MH 777 missing - MH370 media statement

[AVC]

So, "it is not clear how much fuel the plane was carrying"?

I thought that would be a no-brainer. Someone had to load it. Check the pilot's CC

 

[basso]

I wonder if Malaysian authorities are investigating the military radar operators who missed or failed to investigate the radar trace. If they'd been on the ball at the very least they could have confirmed if the trace was MH370 or not, assuming it is then their failure means there was plenty of time for any perpetrators to get a good head start.

From the radar operators point of view, it was a civilian airliner that seemed to be on a normal civilian air path.

 

[Robbi]

From the radar operators point of view, it was a civilian airliner that seemed to be on a normal civilian air path.

How would they know that without the transponder being on?

 

[Robbi]

So, "it is not clear how much fuel the plane was carrying"?

I thought that would be a no-brainer. Someone had to load it. Check the pilot's CC

Yes indeed. You'd think this would be part of the initial investigations.

 

[anat0l]

You can't switch them off, but there are always circuit breakers that may shut them down, or depending upon how they are wired, you may be able to get rid of one or the other by shutting down an AC bus.

Systems that cannot be shut down at all become fire risks themselves. Take all the generators off line, and it would fall back onto batteries, and no power would be wasted on anything that wasn't immediately needed to fly the aircraft.

After an incident like this, suppose that it was forced upon all aircraft manufacturers that all aircraft - both new and existing - must be fitted / refitted with a new system that would ensure that the flight data recorder, voice recorder and transponders are never able to be switched off.

Why would these systems be fire risks? Not having a go - I'm genuinely confused. Is it purely due to the electrical energy circulating around which can pose a potential fire risk (wires, generators)? To be honest - and again, I plead ignorance - I didn't think that the fire risk would be so great that they could not be kept on the whole time. Also, the power consumption of such systems was significant that it could compromise the ability of an aircraft to operate at "bare bones". What if the new scheme I assert above was designed in a way which isolated these systems so that their physical failure does not necessarily compromise the remainder of the aircraft, along with their own separate batteries which could be charged but not cut off.

Notwithstanding the engineering, logistical and financial burdens required to implement these measures, are there still good reasons why it should be possible to turn off (or suspend) the transponder and the flight recorders?

Certainly, there's a whole bunch of people around me who are absolutely dumbfounded (and partly livid) that it is actually possible to turn off or suspend the transponders and flight recorders.

 

[MEL_Traveller]

After an incident like this, suppose that it was forced upon all aircraft manufacturers that all aircraft - both new and existing - must be fitted / refitted with a new system that would ensure that the flight data recorder, voice recorder and transponders are never able to be switched off.

saw an interview last night during which they discussed the option to have the flight data/voice recorder etc transmitted directly to a server on the ground - for each and every flight. We'd never have to look for a black box again. Seems like a good idea to me.

 

[mannej]

There have been incidents/accidents before where a switched off transponder has been part of the cause (thinking the Gol midair collision), so there must be good enough reasons (fire is one of them) as to why you have the ability to turn these items off in flight.

 

[Robbi]

saw an interview last night during which they discussed the option to have the flight data/voice recorder etc transmitted directly to a server on the ground - for each and every flight. We'd never have to look for a black box again. Seems like a good idea to me.

Unless the aircraft suffers damage that destroys part of said comm's system so data is lost or someone with requisite skills blocks or disables the link as happened here. I take JB's comment on board re:fire, this system would have a reasonable power demand and therefore poses a risk of fire so an argument could be made for breakers etc.

I think the black box is with us for ever and should always be the last line of defence, but having a continuous data stream would be fabulous.

 

[JohnPhelan]

I don't think it's just coincidence that the last ping occurred at much the same time that the aircraft would have run out of fuel. It's in the Indian Ocean but will likely never be found.

 

[codash1099]

I've heard it on VA, VX, DL & SQ.

Deleted....

 

[medhead]

After an incident like this, suppose that it was forced upon all aircraft manufacturers that all aircraft - both new and existing - must be fitted / refitted with a new system that would ensure that the flight data recorder, voice recorder and transponders are never able to be switched off.

