastrow]

Is there any indication on the control panel showing the position of each control stick in an airbus? Can one stick override the other? Does the auto pilot disconnect on movement of the control stick?

 

[jb747]

Is there any indication on the control panel showing the position of each control stick in an airbus?

Yes, but it's not there all of the time. It was one of those displays that you simply took no notice of, and it disappeared from your vision. I'd have to look up the parameters for its display (which I can't do at the moment).

Can one stick override the other?

Either stick can override. If you both put a motion in, the result would be additive. If you both put a motion in, in the same direction, it would add them together, whilst opposite directions would cancel out. You'd also get a 'dual input' warning. You aren't supposed to do that though...if you wanted to take over from the other pilot, you'd push the override switch on top of the joystick, and it would give you control. If it was held down (for long enough), it would lock the other joystick out entirely. This was there to allow for the situation of a faulty sensor on a joystick. You could get it back if you really needed to.

Does the auto pilot disconnect on movement of the control stick?

Yes, the autopilot immediately disconnects, but again, you're supposed to push the disconnect switch instead of just overriding it. The autopilot is not the FBW though. The FBW built in protections are active unless there is a system failure (or you force the reversion, by failing something).

 

[jb747]

Boeing sells an option package that includes an extra AoA vane, and an AoA disagree light, which lets pilots know that this problem was happening. Both 737MAXes that crashed were delivered without this option. No 737MAX with this option has ever crashed.

I read that as being totally separate options. The extra AoA vane is a third one. I don't know that it necessarily means better redundancy. I'd need to know how it was integrated into the overall system.

An AoA disagree light...all well and good, but unless the AoA is automatically doing something you don't want, then so what. If the stall warning goes off, and you know the conditions aren't correct for a stall, then straight up you know that there's something amiss with the AoA system. Spurious AoA can set off all sorts of warnings (stick shaker, stall calls, etc), so it will just disappear into the other noises.

Display of AoA is also an option. Useless to most people, almost all of the time. It is of use with unreliable airspeed, and you can accurately fly an approach using AoA, but you need to have been taught how, and it needs to be practiced. Unlikely.

Is even the MAX still using lights? Have they not caught up with EICAS yet?

The sequence should be...
1. AoA vane disagreement detected.
2. All automated responses to AoA frozen.
3. Master Caution (which is probably the red light)
4. AoA DISAGREE on EICAS.
5. Carry out whatever the procedure is.

 

[AviatorInsight]

Is even the MAX still using lights? Have they not caught up with EICAS yet?

Haha you're funny JB! The MAX is still using the old system of Master Caution/Warning lights on the dash in front of the pilots. The AoA/IAS/ALT disagree lights are actually shown on the bottom left corner of the PFD. No associated MC/MW indication.

So no EICAS yet...but I'm hoping the next next gen 737 will have a full EICAS and integrated checklist, and we can finally get rid of the paper QRH!

 

[I love to travel]

Is it my imagination or does some type of alarm sound in the coughpit about 5 seconds from landing on a 737? Heard quite a loud sound from 1A this morning and am sure it's not the first time. Thanks

 

[jb747]

Most likely alarm on any type in the later stage of an approach would be autopilot/autothrust disconnect. On all of the types I’ve flown, a quick double press of the disconnect will get them to drop out without the warnings, but occasionally you’ll hear it momentarily.

 

[AviatorInsight]

Except the 737. No matter how quickly you press the autopilot disconnect, it’ll always give you the aural warning twice. The autothrottle has no aural disconnect alarm.

 

[Flashback]

Most likely alarm on any type in the later stage of an approach would be autopilot/autothrust disconnect. On all of the types I’ve flown, a quick double press of the disconnect will get them to drop out without the warnings, but occasionally you’ll hear it momentarily.

I always hear it when about to land on BA shorthaul flights (Airbus). Sort of like 3 beeps, I think!

