Ask The Pilot

[AviatorInsight]

@AviatorInsight , Hobart airport is having its runway strengthened, in thirds, it seems. Northern ~third (830m according to reports) being done first, so that segment is closed; I saw a bunch of vehicles and people there today. Middle segment to be done over nights, in summer.

Does this pose any particular issues, esp in poor weather? Still get away with fully laden B737s or will fuel have to be managed a bit? I guess the machinery and people have to clear off for an aircraft takeoff/landing?

Correct, the threshold of runway 12 is being done first. This will give us a displaced threshold of 829m. Because of this, the ILS is now out of action. Very similar to BNE's 01R displaced threshold. So increased minimums and visibilities have been calculated with temporary charts using GPS and also the VOR approach (if we need it).

The only weight restriction we have been given is that the planned landing weight must not exceed 64T (2.3T below our maximum landing weight). Nothing about maximum take off weight departing though.

 

[RooFlyer]

Thanks; flying VA direct to BNE on Saturday - looking forward to a sporty take-off!

 

[mjt57]

Last night I watched a video on YT about the Alaska incident. It featured the FO and a captain who was a union rep.

It was an interesting interview. What sort of stuck out though, was the presence of the union guy who said that he was an "international captain". Going by his uniform I think he flies with some other airline.
The FO went to great pains to say how wonderful Alaska Airlines was and how fantastic her captain was during and post-incident.

I'd have loved to be a fly on the wall when they were discussing this off-camera. The FO has been the only crew member willing to go on air to talk about it, too.

 

[jb747]

Last night I watched a video on YT about the Alaska incident. It featured the FO and a captain who was a union rep.

It was an interesting interview. What sort of stuck out though, was the presence of the union guy who said that he was an "international captain". Going by his uniform I think he flies with some other airline.
The FO went to great pains to say how wonderful Alaska Airlines was and how fantastic her captain was during and post-incident.

I'd have loved to be a fly on the wall when they were discussing this off-camera. The FO has been the only crew member willing to go on air to talk about it, too.

Not everyone wants to be on TV.

I was a little amused by her surprise that there was a hole in the aircraft. There pretty much has to be for there to be a bang and rapid depressurisation. The only question will be how big a hole.

 

[jb747]

This guy does a very good explanation of the recent ATR spinning crash.

 

[Quickstatus]

ATR spinning crash.

The holes in the cheese definitely lined up.

The first hole was the airline appeared to allow them to take off and fly in severe icing conditions with a MEL that prevented them from flying higher...

 

[jb747]

The holes in the cheese definitely lined up.

The first hole was the airline appeared to allow them to take off and fly in severe icing conditions with a MEL that prevented them from flying higher...

Engineers don’t know anything about icing. If the book says an MEL exists, they’ll try to apply it. It’s up to the Captain to accept, or reject, an MEL. I once rejected an icing related one in Sydney, on a very hot summer day. It might have been 30º on the ground, but it was still going to be well below zero where we were going. If they’d been 30-40 knots faster, as Magnar says they should have been, then I expect the outcome would have been different.

One other thing that some pilots seem to forget, is that once an MEL has been applied and accepted by a previous Captain, nothing says that you have to (continue that acceptance). The conditions that made him acceptable for him, may not be there for you. Engineers complain loudly when that happens, and the cheeky ones may even take it upon themselves to contact the pilot management..which always makes for an amusing phone call, as they’ll invariably leave something out of the story.

 

[Quickstatus]

If they’d been 30-40 knots faster, as Magnar says they should have been, then I expect the outcome would have been different.

Sure, if they got into severe icing, but wouldn't the better decision be to not go there in the first place especially when the MEL meant they would be in the thick of it and as Magnar suggested that severe icing is a "get out of there now type of emergency". Maybe they could have refused. Maybe there were other pressures that made them not refuse?

 

[mjt57]

Mentour Pilot has another vid out. This time it's about Qantas. Just wondering what those who worked for QF (or who still do) think of this:

 

[JohnM]

Mentour Pilot has another vid out. This time it's about Qantas. Just wondering what those who worked for QF (or who still do) think of this:

Already covered: Needed to be said….Mentour discusses the fall of QF

 

[Melburnian1]

@jb747 , today QF1 had to return to SYD due to a medical incident. It had taken off at 1524 AEST and travelled slightly to the south of Bathurst before turning back.

Given SYD-SIN is the shorter sector, would it have had to dump fuel to enable landing? How many kilograms/tonnes would be the range that it may be carrying for SYD-SIN and if applicable, how much might have been dumped?

 

[RSD]

@jb747 , today QF1 had to return to SYD due to a medical incident. It had taken off at 1524 AEST and travelled slightly to the south of Bathurst before turning back.

Given SYD-SIN is the shorter sector, would it have had to dump fuel to enable landing? How many kilograms/tonnes would be the range that it may be carrying for SYD-SIN and if applicable, how much might have been dumped?

Geez they didn't get very far!

 

[jb747]

@jb747 , today QF1 had to return to SYD due to a medical incident. It had taken off at 1524 AEST and travelled slightly to the south of Bathurst before turning back.

Given SYD-SIN is the shorter sector, would it have had to dump fuel to enable landing? How many kilograms/tonnes would be the range that it may be carrying for SYD-SIN and if applicable, how much might have been dumped?

