EK521 - B777 Crash landing in DXB

[PLANT]

Black box just came online:
Captain: sh*&,F%$^,mother^%&#!
Copilot: Not me fault.

 

[N860CR]

I've only skim read the report thus far, however given the plane had touched down and was in rollout mode, the crew would have needed to push the TOGA buttons to command a thrust increase. Had they simply pushed the thrust levers forward to go around, the auto throttle would have returned them to idle.

 

[jb747]

In this aircraft does pressing the TOGA button /switch alone command a go around with Toga power?

The TO/GA switches will change the flight director/autopilot modes to go around, as well as pushing the power up. The initial power increase is only whatever is needed to give a 2,000 fpm rate of climb (though it will use as much power as it needs to try to get that). A second push of the TO/GA switches will give full power.

In the Boeings, the thrust lever position always corresponds to the commanded power. If the engines are at idle, the levers will be closed, whilst at TO/GA they'll be at full extension. So, if you have your hand on the levers, no matter what the auto thrust does, you can both feel it, and if you don't like it you can override it. The auto thrust disconnect is under your thumb. So disconnect - thumb, go around - middle finger. The switches are disabled once on the ground, to ensure that they won't give an accidental power increase during a landing.

You need to push to TO/GA switches whether the auto thrust is enabled or not, to get the flight directors to display the correct data.

So, pushing the levers up to TO/GA, whilst simultaneously pushing the switches, will put everything into the correct mode. If you don't push the switches, and there is a possibility that the auto thrust will again command idle. There is no need to take your hand off the levers (quite the opposite, it's a bad thing to do). You do not use two hands on the control yoke. If the levers start to do something you don't like, you use your thumb.

 

[jb747]

I've only skim read the report thus far, however given the plane had touched down and was in rollout mode, the crew would have needed to push the TOGA buttons to command a thrust increase. Had they simply pushed the thrust levers forward to go around, the auto throttle would have returned them to idle.

Firstly don't take your hand off the levers. And second, there's always the A/T disconnect.

It really doesn't matter what modes the automatics are in, as long as you are in a position to override them. Boeing make that pretty easy.

 

[N860CR]

Firstly don't take your hand off the levers. And second, there's always the A/T disconnect.

It really doesn't matter what modes the automatics are in, as long as you are in a position to override them. Boeing make that pretty easy.

Not defending him, just saying its a possible cause. In a busy situation errors are made and if you've previously flown a type where you just push the thrust levers up to initiate a go-around then it's possible that you'll default to doing exactly the same in anger. Obviously should have been picked up (PNF, calling modes, hand on throttles etc).

 

[jb747]

Not defending him, just saying its a possible cause. In a busy situation errors are made and if you've previously flown a type where you just push the thrust levers up to initiate a go-around then it's possible that you'll default to doing exactly the same in anger. Obviously should have been picked up (PNF, calling modes, hand on throttles etc).

He had about 5,000 hours on the type, out of a total of 7,500. I haven't seen any mention of Airbus time, but it's certainly possible. The FO certainly had AB time, as he'd been with Jetstar.

Calling modes can be a surprisingly weak check. How often is the expected called, rather than what is actually there. It's much more an Airbus thing anyway, as they've taken away the other cues. I consider the Airbus throttle design and philosophy to be poor, but interestingly, it's a bunch of Boeings in which there have been recent accidents involving the thrust levers.

 

[Quickstatus]

He had about 5,000 hours on the type, out of a total of 7,500. I haven't seen any mention of Airbus time, but it's certainly possible. The FO certainly had AB time, as he'd been with Jetstar.

Calling modes can be a surprisingly weak check. How often is the expected called, rather than what is actually there. It's much more an Airbus thing anyway, as they've taken away the other cues. I consider the Airbus throttle design and philosophy to be poor, but interestingly, it's a bunch of Boeings in which there have been recent accidents involving the thrust levers.

