A quick poll - Nude-o-matics, for or against?

[medhead]

in fact the EPA SA has this information which more eloquently puts it than I

[h=2]Natural radiation[/h]Natural background radiation comes from two primary sources: cosmic radiation and terrestrial sources such as soil, rocks, water, air, and vegetation.
The worldwide average background dose for a human being is about 2.4 milli-sievert (mSv) per year. This exposure is mostly from cosmic radiation and natural radionuclides in the environment.
This is far greater than human-caused background radiation exposure. In 2000, this amounted to an average of about 0.005 mSv per year from historical nuclear weapons testing, nuclear power accidents and the nuclear industry operation combined. The background radiation dose is also greater than the average exposure from medical tests, which ranges from 0.04 to 1 mSv per year.
The level of natural background radiation varies depending on location, and in some areas the level is significantly higher than average. Such areas include Ramsar in Iran, Guarapari in Brazil, Kerala in India, parts of the Flinders Ranges in South Australia and Yangjiang in China. In Ramsar, a peak yearly dose of 260 mSv has been reported.

Slightly ironic that you quote the SA EPA in response to my comment. They employ some excellent people.

My issue is saying natural background radiation is 3 times the "safe level". What is the safe level? When people live in Kerala and Ramsar in such high background areas and epidemiology says the cancer incidence rates are not significantly different to the world wide average, I don't think agree that the background radiation in Glenelg is going to exceed a safe level.

Yes, I'm being somewhat pedantic.


Sent from the Throne

 

[boylero]

Had a feeling you were in the game

My experience is working around uranium processing and also with Nuclear Density Meters. Although somewhat propaganderish we were trained on safe exposure levels and it was based on qty over time. SO if the safe exposure limit was X micro siemens over 8 hours then you would be monitored for this with little red badgey things. In the training we we're told you were more at risk lying on the beach in Glenelg (exposure wise) than you were working at the Uranium Solvent Extraction plant for the same period. Hence my reference to Glenelg, it was probably a throw away line they use for the nearest beach to the local U3O8 plant

 

[juddles]

Many years ago, as a computer programmer, I happened upon Bruce Schneier's Applied Cryptography. It's a fairly dense handbook about codes and cyphers, encryption and decryption. The sort of thing only a true nerd would write. Or read. I devoured it, bought my own copy, bought his other books, subscribed to his website.

I'm no expert in security, but Bruce is, and he knows where the bodies are buried. He has a lot of fun exposing software programs that promise computer security but fall short. He shows how expensive gizmos can be bypassed. He dives into the politics of security and why some things - such as air transport - attract a lot of attention but others, such as cinemas and public transport don't.

Anyone ever gone through a detector of any sort to get on the Tube? Or visit Hoyts? And yet these are places where hundreds of vulnerable people congregate. Hell, the security lines at any big airport will have a big jet's worth of people just standing around with unscreened bags, undies that haven't been scanned, laptops that are hiding in briefcases, liquids in containers greater than 100ml...

Anyway, Schneier knows his stuff. He can be checked and he comes out solid. If anything, he is a bit more alarmist than the general security industry, which is saying something. I remember reading a book he wrote about identity theft in 2000, and that was long before it became a common phrase.

He is scathing about these full-body scanners, has been for years and has repeatedly pointed out their shortcomings and the politics behind them. You are right to be skeptical of the average journalist seeking a good headline or an "armchair expert" pontificating. But if you want to criticise Schneier with one-liners and cheap talk, it tells me that you haven't done any research.

What do I think should be done? I don't know. But I do know what shouldn't be done, and that is to fight the next war as if it were the previous one. There's no magic bullet that guarantees security and the target is always moving. What works best is intelligence, unpredictability and good risk assessment, and none of that applies to the TSA. Spending billions of dollars on machines that sometimes detect suspicious bulges in underwear is a poor spending choice.

If I were spending security money, I'd be increasing surveillance outside the security zone. Look at what people are doing when they get out of taxis, see who arrives together, see what they do before entering the security line, see what they do afterwards. Just pick up on the patterns and the exceptions.

As a night cabbie, I soon got to know what to look for. Everyone is different, but they follow similar patterns. The businessmen going to and from the airport, the late night drunks, the old ladies with their shopping and doctor's appointments. But every now and then there's someone who acts a bit out of the ordinary, and they are the ones to keep an eye on, because they can mean big trouble. The most dangerous are the ones who know the system, know where the security cameras are located, what the driver's options are, when he's likely to have a bag full of money, when he's vulnerable.

