Ask The Pilot

[QF WP]

@jb747, I see former Qantas Chief Pilot Peter Wilson has been appointed as the ATSB’s new Aviation Commissioner. What are your thoughts - a good appointment? Would you want such a role?

Veteran Qantas pilot and aviation executive takes key ATSB role

Peter Wilson, who began working for the Flying Kangaroo as a pilot in 1985, has around 17,500 professional flight hours and has held numerous executive positions, including COO and interim CEO of Tigerair and COO of Qantas.

australianaviation.com.au

 

[jb747]

@jb747, I see former Qantas Chief Pilot Peter Wilson has been appointed as the ATSB’s new Aviation Commissioner. What are your thoughts - a good appointment? Would you want such a role?

Peter actually flew with me a couple of times as my FO! Dates me I guess. I have a lot of time for him, and wish him well; he’s a decent person.

Would I want such a role? Not a chance. Being surrounded by MBAs in their suits would have to be one of the rings of hell. I don’t know if it applies to the ATSB, but CASA apparently has a very toxic environment. NIH reigns.

 

[jb747]

In the latest Mentor Pilot crash investigation video (

) it seems one of the main triggers to the ongoing mistakes they made was the first officer saying the wrong engine had failed. In the video it is said the pilots knew each other well and the captain considered the first officer very reliable and not prone to errors.

My question is: During SIM training, how much training is done where the co-pilot purposely makes errors (such as wrong calls like this), and if so, how much of this is subtle single mistakes like this (which seems quite probable in a high-stress situation like this) rather than just a really uncooperative co-pilot that clearly needs CRM to sort out?

I haven’t caught up with this video yet. I’ll get there.

There were occasional exercises, generally around command training, where an intentional error was injected. But, I’ve never met anyone who is capable of doing the sims without error, so they’ll be random, and self injecting anyway. You really don’t need to add them. I can think of a couple of sims where we had to dig ourselves out of holes we’d dug. It was a place where you learnt the first rule of Italian driving. Whatever is behind you, doesn’t matter. You’ve made a mistake, just fix it and move on.

I may have to change my comments after watching the video, but…

Nobody should ever call which engine has failed. Just “engine failure” or ”engine problem” is more than enough to start with. There is no rush to get to checklists, in most cases. Those very few that do, come with bright red lights, within engine fuel control switches.

If someone said to me “engine #1 has failed”, I’d have to think about which engine is #1. I would not need that information to correctly fly the aircraft. You simply correct the roll/yaw. You do not need to know which engine to do that.

As you run the checklist/EICAS/ECAM, basically one pilot will call what he sees on the gauges, and what that means. The other will then look them over, and give the final judgement. No switch that isn’t easily reversible will be moved without confirmation.

 

[jb747]

Watched it now. I can’t imagine why they never pushed up both thrust levers. I’d use an engine that was on fire if I needed the power.

I don’t agree with the dead foot (leg) theory. That can very easily lead in the wrong direction. You need to properly analyse the engine display…and all of the parameters, not just one or two. We also trimmed the rudder out, and kept it in trim until on finals.

 

[flyer89]

It was a place where you learnt the first rule of Italian driving. Whatever is behind you, doesn’t matter. You’ve made a mistake, just fix it and move on.

It’s very easy when starting out to fall into the trap of being bothered by mistakes that are inconsequential and that no one else would notice to spiral very quickly into making much bigger, real mistakes because you are stewing on something so stupid. It can very quickly ruin a flight.

 

[Quickstatus]

Whatever is behind you, doesn’t matter. You’ve made a mistake, just fix it and move on.

Often seen in the medical high fidelity sims. Some people get so fixated on what they have done they lose the big picture. I think it's because they can't reset the existing mental model.

 

[jb747]

You might remember this one...777 out of Hawaii. This is what happens when you forget to fly the aircraft.

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/NTSB_United_777_Altitude_Final_Report.pdf

Some people get so fixated on what they have done they lose the big picture.

I once had a student at 1FTS, who had far too good a memory. Nice bloke. Always really well prepared. Smart. But, he could never recover from a mistake. It almost didn't matter what it was, there was something in him that wouldn't let it go. So, his trips were either perfect, or perfect until that mistake, then horrible. The RAAF tried hard to sort him out, but it wasn't to be.

 

[Quickstatus]

The RAAF tried hard to sort him out, but it wasn't to be.

People have varying ability to change mental models. One of the important skills in life is to be able to Unlearn. You had to unlearn Boeing to learn Airbus.

"We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them" (Einstein)

 

[jb747]

People have varying ability to change mental models. One of the important skills in life is to be able to Unlearn. You had to unlearn Boeing to learn Airbus.

"We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking we used when we created them" (Einstein)

Sort of. It's still an alloy tube, and you have control over the direction and power. It was just another cassette...

As for my poor student. The RAAF had a psychologist on staff at 1FTS. He was good value, and helped many people over humps in the training. I thought this student would be no different. But, I was wrong. His flying was really excellent until that first error...and then it was terrible. I remember him to this day, because I'd never seen such a contrast, nor have I since.

 

[Quickstatus]

psychologist

That's way ahead of the performance optimisation strategies employed by the medical profession. It's only recently the we have started to explore human factors and non technical performance. Being able to memorise past #10 only gets you so far

Only in the last year or two have we started to embrace the use of checklists (ie it's OK to ask for the checklist) and team briefing

 

[jb747]

That's way ahead of the performance optimisation strategies employed by the medical profession. It's only recently the we have started to explore human factors and non technical performance. Being able to memorise past #10 only gets you so far.