 

[jb747]

I always hear it when about to land on BA shorthaul flights (Airbus). Sort of like 3 beeps, I think!

That’s not a coughpit alarm. There is a note in the cabin associated with a change in some of the lighting (exit), but it wasn’t in the pilot’s manuals, and I never took much notice. I think it’s coincident with gear extension and retraction.

 

[Flashback]

That’s not a coughpit alarm. There is a note in the cabin associated with a change in some of the lighting (exit), but it wasn’t in the pilot’s manuals, and I never took much notice. I think it’s coincident with gear extension and retraction.

Sounds about right, it's normally just before touch down as the plane is wobbling left and right about to hit the runway

 

[OZDUCK]

There is an article on BBC about a BA (Operated by another company but sold as BA.) flight that landed in Edinburgh when all the passengers thought they were going to Dusseldorf. BA flight lands in Edinburgh by mistake

It seems that the pilots had been given a 'flight plan' to Edinburgh instead of Dusseldorf and the cabin crew were also expecting to be arriving in Edinburgh. The flight No. was apparently that of the normal Dusseldorf flight. This would be a very unusual happening - I trust? It seems a lot of Swiss cheese holes lined up to let this happen.

Do pilots take notice of flight numbers they are scheduled to fly and know what destination they normally cover or turn up and follow what fly plan they are given? Also I wonder what the gate announcements/signs listed as the destination.

 

[AviatorInsight]

Do pilots take notice of flight numbers they are scheduled to fly and know what destination they normally cover or turn up and follow what fly plan they are given? Also I wonder what the gate announcements/signs listed as the destination.

With anywhere between 60-70 sectors a month it can get quite disorientating. So...we have procedures in place to make sure we are headed in the right direction. Before each duty I'll print out a briefing report with all that day's flying. I'll keep marking off sector by sector. Next once we receive the flight plan, I check that it matches up with the briefing report. There has been on occasion a different flight plan delivered to the aircraft and on checking with operations, turns out we had an aircraft swap!

Finally, the last piece of the check is what goes in the FMC. The PF will usually load the FMC and the PM will silently check it. Then we'll come together and go through the FMC routing marking it off with the flight plan.

 

[Hercules_rockefeller]

The sequence should be...
1. AoA vane disagreement detected.
2. All automated responses to AoA frozen.
3. Master Caution (which is probably the red light)
4. AoA DISAGREE on EICAS.
5. Carry out whatever the procedure is.

Thank you very much for this post (and all the others everyone else has contributed to the discussion as well) - this is exactly why I made a point of checking out this thread after reading about the whole issue in the mainstream media. A lot of articles made it sound like Boeing was being cheap by charging extra for the AOA disagree display (one article even compared it to video game DLC!). I have to confess I was feeling a bit critical of Boeing for charging extra for them. But having read your explanation, it's suddenly obvious that the indicator would only help the pilots realize what the problem is; it wouldn't do anything to solve the problem. And I think it's worth noting the reports that the LionAir pilots were trying to disable MCAS prior to the crash. If that's true (I'll take the reports with a grain of salt until the official investigations are complete), the AOA disagree and AOA indicators wouldn't have told them anything they didn't already know

 

[jb747]

There is an article on BBC about a BA (Operated by another company but sold as BA.) flight that landed in Edinburgh when all the passengers thought they were going to Dusseldorf. BA flight lands in Edinburgh by mistake

It seems that the pilots had been given a 'flight plan' to Edinburgh instead of Dusseldorf and the cabin crew were also expecting to be arriving in Edinburgh. The flight No. was apparently that of the normal Dusseldorf flight. This would be a very unusual happening - I trust? It seems a lot of Swiss cheese holes lined up to let this happen.

Do pilots take notice of flight numbers they are scheduled to fly and know what destination they normally cover or turn up and follow what fly plan they are given? Also I wonder what the gate announcements/signs listed as the destination.

Those pesky passengers, getting on the wrong plane....