The prelim report indicates the commander -pilot flying when it crashes had A330/340 P2 rating, while the copilot only had B777/787 P2 rating.

 

[jb747]

The prelim report indicates the commander -pilot flying when it crashes had A330/340 P2 rating, while the copilot only had B777/787 P2 rating.

And so it does. Curious that the FO is listed with 777 & 787, as they are quite different. 757 & 767 were a double endorsement, but the coughpits were close to identical (or so I'm told).

Be interesting to know the captain's progression.

 

[Quickstatus]

And so it does. Curious that the FO is listed with 777 & 787, as they are quite different. 757 & 767 were a double endorsement, but the coughpits were close to identical (or so I'm told).

Be interesting to know the captain's progression.

Captain seemed to have spent most of his flying on B777. And maybe earlier some time on A330 when EK had them. I've heard He is an Emirati.

Here is the preliminary report:
https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublica...Report, AAIS Case AIFN-0008-2016 - A6-EMW.pdf

Pages 19-21 (last 3 pages) describe the TOGA procedure

Pressing the TOGA switch commands the TOGA - autothrust increases thrust to obtain 2000fpm climb rate and other auto functions such as pitch to maintain speed and climb. Flaps are requested by Pilot Flying and actioned by Pilot Monitoring.
There does not seem to be a requirement to manually move the Thrust levers.

PM also ensures adequate thrust and adjusts if necessary and also calls out Positive Climb, verified by PF who then commands Gear up

Second press of TOGA commands full thrust condition.
TOGA mode remains active even if landing gear contacts the ground after TOGA selected.

If the thrust levers are an accurate facsimile of the thrust condition of the engines (on a Boeing), it would move (via autothrust) during a TOGA command .
Why then did thrust levers remain at idle and only moved to full thrust condition 3 seconds before impact?
Why didnt the pilots press TOGA again?

 

[mannej]

Captain seemed to have spent most of his flying on B777. And maybe earlier some time on A330 when EK had them. I've heard He is an Emirati.

Funny it is quite easy to find the details of the FO, but not the Captain (from what I have seen).

 

[Quickstatus]

Funny it is quite easy to find the details of the FO, but not the Captain (from what I have seen).

Au Contraire:

M/E Land = multiengine Land aircraft (as opposed to water airplanes)
P2 = copilot rating non command.

 

[jb747]

Pages 19-21 (last 3 pages) describe the TOGA procedure

The title of the section....Automatic flight.

It also states...the TO/GA switches are disabled when on the ground. So, the ONLY way you're going to get a thrust increase is if you push the levers up.

And then there's the requirement to verify that the thrust has increased

 

[mannej]

Au Contraire:

M/E Land = multiengine Land aircraft (as opposed to water airplanes)
P2 = copilot rating non command.

View attachment 79235

Details as in name, so my point still stands.

 

[Quickstatus]

The title of the section....Automatic flight.

It also states...the TO/GA switches are disabled when on the ground. So, the ONLY way you're going to get a thrust increase is if you push the levers up.

And then there's the requirement to verify that the thrust has increased

Thanks for the clarification and From another part of the report - especially the last sentence:

 

[Quickstatus]

I understand airline operating procedures say GA after a long landing, but could the aircraft have stopped with Tarmac still available?. They prob had 3000m in front of them.?

On the other hand Lots of accidents happen when GA did not occur in circumstances of unstable approach and pilots hoping unstable becomes stable.

could have, should have.....hindsight always perfect

 

[jb747]

I understand airline operating procedures say GA after a long landing, but could the aircraft have stopped with Tarmac still available?. They prob had 3000m in front of them.?

Yes, of course it could have stopped.

The issue seems to be that some airlines have fairly punitive management regimes. SOPs attempt to define everything, and then punish any breaches. In so doing they may well make operations less safe than would have been the case if they left some room for individual decision making.

This may be another example...
https://www.aeroinside.com/item/727...n-mar-26th-2016-fms-decides-runways-too-short