They study the system, they work out how to beat it, they practise their roles. They know the rules, but they don't play by them. They, like hijackers, are the Liars and Outliers.

First off Skyring, thank you for the detailed response. This Schneiers chap sounds interesting - will look him up.

I have a few issues with what you say, including the following:

I agree with you the general concept that the threat is forever changing, evolving. But that does not mean you should leave open the holes that have been found in the past. Someone else here described it as closing the gate after the horse has bolted. I see it as closing the gate as there are still horses in the paddock. But the key concept is that this gate-closing is only part of a wider campaign.

Yes the scanners do not prevent everything. But they may force bad people to use other more restricted avenues which can then be montiroed better. IE the scanners are just the highly visible part of a multi-layered defence. When I said that the Yanks had prevented a repeat of 9/11, I was obviously not suggesting that these scanners were the cause of that succes. Wat I am saying is that the Yanks, like the Israelis, have managed to have very few succesful attacks despite being the subject of intense hatred around the world. That says their systems ((only some of which are publiicly known) are actually very effective.

In a separate post you describe these procedures as being a pain for everyone. I work with a relatively small group of people, but we travel a hell of a lot, and none of them (nor me) has any issue with security procedures. I feel much greater annoyance at under-staffed immigration desks causing lengthy queues. We have absolutely no problem with scanners, pat downs, etc etc. I recognize that others have personal dislike of these, but many of us do not.

As for that cabbie sense of vigilance, yes, that is very valid. But it is slightly harder in an area where the average securiity staff member could spend an entire career without encountering a terrorist.

And yes, I agree with your point about the fact that there are so many other areas of public concentrations that could be targets. But air travel has always been special in the human mind. Peopel are much more alarmed by things, even though the statistics should allay those fears.

And speaking of statistics, you have mentioned a few thousand Americans being killed in Afghanistan. During the same period they lost hallf a million on their roads. But which rates the interest of everyone?

 

[simongr]

And speaking of statistics, you have mentioned a few thousand Americans being killed in Afghanistan. During the same period they lost hallf a million on their roads. But which rates the interest of everyone?

Wow 33K road deaths last year - seems a huge number - but quite a low per capita number...

 

[medhead]

First off Skyring, thank you for the detailed response. This Schneiers chap sounds interesting - will look him up.

I have a few issues with what you say, including the following:

I agree with you the general concept that the threat is forever changing, evolving. But that does not mean you should leave open the holes that have been found in the past. Someone else here described it as closing the gate after the horse has bolted. I see it as closing the gate as there are still horses in the paddock. But the key concept is that this gate-closing is only part of a wider campaign.

Yes the scanners do not prevent everything. But they may force bad people to use other more restricted avenues which can then be montiroed better. IE the scanners are just the highly visible part of a multi-layered defence. When I said that the Yanks had prevented a repeat of 9/11, I was obviously not suggesting that these scanners were the cause of that succes. Wat I am saying is that the Yanks, like the Israelis, have managed to have very few succesful attacks despite being the subject of intense hatred around the world. That says their systems ((only some of which are publiicly known) are actually very effective.

The close the gate thing was specifically about your claim that they have prevented a reoccurrence. It was never a suggestion to not do something. It would be good if you could stop misrepresenting that point.

It is nice that you think they have a wider system. Just a shame that it always seems to be reactive and it doesn't actually add any extra security. In some cases it is farcical nonsense - eg let's ban Cat Stevens from flying. Yeah, that's a great system!

I'd also challenge the idea about having very few successful attacks. For a start the attacks are very few in the first place. Those that have occurred have not been prevented by the physical security measures introduced at airports post 9/11. Underwear and shoe bombers both got on an aircraft. The parcel bombs were stopped by vigilant intel not physical security measures.

Then finally there remains the fact that capable, motivated operatives are extremely hard to stop once on the aircraft. No amount of physical security at an airport will stop them getting onto an aircraft.


Sent from the Throne

 

[juddles]

The close the gate thing was specifically about your claim that they have prevented a reoccurrence. It was never a suggestion to not do something. It would be good if you could stop misrepresenting that point. ...