Why would these systems be fire risks? Not having a go - I'm genuinely confused. Is it purely due to the electrical energy circulating around which can pose a potential fire risk (wires, generators)? To be honest - and again, I plead ignorance - I didn't think that the fire risk would be so great that they could not be kept on the whole time. Also, the power consumption of such systems was significant that it could compromise the ability of an aircraft to operate at "bare bones". What if the new scheme I assert above was designed in a way which isolated these systems so that their physical failure does not necessarily compromise the remainder of the aircraft, along with their own separate batteries which could be charged but not cut off.

Notwithstanding the engineering, logistical and financial burdens required to implement these measures, are there still good reasons why it should be possible to turn off (or suspend) the transponder and the flight recorders?

Certainly, there's a whole bunch of people around me who are absolutely dumbfounded (and partly livid) that it is actually possible to turn off or suspend the transponders and flight recorders.

The fire risk must arise because of the electrical energy. That is why circuit breakers exist, everywhere from homes to complex machinery and industry. I would never get in an aircraft if I knew it didn't have adequate electrical safety systems.

 

[DaveB]

Everything points to someone never wanting to be found.
Why the plane backtracked but carefully ensured it flew along designated passenger routes could only be intended to obscure itself from defence tracking.
I think the pilot believed he had a better chance of going undetected in the Indian Ocean than the Pacific given the US and China. One major question for me though is why our Jindalee radar network seemingly didn't register the plane as it supposedly can pick up small single engine planes up to 3,000km away.
The plane deviated from recognised routes only after crossing back over Malaysia and leaving radar range in the opposite direction.
It is likely those involved (probably singular) never had control of the cabin. Either that or way too many passengers never bother to deactivate their mobiles these days. I think this is why the plane was taken sharply to an excessive height soon after it was reported missing and communications cut.
I also think that ultimately the person involved could not bring himself to crashing the plane and probably overdosed on something soon after setting the final course for the southern Indian Ocean.

 

[maninblack]

There have been a number of "what we know" posts in this thread. But, what is known that emanates from a reliable, credible 'official' source outside of Malaysia?

 

[OATEK]

Everything points to someone never wanting to be found.
Why the plane backtracked but carefully ensured it flew along designated passenger routes could only be intended to obscure itself from defence tracking.
I think the pilot believed he had a better chance of going undetected in the Indian Ocean than the Pacific given the US and China. One major question for me though is why our Jindalee radar network seemingly didn't register the plane as it supposedly can pick up small single engine planes up to 3,000km away.
The plane deviated from recognised routes only after crossing back over Malaysia and leaving radar range in the opposite direction.
It is likely those involved (probably singular) never had control of the cabin. Either that or way too many passengers never bother to deactivate their mobiles these days. I think this is why the plane was taken sharply to an excessive height soon after it was reported missing and communications cut.
I also think that ultimately the person involved could not bring himself to crashing the plane and probably overdosed on something soon after setting the final course for the southern Indian Ocean.

I originally thought the 777 would be found somewhere in the South China Sea, and that all the leaks about turning around and heading towards the Indian Ocean were a bit far fetched. I suppose that is because we place so much trust in the air crew each time we board a plane that we can't easily conceive that they would take such complex evading action just to crash the plane, and for hijacking to occur without any alarm being triggered seems to go against all that has been put in place since 9/11. Now I have swung around and find DaveB's argument more compelling than having landed in the 'stans. Terribly sad and largely incomprehensible for all the families involved really, and the longer the suspicion remains the more damage must be done to MH's reputation.

 

[Deleted member 29185]

The fire risk must arise because of the electrical energy. That is why circuit breakers exist, everywhere from homes to complex machinery and industry. I would never get in an aircraft if I knew it didn't have adequate electrical safety systems.

