Midair collision between Helicopter and CRJ (AA5342) at Washington (DCA)

[oz_mark]

I can suggest looking into aviation regulatory documents, pilot training resources, or technical literature on helicopter aerodynamics and flight control.

I dare say that Straitman has been intimately familiar with all those documents, resources and literature.

 

[marki]

I dare say that Straitman has been intimately familiar with all those documents, resources and literature.

When asked, I responded by stating where I derived this information. I could have written a shorter version, And I am sure Straitmen is all over it.
Signed Mr Nobody Marki. Enjoying the Thread.

 

[justinbrett]

Apparently conflict warnings were so common, that they became normal.

That happens here too. Really no way to get around it with aircraft in the circuit area.

The tower isn’t supposed to be using the radar to separate, it’s a backup tool. Looking out the window is the primary tool.

 

[jb747]

That happens here too. Really no way to get around it with aircraft in the circuit area.

The tower isn’t supposed to be using the radar to separate, it’s a backup tool. Looking out the window is the primary tool.

Which I guess works until you don't actually have a person to look out the window (for whatever reason), and then it doesn't. The question is how much 'deviance' should be allowed to normalise.

 

[elanshin]

I wonder how much of a part having potential direction from the controller to look at for the traffic for the helicopter would have helped correctly identify the target plane visually. Like "traffic at X o'clock, CRJ circling to land at 33".

 

[justinbrett]

I wonder how much of a part having potential direction from the controller to look at for the traffic for the helicopter would have helped correctly identify the target plane visually. Like "traffic at X o'clock, CRJ circling to land at 33".

I think you’re referencing the second traffic call immediately prior to the crash.

The first traffic call was detailed - traffic just south of the Woodrow Bridge, a CRJ, is 1200 feet setting up for runway 33.

In Australia (and I assume the rest of ICAO following countries), to implement pilot separation both aircraft have to be given traffic information, and the CRJ would have been told the Blackhawk is maintaining separation with you. This appears not to be a requirement in FAA.

Absolutely the second traffic call should be been more direct, but in the controllers mind he already had him in sight so it was just an update.

 

[JohnM]

Update from Juan Browne <1h ago:

 

[moa999]

Former Washington Reagan ATC operator with some comments. Mostly that many of these procedures happen every day in Washington airspace.

In particular the R1 to R33 shift helps both pilots (less taxi) and ATC (allows them to line up departing aircraft on R1)

There is a strange comment in there about Helo Route 4, albeit corrected by others in comments. Route 4 does cross the centre line of R33 arrivals.

 

[p--and--t]

[OT] i thought I read somewhere some newer airports don't or won’t have towers. That will introduce some variation to that procedure . Added risk?

Looking out the window is the primary tool.

 

[Quickstatus]

The question is how much 'deviance' should be allowed to normalise.

Safety culture (or lack of ) basically assumes that if there are no failures, then the system must be right and is safe. Often, the bean counters then see it as a reason to cut back while citing the system's excellent safety record, ... all the while drifting into failure. When failure occurs, the pre-failure actors are long gone with their bonuses

The drifting of SOP into something other than was originally envisaged happens all the time. The problem is that the changed procedure is then normalised because it has been done many times before without a failure. Unfortunately this opens up the procedure to be further modified. It does not take long before there is a large gap between the original SOP and the current procedure. Protection against drifting/deviation is a hallmark of a safety culture but can be very hard to achieve - because no failure occurred.

Conflict alarm - space conflict between 2 aircraft.
Lets say the SOP is to separate the aircraft by giving deconflicting instructions to one or both aircraft

>>> Drifts>>>

Conflict alarm
The new procedure is to tell one aircraft to identify the other aircraft and deconflict themselves at night.

What was the original SOP for deconfliction?
Does the current deconfliction SOP differ from the original?

 

[RooFlyer]

[OT] i thought I read somewhere some newer airports don't or won’t have towers. That will introduce some variation to that procedure . Added risk?

WSI won't have a tower.

 

[justinbrett]

[OT] i thought I read somewhere some newer airports don't or won’t have towers. That will introduce some variation to that procedure . Added risk?

They will have a virtual tower with 360 degree cameras. The procedures are no different to if the controller was there in person.

 

[straitman]

But are you a helicopter pilot?

@straitman is a career helo pilot - military and civil.

Actually an RAAF and civilian fixed wing and helicopter pilot and flying instructor.