Ethiopian 737 Max 8 crash and Fallout

[kamchatsky]

The question is whether VA will actually bring in those 737Max ? Or Bain has already cancelled the orders as part of the voluntary administration process? If VA brings it back I won't be flying with them.

 

[jakeseven7]

The question is whether VA will actually bring in those 737Max ? Or Bain has already cancelled the orders as part of the voluntary administration process? If VA brings it back I won't be flying with the,

They didn't cancel them (unless they have not disclosed this) they just deferred them. They are still on the order book....

But many highly criticised the decision to order them in the first place before they started dropping out of the sky because it was seen as an indulgence VA1 could not afford. Doubt Bain/VA2 can afford them either.

 

[MEL_Traveller]

I suspect that we are seeing a repeat of this performance with Boeing's Starliner spacecraft. The same arrogance with regard to software simulation of hardware behaviour, coupled with poor software, and failure to do end to end testing. I wonder what other products are infected with this particular form of hubris.

What are you thoughts jb747 on passengers taking the MAX? Safe to fly on now? Or safe to fly on with airlines we know have experienced pilots and comprehensive training?

 

[straitman]

What are you thoughts jb747 on passengers taking the MAX? Safe to fly on now? Or safe to fly on with airlines we know have experienced pilots and comprehensive training?

Many aircraft over the years have had many accidents but rarely get the attention that the MAX has received. (It deserves the attention IMHO)
Many a/c have then gone on and had a long and successful life. Had the MAX accidents been over a longer timeline the MAX may not have had this (deserved) scrutiny either.

Attached is a copy of the FAA Statement on Boeing 737 Max Return to Service. People are probably better off reading this than the more commercialised versions from the news media. Here and also contained within that statement is a link to the actual Airworthiness Directive (AD) from the FAA.

 

[drron]

Alaskan is to swap A320s for the MAX.

Alaska Airlines Swaps A320s For 737 MAXs

Alaska Airlines has entered into a deal that will see the airline trading in some A320 aircraft for some 737 MAXs. Here are the details.

onemileatatime.com

 

[Mattg]

And the European safety regulator has now issued draft approval for the 737 MAX to return to service, with a possible un-grounding in the EU from mid-January 2021.

Reuters | Breaking International News & Views

Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.

in.reuters.com

 

[jb747]

What are you thoughts jb747 on passengers taking the MAX? Safe to fly on now? Or safe to fly on with airlines we know have experienced pilots and comprehensive training?

As I'm extremely unlikely to be anywhere near a MAX in the next few years....

I would still avoid them if I can. But, if given the choice of flying one, or walking, I'd go.

 

[MEL_Traveller]

As I'm extremely unlikely to be anywhere near a MAX in the next few years....

I would still avoid them if I can. But, if given the choice of flying one, or walking, I'd go.

Thanks jb. Part of me *almost* thinks that the extended time put in to this means they must have sort of got it right, by now. Had it been a 'quick fix' in a few months I would have been more skeptical.

 

[jb747]

Thanks jb. Part of me *almost* thinks that the extended time put in to this means they must have sort of got it right, by now. Had it been a 'quick fix' in a few months I would have been more skeptical.

In many ways, it's still a quick fix.

The aircraft still does not have the triplicated sensors of any Airbus.

MCAS is still there, and it's obvious that it's necessary for aerodynamic issues, not the originally claimed 'pilot training' avoidance. The two major steps that make it much more palatable, are that MCAS now requires dual AoA signals for activation, and it can only activate once. It would be interesting to hear their definition of 'once', as there is almost certainly some form of event timer/counter associated with that.

The disabling of trim motor power, by moving the control column in the opposite direction (that exists on the 737 before MAX, 767, etc), and which would have stopped both of the accidents, is still disabled.

Pilot training is better, but decent engineering would have been my preference. Not all pilot training systems are equal.

Having said that, I don't think a repeat of these particular incidents are likely. But, I do think that Boeing's design capability is now extremely sloppy, so something new will eventually crop up.

 

[kelvedon]

In many ways, it's still a quick fix.

The aircraft still does not have the triplicated sensors of any Airbus.

MCAS is still there, and it's obvious that it's necessary for aerodynamic issues, not the originally claimed 'pilot training' avoidance. The two major steps that make it much more palatable, are that MCAS now requires dual AoA signals for activation, and it can only activate once. It would be interesting to hear their definition of 'once', as there is almost certainly some form of event timer/counter associated with that.