At a guess, zero fuel weight would be around 370 tonnes. Fuel order for the sector probably around 90 tonnes, and it would have burnt around 15 by Bathurst. Return wouldn’t burn much, so you’d be left with around 70 tonnes, for a weight of about 440 tonnes. Max landing weight is nominally 391 tonnes. So, you’d have about 50 tonnes too much fuel.

But…the A380 cannot dump all of its fuel. It actually can’t dump below about 80 tonnes remaining, so even though nominally over max landing weight, it would be unable to dump any of this fuel. You’d simply land overweight.

Max landing weight isn’t the maximum weight at which you can land. You can do so in some cases right up to max take off weight (which is almost 200 tonnes over MLW). It’s simply the maximum weight at which you can do so at a nominated rate of descent, without requiring follow up checks. If the aircraft were landed smoothly at a normal rate of descent, it would be well below this figure, and no action would be required.

 

[Melburnian1]

Thank you @jb747 for such a comprehensive response.

@Stanley Lambchop posted: he's in Y on today's QF1:

Going to be disembarked. Need to re cater as some meals were already in ovens and no longer edible also need to perform checks due to landing with heavy fuel load. Delay could be a further 2-3 hours at a guess.

 

[JohnM]

Pilots, any comments on this?:

 

[jb747]

Pilots, any comments on this?:

I expect that you can draw the correct conclusions by looking at these two -

Accident Boeing 747-412 9V-SMT, Wednesday 12 March 2003

Singapore Airlines flight SQ286 taxied to runway 23L at Auckland's International Airport and was cleared for takeoff. When the captain rotated the airplane for lift-off the tail struck th...

asn.flightsafety.org

Tailstrike and runway overrun - Airbus A340-541, A6-ERG, Melbourne Airport, Victoria, on 20 March 2009 | ATSB

www.atsb.gov.au

 

[JohnM]

I expect that you can draw the correct conclusions by looking at these two -

Accident Boeing 747-412 9V-SMT, Wednesday 12 March 2003

Singapore Airlines flight SQ286 taxied to runway 23L at Auckland's International Airport and was cleared for takeoff. When the captain rotated the airplane for lift-off the tail struck th...

asn.flightsafety.org

Tailstrike and runway overrun - Airbus A340-541, A6-ERG, Melbourne Airport, Victoria, on 20 March 2009 | ATSB

www.atsb.gov.au

It appears that incorrect (manual?) data entry was the cause in each of the three cases and the error propagated undetected through the whole takeoff process.

What processes are in place to either prevent that happening or detecting that something doesn't seem quite right before the point of no return?

 

[RooFlyer]

@AviatorInsight any trips to Hobart today or planned for tomorrow? The winds around the Airport have been and will be really strong and gusty. Some flights cancelled this morning and inbound returned to originating port Not saying it’s going to be a problem, should be a lot of fun.

 

[jb747]

It appears that incorrect (manual?) data entry was the cause in each of the three cases and the error propagated undetected through the whole takeoff process.

What processes are in place to either prevent that happening or detecting that something doesn't seem quite right before the point of no return?

Well, I can only speak for QF, and they way that they do things. It's quite apparent that others do things differently.

Each pilot will work out the data separately. You get the weight from the provisional loadsheet yourself. No discussion, or leaning over the shoulder. If there are extra pilots, they will also work it out the same way, though they won't have access to the main computers, and will do it on an iPad. On the 380 there was a calculated excess runway length, which moved substantially with small changes to the inputs. All you'd look for at this time was for that number to be the same from all of calculations. The pilot flying would enter his numbers into an FMC, and then when the briefing was being conducted the other pilot would confirm that the entered numbers were the same as on his own calculations. Again any extra pilots would make sure that what was entered was the same as the brief, and also within a knot or two of their own calculations. No difference between computers was acceptable, but a small difference between computers and ipads was ok.

The numbers don't really vary all that much for long haul ops, though you did have to be careful of flap settings, as the 380 could actually decide to use any of 3 settings. In jumbo days it tended to be the same for all. But, even then the setting is entered into the FMC as part of the data, and it will object if it then doesn't see that setting actually selected.

The V numbers mentioned in the video are ridiculously different from what was required, and should have triggered a few light bulbs. There was a trainee involved, and perhaps the numbers were similar to what he was used to on a previous aircraft. The 3rd pilot really should be looking out for this, especially on a training flight.

Compounding this will be that if the wrong weight is used for the calculation, the power setting will also be incorrect.

 

[AviatorInsight]

It appears that incorrect (manual?) data entry was the cause in each of the three cases and the error propagated undetected through the whole takeoff process.

What processes are in place to either prevent that happening or detecting that something doesn't seem quite right before the point of no return?

We check the numbers at least 3 times before departure.

After comparing that we have both entered the same information on the iPad then each pilot will verify the numbers written on the take off data card to the FMC. Then again after the final load sheet has been sent to the aircraft.

After so many take offs you tend to have a good idea of the speeds that should be set for the different weights.

As a gross error check I use the take off weight - 20 to get the V2 (take off safety speed). For example, if the take off weight is 70T then the V2 should be around 150kts (give or take a couple of knots).

I appreciate that these guys may not fly as frequently but that should mean that extra vigilance should be taken when entering data.