The following is a portion of a much longer article from Aviation Week and Space Technology on the Boeing 737 MAX and it’s issues.
MAX Grounding Challenges Both Boeing’s Present And Future
Jun 12, 2019
Jens Flottau,
Guy Norris and
Sean Broderick | Aviation Week & Space Technology
As the curtain rises on the 53rd Paris Air Show,
Boeing’s growing fleet of stored and undelivered 737 MAXs is a stark reminder of its industrial nightmare, lingering uncertainty for operators, and headlines focused on the now months-long grounding of its beleaguered narrowbody.
With no firm date in sight for the aircraft’s return to service, and newly produced aircraft still coming off the line, the embattled OEM is drifting into deeper water with each passing week. Easily exceeding the depth and span of the 787’s 2013 grounding, which saw 50 aircraft suspended from service for three months because of a battery fire problem, the knock-on impact of the MAX crisis is being felt across the company and throughout the supply chain.
The crisis that started in March after the aircraft’s Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight-control law was implicated in two accidents—Lion Air Flight 610 on Oct. 29, 2018, and
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019—has also adversely affected Boeing’s broader MAX-family strategy. The grounding hit just as Boeing was accelerating production to historically high levels, as well as introducing a trio of new models into the assembly process.
Despite slowing production in April of all
737s by 19% to 42 aircraft per month from the previous 52, the company has asked suppliers to stay at the original higher rate to avoid further disruption when, it hopes, deliveries resume later in the year. Having originally planned to accelerate the line further to 57 per month in 2019, Boeing is instead now offering to financially support stressed suppliers as it manages the crisis, and it is reconsidering the timing of the next rate increase.
With storage space becoming an issue for accruing inventory, such as fuselages built by Spirit AeroSystems in Wichita, Boeing also faces the cost of storing and later reactivating undelivered aircraft parked at company facilities around the Western U.S. It is also preparing to help airlines return previously delivered aircraft to service from storage locations around the world.
In another unfortunate coincidence, the grounding occurred just as production of the long-running 737 Next Generation winds down. Of 135 new 737s to have flown off the runway at Renton, Washington, for their first test flight since mid-March, only 18 have been 737NGs, some of which were military versions. The product mix is in the final phases of transitioning to 100% MAX variants as the final few NGs are delivered. Around 24 737NGs appear to have been handed over to customers since the MAX was first grounded, seven of those in May.
Depending on when the ban is lifted, the total number of affected aircraft could grow to over 600 by late summer. Storage space for newly built aircraft has reached a premium in the Puget Sound area. As room first in Renton and then Boeing Field has run out, Boeing has been forced to send completed MAX aircraft to Everett, as well as to more distant Spokane or out of state to Kelly Field in San Antonio and Acadiana Regional Airport in Louisiana. Aircraft are being ferried to storage locations after painting in sites such as Victorville, California, too. Boeing is also freeing up ramp space in Everett for the MAX by flying
787s to its facility in Charleston, South Carolina for completion.
Southwest Airlines pilots are confident that the new MAX training will be sufficient. Credit: Southwest Airlines
Possibly the only side benefit to Boeing of the slowdown is that production line workers have additional margin as they assemble the first -10. The biggest challenge is integrating the aircraft’s new landing gear into the production flow. The -10 gear is 9.5 in. (24 cm) taller than the standard MAX gear when fully extended. The first 737-10 was originally set for delivery to
United Airlines in late 2020, but it is unclear if this remains feasible, given the ongoing MAX issues.
There is speculation that other programs, namely the
777X and yet-to-be-launched NMA (new midmarket airplane), are also being affected as Boeing funnels engineering resources into the 737. The first flight of the 777-9, which was rolled out in March in a low-key event in the shadow of the MAX grounding, is already delayed due to a l
ate-occurring durability issue with the General Electric GE9X engine and seems to be suffering from program delays unrelated to the overall resource issues caused by the MAX update work.
Boeing meanwhile insists the NMA timeline is unchanged and, despite this year’s disruption, remains on track for board authority to offer later in 2019 and launch in 2020. The company is banking on a radically new manufacturing design system to produce and certificate the NMA within six years.