I was surprised that medicine was so far behind aviation in the use of checklists. We 100% memorise very few non normals these days, though our level of familiarity with most of them would be about 80-90% memorised. Nevertheless, they are not performed from memory, but are read out, step by step. Items like my favourite, depressurisation, require instant action, but even then only the first few items are done from memory. Slowing down, is invariably faster in the end.

Only in the last year or two have we started to embrace the use of checklists (ie it's OK to ask for the checklist) and team briefing.

Whilst aviation is at the point that someone who does not use a checklist is considered totally unprofessional.

 

[Quickstatus]

Whilst aviation is at the point that someone who does not use a checklist is considered totally unprofessional.

It's been a learning curve for all of us who got our license way back when.

One of QF 767/330/787 Captains Sean G is on the faculty of one of the major Medical Sims installations in Sydney. He got recruited during the Covid wilderness. I had him for some of my sims. You might know him.

We also don't do enough sims - just one module per year but all modules in 3 years.

 

[Quickstatus]

Slowing down, is invariably faster in the end.

That's one of the big lessons.
2 ways of solving a problem - fast and slow

Fast or "frequency gambling" = pattern recognition, instinctive, rapid does not require cognitive bandwidth But prone to error and vias.

Slow or "system thinking" = slow, logical, systematic, but requires cognitive bandwidth.

Both have a place but for a lot of us it was Fast - because it is easier and requires very little cognitive bandwidth but very prone to error. Stop and think is very difficult for some people.

 

[jb747]

One of QF 767/330/787 Captains Sean G is on the faculty of one of the major Medical Sims installations in Sydney. He got recruited during the Covid wilderness. I had him for some of my sims. You might know him.

Yes, I know him. He flew with me on the 767 when he was a new FO. He was a good choice for our training world, but I didn't know he'd branched out.

We also don't do enough sims - just one module per year but all modules in 3 years.

I counted all of mine when I retired. Averaged 8 per year.

That's one of the big lessons.
2 ways of solving a problem - fast and slow

Fast or "frequency gambling" = pattern recognition, instinctive, rapid does not require cognitive bandwidth But prone to error and vias.

Slow or "system thinking" = slow, logical, systematic, but requires cognitive bandwidth.

Both have a place but for a lot of us it was Fast - because it is easier and requires very little cognitive bandwidth but very prone to error. Stop and think is very difficult for some people.

Thinking about it, flying probably has two simultaneous streams. One, the actual flying, requires constant, and pretty much instant, reaction. The other, managing the systems/problems, should generally be slower, and hopefully checklist driven. The flying side does override the other side though...for instance if I need more power to avoid a crash, but the checklist says shut the engine down...the flying side should win (the AF Concorde is an example where this should have happened). Interestingly though, there are untold examples of cases where people get over-involved in the checklist side, and forget to do the flying. That always ends badly.

 

[Quickstatus]

I didn't know he'd branched out

Its a side gig

He is still involved with sunrise if I recall and also still does left seat for the 787

 

[mjt57]

there are untold examples of cases where people get over-involved in the checklist side, and forget to do the flying. That always ends badly.

Is that the Aviate, Navigate, Communicate thing?

When reading RdC's book on QF32 that appears to what they did up front. The captain flying the aircraft with the rest monitoring, reacting and trying to find solutions to the problems.

Dunno how you folks can handle that sort of pressure.

 

[flyer89]

Whilst aviation is at the point that someone who does not use a checklist is considered totally unprofessional.

I remember being scalded during training for not using the shutdown checklist (I had memorised it in my opinion). My instructor reminded me that “there are blokes that have been flying 767s for 30 years and they use a checklist”. I was in a Piper Warrior but his point was taken.

 

[jb747]

Is that the Aviate, Navigate, Communicate thing?

That's really all about priorities.

When reading RdC's book on QF32 that appears to what they did up front. The captain flying the aircraft with the rest monitoring, reacting and trying to find solutions to the problems.

There's an argument for letting the FO fly the aircaft, at least part of the time, so that you can get a handle on that. It is always an interesting balancing act.

Dunno how you folks can handle that sort of pressure.

Well, my theory is that we're all a bit slow, and don't realise we're under pressure.

 

[Saab34]

AV, are you noticing pilot pathways to say , your job, reducing in the current environment, compared to back in your early career?

I noted someone on my Facebook I went to school with, spent only 5 years in GA, and just got a job with Virgin. I seem to recall it was a 7-10 year pathway to that bigger jet job years ago.

 

[AviatorInsight]

AV, are you noticing pilot pathways to say , your job, reducing in the current environment, compared to back in your early career?

I noted someone on my Facebook I went to school with, spent only 5 years in GA, and just got a job with Virgin. I seem to recall it was a 7-10 year pathway to that bigger jet job years ago.

Big time. People are entering the company with as little as 500hrs from what I’ve heard.

I’ve even heard of guys and gals not even turning up for the interview and getting a better job elsewhere (mainly the US).

There are a few retirements coming up and people still leaving the airline for greener pastures.

The training requirements are getting projected so far in advance at the moment, I’d say if you’ve got a pulse then you’re pretty much guaranteed a job at the moment.