I think anat0l was referring to the amount of energy dissipation on a short possibly being less than the intrinsic level necessary to ignite surrounding flammables. I have no doubt that the energy dissipation would be high enough to ignite avgas vapour and circuit breakers protection is not for intrinsic safety. There are certainly ways to limit the amount of energy dissipation to a level lower than the ignition level of gasses and it is possible to make circuit isolation much harder than just turning off a breaker, in fact there are many breaker types that make it impossible (or very difficult) to just "switch" off but do still provide overcurrent protection. I guess the real question is........should a pilot have the ability to isolate a circuit? Presumably some people far wiser than I have decided, yes they should.

 

[medhead]

I think anat0l was referring to the amount of energy dissipation on a short possibly being less than the intrinsic level necessary to ignite surrounding flammables. I have no doubt that the energy dissipation would be high enough to ignite avgas vapour and circuit breakers protection is not for intrinsic safety. There are certainly ways to limit the amount of energy dissipation to a level lower than the ignition level of gasses and it is possible to make circuit isolation much harder than just turning off a breaker, in fact there are many breaker types that make it impossible (or very difficult) to just "switch" off but do still provide overcurrent protection. I guess the real question is........should a pilot have the ability to isolate a circuit? Presumably some people far wiser than I have decided, yes they should.

I was addressing the confusion as to why an electrical system would be a fire hazard.

 

[Deleted member 29185]

I was addressing the confusion as to why an electrical system would be a fire hazard.

True. It's just that a fire risk can be mitigated without isolating essential circuits.

 

[anat0l]

The fire risk must arise because of the electrical energy. That is why circuit breakers exist, everywhere from homes to complex machinery and industry. I would never get in an aircraft if I knew it didn't have adequate electrical safety systems.

I think anat0l was referring to the amount of energy dissipation on a short possibly being less than the intrinsic level necessary to ignite surrounding flammables. I have no doubt that the energy dissipation would be high enough to ignite avgas vapour and circuit breakers protection is not for intrinsic safety. There are certainly ways to limit the amount of energy dissipation to a level lower than the ignition level of gasses and it is possible to make circuit isolation much harder than just turning off a breaker, in fact there are many breaker types that make it impossible (or very difficult) to just "switch" off but do still provide overcurrent protection. I guess the real question is........should a pilot have the ability to isolate a circuit? Presumably some people far wiser than I have decided, yes they should.

I have a limited understanding of electrical engineering, so I don't know exactly what I was referring to. I think it may be a combination of both.

Would there be a practical method of safeguarding the system (especially if it were physically isolated) rather than having a circuit breaker in the coughpit? For example, an automated control which acts as a circuit breaker when it detects certain conditions, or a dedicated fire suppression system. Sorry if that sounds naive.

Giving the human authority (viz. the pilots) the ability to manually control the shut down of the transponder / flight recorder system is obviously advantageous or even necessary depending on the situation, versus an automated control which is only effective if the number of situations when the system should be turned off can be correctly classified in a few cases. It is certainly a lot less complex to implement it the way it is now rather than my suggestion of physically isolating the system.

 

[SFSC]

There should always be power circuit protection. A design for power supply for equipment considered essential could have the breaker located or configured such that it cannot be manually turned off and auto reclose should be considered.

Auto reclose is used extensively for high voltage circuits. The breaker is reclosed after a short time delay following a protection trip and if the fault has cleared, the breaker remains closed. If the fault is still present, the breaker is inhibited from closing again. It probably would be difficult to adapt this sort of protection to lower voltage and low current circuits but for all I know it may already have been implemented by some manufacturers.

 

[tgh]

Assuming it's somewhere in the southern ocean , will they seriously try to find it?
Who Pays ?
Seems that there could be a bit of a clash of wills.. the Chinese and everyone else will want to know and the hell with the cost….
The Malaysians who , one assumes, will foot the bill may not be so keen.

The successful search for af447 was carried out by the Woods Hole Institute.
They say 100sqkm a day with two vehicles.
The search area seems to be the problem , but they may eventually tighten that up


link here.. http://boingboing.net/2011/05/06/air-france-447-how-s.html