That seems to be arguing a technicality. The expression ¨closing the gate after the horse has bolted¨ specifically refers to taking action after a problem has already occurred where the ¨problem¨ (ie the horse escaping) cannot reoccur as it has already happened. The inference is that it is useless to close the gate. I do not see how I have misrepresented your post?? You also said that terrorists MO is to not repeat the same attack twice. They dont do that just to be novel, they are forced to do that because these gates get closed. As for my ¨claim¨ that they have prevented a repeat, I am unaware of any subsequent attack that was as spectacularly succesful as 9/11. To not agree that the Yanks have prevented further attacks would require you to also believe that noone has wanted to repeat them. That would be great, but I suspect there are still just a few USA-haters out there.
And yes, I do believe they have a wider system. I sincerely hope you dont think that they dont. Seriously? The Yanks are infamous for the extent they delve into intel/secret squirrel stuff/black ops, etc etc etc. Not saying they have it perfect, but by God they do try.
Please dont be so sensitive to different opinions. I dont think I have attacked anyone here - just have dared to express a difference of opinion and beliefs. I believe they are trying to do their best in a very difficult area. You think they are a joke. I disagree with you. That should be OK.

 

[boylero]

actually to be more technical, the phrase "Closing the stable door after the horse has bolted" is correct.

 

[Skyring]

First off Skyring, thank you for the detailed response. This Schneiers chap sounds interesting - will look him up.

I have a few issues with what you say, including the following:

I agree with you the general concept that the threat is forever changing, evolving. But that does not mean you should leave open the holes that have been found in the past. Someone else here described it as closing the gate after the horse has bolted. I see it as closing the gate as there are still horses in the paddock. But the key concept is that this gate-closing is only part of a wider campaign.

Yes the scanners do not prevent everything. But they may force bad people to use other more restricted avenues which can then be montiroed better. IE the scanners are just the highly visible part of a multi-layered defence. When I said that the Yanks had prevented a repeat of 9/11, I was obviously not suggesting that these scanners were the cause of that succes. Wat I am saying is that the Yanks, like the Israelis, have managed to have very few succesful attacks despite being the subject of intense hatred around the world. That says their systems ((only some of which are publiicly known) are actually very effective.

In a separate post you describe these procedures as being a pain for everyone. I work with a relatively small group of people, but we travel a hell of a lot, and none of them (nor me) has any issue with security procedures. I feel much greater annoyance at under-staffed immigration desks causing lengthy queues. We have absolutely no problem with scanners, pat downs, etc etc. I recognize that others have personal dislike of these, but many of us do not.

As for that cabbie sense of vigilance, yes, that is very valid. But it is slightly harder in an area where the average securiity staff member could spend an entire career without encountering a terrorist.

And yes, I agree with your point about the fact that there are so many other areas of public concentrations that could be targets. But air travel has always been special in the human mind. Peopel are much more alarmed by things, even though the statistics should allay those fears.

And speaking of statistics, you have mentioned a few thousand Americans being killed in Afghanistan. During the same period they lost hallf a million on their roads. But which rates the interest of everyone?

I was going to mention the roads - and other leading causes of death - but didn't want to drag the topic too far away from the security lines.

It's all about being seen to do something about a sensitive topic. People are relatively comfortable about a huge road toll because it's rare that any one event dominates the front pages across the nation - or the world. By and large, drivers are responsible for their own safety, and while you'll always get a conversation going about drug-crazed sleep-deprived logbook-fiddling truckies ploughing into helpless motorists, road deaths aren't seen as that big a deal.

But when hundreds or thousands die in one event, it's something that is a massive story and the politicians have to do something about it. Or be seen to do something.

Making sure that everyone who boards a plane participates in a highly visible security process ticks all the boxes. Yes, it does have some security benefit, but most importantly it is something that everybody sees. You can have vast offices full of intelligence people scrutinising every email, every security camera, every twit and facepalm, but if the general public doesn't see what they do then it may be great security, but it's wasted effort from a political point of view.

Being able to spot terrorists effectively isn't the point of observing passenger behaviour. The idea is to spot passengers who don't fit the general pattern and select them for investigation. Maybe they are sweating because they just consumed a dozen sachets of taco spice, maybe they have a bomb hidden on (or in) their person. Why is someone loitering before joining the queue for checkin? Are they waiting for their wife in the Ladies, or are they waiting for their accomplice to signal that he's made it through security?

Anybody who hangs around airports a lot - which is most of us here, I guess - could identify the outliers. Terrorists being very thin on the ground, most people in airports who act oddly are doing so innocently, but still we never know. Think back to your last trip through Customs and Immigration. You don't get everybody pulled aside for a complete luggage check, you get a form to fill in, you get one or two low-level people asking questions, you get a few supervisors overseeing the operation. Those guys are pretty good at picking the people to look into a bit more closely.

