Ask The Pilot

  • Thread starter Thread starter NM
  • Start date Start date
  • Featured
Getting back to QF32 for a minute, I've just finished reading the book.

At the very end he asked how his check ride went, to which he was told that he'd failed.

At the start of the book he reminded the crew that he was being evaluated and that if he failed his career was on the line.

As far as I can tell, he is still flying. So, what was that about?

As for the book, I was starting to empathise with him, as they had to deal with the ECAM messages and checklists that seemed to be never ending. I was wondering when it would all end. Even though we all know the outcome, I just had to finish it.

Currently listening to JB's Blog Interview. (telling the audience that he's learning how to hover a helicopter)
 
Getting back to QF32 for a minute, I've just finished reading the book.

At the very end he asked how his check ride went, to which he was told that he'd failed.

At the start of the book he reminded the crew that he was being evaluated and that if he failed his career was on the line.

As far as I can tell, he is still flying. So, what was that about?

A bit more artistic licence. In the normal course of events, if the checker has to make some input, then it's probably a fail. In this instance, it was anything but normal, so the checker could consider his input to have invalidated the check. Not a fail, simply not completed. After the event, he took long enough off work to require a recurrency program anyway, and a check is part of that, so the result would not have mattered.

Checks don't terminate ones career either, though it is best not to have to repeat one.
 
Checks don't terminate ones career either, though it is best not to have to repeat one.

I can imagine. What's that immortal line from Top Gun, "...you'll be flying a cargo plane full of rubber dog --- out of Hong Kong!..."

Just been listening to your QF30 podcast. You said that "common sense prevailed..." when you decided to stay on the runway, rather than to taxi off of it. What were the risks of taxying?
 
A bit more artistic licence. In the normal course of events, if the checker has to make some input, then it's probably a fail. In this instance, it was anything but normal, so the checker could consider his input to have invalidated the check. Not a fail, simply not completed. After the event, he took long enough off work to require a recurrency program anyway, and a check is part of that, so the result would not have mattered.

Checks don't terminate ones career either, though it is best not to have to repeat one.

That final sentence left me puzzled as well, although I did detect a note of black humour irony in it to give a 'kick' ending. However, it did leave me hanging, so thanks very much for the explanation, JB.

I think we also need to bear in mind that RdC had what he referred to as "a collaborator" on the book. Authoring a book is no easy task and my take is that the collaborator was a professional writer/journalist-type and they tend to brush up the dry-and-dusty factual stuff of technical and scientific types (of which I am one of the latter) to make for more engaging general reading.

In my opinion, none of this should detract from what was a stupendous human team achievement that thoroughly deserved to be documented in the vein of Paul Brickhill WWII epics ('Dambusters' etc.) - if any of you, like me, are old enough to have read those as a kid.

The addition of lots of background and personal stuff I thought 'rounded out' the book beautifully and underscored the incredible importance of great training, mentoring, relationships and 'lessons in life' when the crunch REALLY comes - which JB with his personal similar experience has already demonstrated and I'm sure would attest to.

I'm in total awe of JB, RdC, 'Sully' and others like them.
 
Just been listening to your QF30 podcast. You said that "common sense prevailed..." when you decided to stay on the runway, rather than to taxi off of it. What were the risks of taxying?

Well, we basically didn't really know the state of the aircraft. Whilst it 'seemed' ok, we had no idea of the cause of the problem, and we didn't know if taxying it would throw up more issues. We were in a safe position, and shutting it down meant that we could even more quickly move to evacuate if something changed. Once the engineers arrived ( barely a few minutes ) we were able to get enough information to decide that it was most likely safe to tow.

Airline pilots are generally very risk averse. There are times when you may be forced to accept an element of risk, but as a rule, if there are two choices, one with less risk than the other, then you always go for the low risk choice. That is demonstrated in many simple ways, for instance, generally choosing a longer runway rather than short, even though both may be adequate.