Icelandair has furloughed pilots hired to fly its MAXs. Credit: Joe Walker
However, while the timescale for the NMA may not have been altered, it is a fair bet to assume that background work on the 737 replacement study/new small airplane (RS/NSA) project has picked up steam in the wake of the MAX grounding. Although Boeing was relatively well-advanced with an all-new single-aisle concept in 2011 when it changed tack to launch the reengined MAX instead, the revised design will depend heavily on sharing new avionics, systems, structures and design-build practices with the NMA.
In the near term, Boeing’s focus is on getting the MAX back into revenue service. The manufacturer continues to work through a series of questions the
FAA has posed about its modified MCAS software and how the updated flight-control law performs in different flight profiles, including failure modes and the rare edge-of-the-flight-envelope scenarios it is designed for.
Once Boeing has addressed the FAA’s issues, test pilots for the regulator will perform a certification flight on a MAX with the new software. The pilots will prepare a detailed report that Boeing will include in its final submission to the FAA—a process that is expected to take at least a week. The agency then will review the package and ensure that the MCAS complies with regulations—likely a process that will take several weeks. Once the package is verified, the FAA would then lift its MAX flight operations ban.
The return-to-service timeline could be prolonged if regulators opt to add more stringent training as a condition for pilots’ return to the MAX flight deck. While the FAA has said it will not finalize its 737 training document update until it reviews Boeing’s final training package, the agency is not expected to require full-flight simulator sessions—Level D training, in FAA parlance—as a condition of allowing pilots to fly the MAX again. But other countries have signaled their intent to require simulator time right away. This could help set the stage for a phased return to service.
The FAA, however, is expected to mandate new simulator sessions during recurrent training—a move that would place far less of a burden on operators. The Allied Pilots Association (APA) and Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) have signaled their tentative endorsements of the FAA’s approach, so long as the baseline training is sufficiently detailed.
Both the APA and ALPA emphasize that their comments were filed without benefit of reviewing Boeing’s final training package, and their views could change.
Among the issues the FAA is reviewing is the runaway stabilizer trim emergency checklist that Boeing positioned as key to overcoming an MCAS failure that triggers uncommanded nose-down horizontal stabilizer inputs. Neither the Lion Air nor Ethiopian flight crews followed the checklist, information released by investigators shows. The Lion Air crew never recognized the MCAS failure as a runaway stabilizer issue.
The Ethiopian pilots apparently did and followed some of the checklist’s steps. But they were unable to pull the aircraft’s nose up after the MCAS activated and, acting on erroneous AOA data, directed it downward by moving the horizontal stabilizer. They deviated from the checklist in several ways, including not reducing the aircraft’s speed enough and reengaging the automatic stabilizer motors that the MCAS uses to trim the aircraft. The pilots also were not able to manually move the stabilizer to counteract the MCAS inputs.
The APA and other pilot groups have pointed out that Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist is neither clear nor detailed enough when applied to an MCAS failure scenario and should be revamped. Among the issues: The 737 flight crew operations manual (FCOM) does not explain that moving the stabilizer manually may require both pilots or that aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer may have to be reduced—such as by pushing the nose down—before trimming the aircraft manually. These details are included in supplemental training documents, and the APA wants to see more of them in the FCOM. The FAA is reviewing the checklist, and is likely to require changes.
Despite Boeing’s improvements to the MCAS, designed in part to make erroneous operation far less likely, the APA believes the revamped checklist—which would also apply to the 737NG—should be in place before the MAX is approved to fly again.
“[The runaway stab trim checklist] is related to the MCAS, even with the new software,” APA spokesman and American Airlines 737 Capt. Dennis Tajer says. “It’s still what I’m left with to recover the aircraft if the MCAS misfires.”
Pilots for
Southwest Airlines, which has the largest fleet of MAXs grounded, at 34, did not offer formal comments on the draft 737 training standards update. “We are comfortable with the proposed training elements we have seen thus far,” the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association says.