The usual response to security threats is to haul out the handbook and do what it says. Doing nothing is not an option. That's why we don't make jokes about bombs on aircraft, because if somebody official hears it, they are going to do something, and that something could range from personal inconvenience to having the flight delayed while the plane is searched and everyone's bags are pulled off and checked. The tale of the guy who dropped his ipod in an onboard toilet is a classic. The plane made an emergency landing, every passenger was pulled off and interrorgated and this guy was grilled on everything from his World of Warcraft games to his sex life.

The nudeoscopes represent the official response to the underwear bomber. He got through security, attempted to detonate a bomb in his underwear and got his balls burnt. Despite the fact that US intelligence had received information on this guy beforehand and he ticked any number of boxes for people to look at very carefully, the fact remains that he got through security onto a US-bound flight with a bomb.

So now we have devices that can see into people's underwear, in case they have something hidden here. Sure, they may stop any similar attack, but a serious bomber won't go through a scanner with a bomb that is going to be detected to his immense personal inconvenience and a long prison term. He's going to find a way to get the bomb through and the easiest way is to put it inside his body where it won't be detected in the routine scan.

So the devices aren't going to work against a serious attack anyway. They weren't in place for the ten years after 9/11, so you can hardly say that this is leaving the gate open. If you accept that premise, the gate was open for a decade and no hijackings happened.

Regardless of whether you personally have no problem with them, I do. I have two big problems with them. First is the gross invasion of privacy, because nude images are being generated and stored. They may well be subsequently processed into a stick figure and eventually deleted, but the bottom line is that the system looks under your clothes. Way to build bridges with the Islamic world, America!

Second is that they are expensive and we have to pay for them. That's more cost for the general traveller and taxpayer, and more money that isn't spent on things I consider useful. Like schools and hospitals.

And third is personal. I can walk straight through a metal detector, but with these things, I am required to stop and pirouette and hold my underarms up. That's a step backwards in my eyes.

 

[juddles]

I ......

I understand and respect your views, even if I cannot agree with all of them.

.....guy was grilled on everything from his World of Warcraft games to his sex life....

This made me chuckle

 

[SeatBackForward]

The one fundamental problem with trying to stop modern day terrorism is - how do you stop someone who is determined to kill themselves? you certainly can't threaten their own life as a prevention measure.

 

[juddles]

You cannot stop them killing themselves. But you can make it harder for them to take many others with them.

 

[Skyring]

You cannot stop them killing themselves. But you can make it harder for them to take many others with them.

That turns out not to be the case. As noted earlier, if you increase security checks, you also increase the crowd of people who are waiting to go through security. If you run those people through a security check before they get to stand in line for the boarding security, there's going to be a crowd of people waiting to go through that security check. At some point you are in the real world.

The world of sports events and commuter crowds and shopping malls and cinemas. No security checks when everyone is streaming out from the big match and thousands of people are packed in tight.

Sure, we can get every passenger to remove all their clothing and have an internal check. We can make it incredibly inconvenient and incredibly secure. All that will do is push the kinds of people who make these attacks onto softer targets.

And just how far do we want to go to make our society into a police state?

 

[Skyring]

The one fundamental problem with trying to stop modern day terrorism is - how do you stop someone who is determined to kill themselves? you certainly can't threaten their own life as a prevention measure.

You do it the way we've been doing it ever since 9/11. Keep track of the sort of people who are likely to be suicide bombers. There have been a few got through, such as the 7/7 attacks in London, but there have been quite a few stopped one way or another.

 

[medhead]

That seems to be arguing a technicality. The expression ¨closing the gate after the horse has bolted¨ specifically refers to taking action after a problem has already occurred where the ¨problem¨ (ie the horse escaping) cannot reoccur as it has already happened. The inference is that it is useless to close the gate. I do not see how I have misrepresented your post?? You also said that terrorists MO is to not repeat the same attack twice. They dont do that just to be novel, they are forced to do that because these gates get closed. As for my ¨claim¨ that they have prevented a repeat, I am unaware of any subsequent attack that was as spectacularly succesful as 9/11. To not agree that the Yanks have prevented further attacks would require you to also believe that noone has wanted to repeat them. That would be great, but I suspect there are still just a few USA-haters out there.
And yes, I do believe they have a wider system. I sincerely hope you dont think that they dont. Seriously? The Yanks are infamous for the extent they delve into intel/secret squirrel stuff/black ops, etc etc etc. Not saying they have it perfect, but by God they do try.
Please dont be so sensitive to different opinions. I dont think I have attacked anyone here - just have dared to express a difference of opinion and beliefs. I believe they are trying to do their best in a very difficult area. You think they are a joke. I disagree with you. That should be OK.