The disabling of trim motor power, by moving the control column in the opposite direction (that exists on the 737 before MAX, 767, etc), and which would have stopped both of the accidents, is still disabled.

Pilot training is better, but decent engineering would have been my preference. Not all pilot training systems are equal.

Having said that, I don't think a repeat of these particular incidents are likely. But, I do think that Boeing's design capability is now extremely sloppy, so something new will eventually crop up.

So would you fly in one now ?

 

[straitman]

So would you fly in one now ?

See post #1607 for your answer.

 

[Brissy1]

...so something new will eventually crop up.

If they've got form, they're more likely to reoffend. Seen so often in the corporate world.

 

[flychrisfly]

MCAS is still there, and it's obvious that it's necessary for aerodynamic issues, not the originally claimed 'pilot training' avoidance. The two major steps that make it much more palatable, are that MCAS now requires dual AoA signals for activation, and it can only activate once. It would be interesting to hear their definition of 'once', as there is almost certainly some form of event timer/counter associated with that.

From the FAA's Airworthiness Directive:
"The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch by using only the control column."

 

[jb747]

From the FAA's Airworthiness Directive:
"The new flight control laws now permit only one activation of MCAS per sensed high-AOA event, and limit the magnitude of any MCAS command to move the horizontal stabilizer such that the resulting position of the stabilizer will preserve the flightcrew’s ability to control the airplane’s pitch by using only the control column."

Which is where my comment about a timer or event counter comes in.

One AoA event from faulty sensor or software interpretion. MCAS activates. AoA reduces below the activation point. So, does the MCAS event counter reset, as this would be a different AoA event.

What happens if a CB is reset?

Can MCAS reset its counter without intervention. The comment about AoA event would imply to me that it can, in which case I can see software and hardware scenarios that could continually reactivate it.

Best of all of would be if it’s a hard (latched) reset, that can only be fixed on the ground, and which requires much more than a simple reset switch activation.

Strange as it may seem, you need to tightly define the meaning of the word ‘once’.

 

[kamchatsky]

My problem with these fixes is that accidents/disaster are only a "minor software update" away. it is very easy to skip regression testing, or someone make a simple error.

Using software to compensate poor engineering is still not on for me.

 

[flydoc]

One of the Silkair B38Ms in storage at ASP flew today

 

[Scarlett]

Apparently GOL in South America have recommenced pax revenue flying with their B737MAX8 fleet. Other airlines due to follow suit in the near future, including AA.

Brazil's GOL Becomes First Airline To Resume 737 MAX Flights

Brazilian airline GOL has become the world's first airline to reintroduce the 737 MAX into commercial service after its global grounding.

onemileatatime.com

 

[OZDUCK]

And the first one is due back in U.S skies - Tuesday 29/12 US time..

Boeing 737 Max Resumes Flying U.S. Passengers After 2-Year Halt (Published 2020)

American Airlines used the plane, which was grounded in March 2019 after two fatal crashes, on a flight from Miami to New York.

www.nytimes.com

 

[jb747]

My problem with these fixes is that accidents/disaster are only a "minor software update" away. it is very easy to skip regression testing, or someone make a simple error.

Back in the late 90s, or thereabouts, I discovered a glitch in the autopilot/flight director software on the 767. Basically, it was a repeatable way of making the aircraft fly through the target altitude set on the MCP (mode control panel .... the dash). After a bit of fiddling, I was able to present our Boeing technical pilot with a set of instructions on how to make it happen. His first response was ‘b/s’, but he forwarded it to Seattle, and within a day or so I heard that they were able to replicate it on their ‘system‘ simulators. A red bulletin came out for the flight manuals within a couple of weeks. Interestingly, the bulletin covered all of their aircraft, so this bug existed across 767, 757, 747 and 737.

A few months later, after a software update, the bulletin was removed, and the aircraft would no longer breach the target.

Now fast forward a couple of years. I’m now flying the 747-400, and after a software update, I find that the bug has returned. Try out my previous ‘how to’ and yes, it’s back exactly as it was five years previously.

 

[Quickstatus]

but he forwarded it to Seattle, and within a day or so I heard that they were able to replicate it on their ‘system‘ simulators

At least Boeing took it seriously back then.
If only they took it seriously after the first Max crash. (or better still during the design process)