We once had a Captain who occasionally welcomed passengers on board, with the expected weather, and routing, etc...but to somewhere they weren’t going.

 

[jb747]

Thank you very much for this post (and all the others everyone else has contributed to the discussion as well) - this is exactly why I made a point of checking out this thread after reading about the whole issue in the mainstream media. A lot of articles made it sound like Boeing was being cheap by charging extra for the AOA disagree display (one article even compared it to video game DLC!). I have to confess I was feeling a bit critical of Boeing for charging extra for them. But having read your explanation, it's suddenly obvious that the indicator would only help the pilots realize what the problem is; it wouldn't do anything to solve the problem. And I think it's worth noting the reports that the LionAir pilots were trying to disable MCAS prior to the crash. If that's true (I'll take the reports with a grain of salt until the official investigations are complete), the AOA disagree and AOA indicators wouldn't have told them anything they didn't already know

Boeing were being cheap, in a number of ways. Mostly in trying to keep a 1950s design in production. Hopefully the MAX debacle will push them into a real 737 replacement....it’s long overdue.

Whilst most commentators have said that they should have recognised the failure as a runaway trim, and that the procedures for that would have solved the problem, MCAS doesn’t really present itself in quite the same way. I wonder if they realised that, and so went looking for the correct procedure...the one that Boeing did not diseminate.

One further step I’d be taking, if I were a regulator, is to consider the MAX and it’s ilk to be separate aircraft (from the older 737s) and not allow pilots to fly across the 737 variants.

 

[Jacques Vert]

Those pesky passengers, getting on the wrong plane....

We once had a Captain who occasionally welcomed passengers on board, with the expected weather, and routing, etc...but to somewhere they weren’t going.

I'm pretty sure I flew with him once; or someone with a similar sense of humour

 

[woodborer]

Whilst most commentators have said that they should have recognised the failure as a runaway trim, and that the procedures for that would have solved the problem, MCAS doesn’t really present itself in quite the same way. I wonder if they realised that, and so went looking for the correct procedure...the one that Boeing did not diseminate.

An interesting point to ponder on. If they had put 100 pilots in a simulator, before they knew there was an MCAS, and simulated what happened to Lion (even though the simulators didn't exist, but anyway...), how many would have saved the day, and how many would not have.

 

[Major]

There are going to be some changes to MCY next year.

Sunshine Coast Airport Airspace Changes Runway 13/31 | Airservices

When these, or any other changes occur, how are you notified ? Do you receive a NOTAM or does it just turn up in your flight planning for loading into the FMC ?

Have you been surprised by any past changes to flight paths ?

 

[jb747]

There are going to be some changes to MCY next year.

Sunshine Coast Airport Airspace Changes Runway 13/31 | Airservices

When these, or any other changes occur, how are you notified ? Do you receive a NOTAM or does it just turn up in your flight planning for loading into the FMC ?

There are packages of NOTAMs associated with all flights. They are mostly utterly useless, and exist solely as a means of passing the buck (the crew were informed!). Readability is not high on the list.

New approaches STARs and SIDs will appear in the Jeppesen (and the Australian pubs). The FMCs will also be updated with information from Jeppesen. Pilots don't load that. These things are very standardised, and it only takes a couple of minutes to work your way through a new one.

Have you been surprised by any past changes to flight paths ?

Only when politicians are involved.

 

[OZDUCK]

An interesting point to ponder on. If they had put 100 pilots in a simulator, before they knew there was an MCAS, and simulated what happened to Lion (even though the simulators didn't exist, but anyway...), how many would have saved the day, and how many would not have.

There is an interesting article in today's New York Times about pretty much that. The claim is that they found that they had 40 seconds to diagnose and correct the problem. And - "The software, as originally designed and explained, left little room for error. Those involved in the testing hadn’t fully understood just how powerful the system was until they flew the plane on a 737 Max simulator, according to the two people."


In Test of Boeing Jet, Pilots Had 40 Seconds to Fix Error