You misrepresented my post with the implication that I was suggesting they should do nothing. You are continuing to do that by suggesting that I don't believe some people still want to attack them. I never said they don't want to attack them I said they don't normally do the same style of attack twice. You might like to think this is because of the security. But as I clearly stated it is equally likely that they do it because they know the response is reactive. Sure I wrote something about closing the gate. But what else did I write? They are cutting a hole in the fence elsewhere! (I listed the major examples of these later events that were not prevented by physical airport security)

I'm not sensititive to your different opinion. I'm sensitive to you selective ignoring half of my post and then having go at my opinion on that basis.


Sent from the Throne

 

[tuapekastar]

Just a general post re some security issues that have been alluded to.

Last year a group of us had some 'behind the scenes' tours at SIN. One included a presentation by the United Airlines station manager.

He (understandably) would not go into detail but made it clear that from when you arrive at the airport's car park, train station etc. till when you board you are being watched.

He likened breaching security to passing through a series of nets (12 or 13 of them I think was the number he used). Each net may have a hole in it, but the chances of those holes lining up in a straight line on all 12 or 13 nets so you are able to pass through them all are infinitesimal.

 

[juddles]

....
He likened breaching security to passing through a series of nets (12 or 13 of them I think was the number he used). Each net may have a hole in it, but the chances of those holes lining up in a straight line on all 12 or 13 nets so you are able to pass through them all are infinitesimal.

This does of course then beg the question: Can we then afford to get rid of one of those nets that seems to irritate so many people?

 

[munitalP]

This does of course then beg the question: Can we then afford to get rid of one of those nets that seems to irritate so many people?

You can't. Mankind has a fundamental flaw, we just can't get along with each other and until aliens invade earth and implant their "be nice" genes into us, it's never going to happen.

 

[tuapekastar]

This does of course then beg the question: Can we then afford to get rid of one of those nets that seems to irritate so many people?

I'd be inclined to say no. I don't have a problem with most security, though compulsory removal of belts and shoes mildly irks me, but I just accept it without really getting upset (then again it may not irk others, while stuff that irks them may not bother me). We travelling public all have a different outlook, so I guess the minimum level of security applied needs to be lowest common denominator stuff (ie. at a high level - and that is OK by me).

One thing that does annoy me is inconsistencies. I can understand it differing between countries but I'm talking wholly within Australia. Item A is OK at Airport X, but not at Airport Y. Sometimes if even differs between different domestic terminals at the same airport. So you prepare your items for the security check (laptop etc.) then find yourself having to open your bag on the other side and pull out extra items for inspection. That's the only time I get peed off.

 

[medhead]

This does of course then beg the question: Can we then afford to get rid of one of those nets that seems to irritate so many people?

I'm not sure that question arises at all since no one here has suggested removing nets.


Sent from the Throne

 

[Skyring]

One thing that does annoy me is inconsistencies. I can understand it differing between countries but I'm talking wholly within Australia. Item A is OK at Airport X, but not at Airport Y. Sometimes if even differs between different domestic terminals at the same airport. So you prepare your items for the security check (laptop etc.) then find yourself having to open your bag on the other side and pull out extra items for inspection. That's the only time I get peed off.

Actually, I'm big on inconsistencies and unpredictability. It makes it difficult for terrorists to game the system.

Think back to the Big Brother reality shows. Every day there was something new and the contestants couldn't relax. The second season brought in some big changes. Likewise the third. The contestants might think they had worked it out and there'd be some twist which would negate their strategy. An act of coughry would come back to haunt them when an eliminated contestant returned.

If the rules of the airport security game are fixed and unchanging, then it's relatively easy to crack the system. There are always loopholes and exploits. If the system is constantly changing, then it's going to be harder to beat.

A pertinent example occurred last Thanksgiving, when there was a move to jam up the system by getting as many travellers as possible to opt out of the nudeoscopes and receive the intimate patdowns. The aim was to create chaos in airports during the busiest day of the year. The TSA simply turned off the new machines and reverted to the old metal detectors. For that one day.