In QF30 we had already accepted a couple of risks. Whilst initially during the descent we held our speed to near what it had been when the explosion happened, we ultimately increased the speed somewhat ( to about 325k, still well short of the 364k max ). That was in response to what looked like a valid crew oxy warning....having us go to sleep would have been bad. The runway itself was technically too short for us ( without the anti skid ), but I felt that would not be an issue. In the 32, it was important that they took the time to complete the ECAMs, which explains their long hold. In our case, we wanted the jet on the ground ASAP, so that required a quite different way of attacking the problems.
 
Last edited:
Australia's highest-earning Velocity Frequent Flyer credit card: Offer expires: 21 Jan 2025
- Earn 60,000 bonus Velocity Points
- Get unlimited Virgin Australia Lounge access
- Enjoy a complimentary return Virgin Australia domestic flight each year

AFF Supporters can remove this and all advertisements

In QF30 we had already accepted a couple of risks. Whilst initially during the descent we held our speed to near what it had been when the explosion happened, we ultimately increased the speed somewhat ( to about 325k, still well short of the 364k max ). That was in response to what looked like a valid crew oxy warning....having us go to sleep would have been bad.

If you were cruising at 39,000 feet instead, what would've been the plan of actions given that it would've taken another minute or 2 to descend?
 
If you were cruising at 39,000 feet instead, what would've been the plan of actions given that it would've taken another minute or 2 to descend?
Realistically, it wouldn't have changed. Mach limited initially, but IAS would have been lower in the early phase until mach/IAS changeover, which happens at about FL280.

The cabin was already at max differential pressure, so I don't think the event itself would have greatly changed.
 
How much must it take a bit to "indoctrinate" such a culture or attitude into younger pilots who come from the military, particularly those who flew fast jets?

The military are much more heavily supervised than you seem to realise. Operations that may seem hazardous to you, are generally very tightly planned. Risky behaviour is much more likely to develop in an unsupervised GA pilot.
 
The military are much more heavily supervised than you seem to realise. Operations that may seem hazardous to you, are generally very tightly planned. Risky behaviour is much more likely to develop in an unsupervised GA pilot.

Yes, I suppose you're right.
 
The military are much more heavily supervised than you seem to realise. Operations that may seem hazardous to you, are generally very tightly planned. Risky behaviour is much more likely to develop in an unsupervised GA pilot.

Does that also apply equally to the US military? They seem to have a macho culture with aggressive-sounding nicknames and an appearance often of shoot first, ask questions later. Or is that an image conjured up by Hollywood while wrong targets and unplanned collateral damage being principally the results of poor information?
 
Does that also apply equally to the US military? They seem to have a macho culture with aggressive-sounding nicknames and an appearance often of shoot first, ask questions later. Or is that an image conjured up by Hollywood while wrong targets and unplanned collateral damage being principally the results of poor information?

Nicknames are just that. Whilst I suspect you're thinking of 'Iceman' and 'Maverick', these names are just used so that results at the range can be assigned to individuals, without transmitting names over the airwaves. Real call signs are much more mundane: Gino, Springbok, and Trashcan come to mind.

The fighter people tend to be very assertive. A timid fighter driver is not much use. They are there to make the aircraft do their bidding, not the other way around. They almost always graduate in the top third of their pilots' course.

Wrong targets, or collateral damage, are more likely a failure of intel or the mission rules.

Top Gun was a movie. Quite a cough one really. But it did have some nice F14 and Scooter shots.
 
I'm a bit past the same spot in the book. I think I'd call it artistic licence. The 'take' on command that is being presented isn't how I operate...so I guess that's why I didn't write a book.

I can only say after reading all of your replies to this momentous thread (at times laughing and sometimes nearly crying), that it is a bloody pity you didn't write a book. You obviously have the talent and experiences combined with a gift for communicating with patience and diligence.

It's never too late, and I reckon others would agree.

I'll reserve a copy now!
 

Become an AFF member!

Join Australian Frequent Flyer (AFF) for free and unlock insider tips, exclusive deals, and global meetups with 65,000+ frequent flyers.

AFF members can also access our Frequent Flyer Training courses, and upgrade to Fast-track your way to expert traveller status and unlock even more exclusive discounts!

AFF forum abbreviations

Wondering about Y, J or any of the other abbreviations used on our forum?

Check out our guide to common AFF acronyms & abbreviations.
Back
Top