Ethiopian 737 Max 8 crash and Fallout

[33kft]

From what pilots around here have said, I'm not sure the optional extra would have made a difference.

From experience working with redundant systems in a completely different industry (IT), two does not maketh a quorum. 1 sensor is absolute, 2 can disagree and only 3 can isolate a single faulty sensor. That's without even considering the rabbit hole of what happens if 2 sensors are faulty.

If they disagree, a light illuminates and the humans flying the plane have to sort it out. This isn't as controversial as some people are making out, although fair to say any redundancy that you can build in cost effectively is a good thing, but you know, back to my earlier point about 4 engine aircraft....

 

[dajop]

This is the nagging fear I always had with these LCCs and this is proof that it didn't come totally out of nowhere.

Just pointing out that ET is not a LCC.

It would be unwise to suggest all LCC’s don’t include optional safety features, and it would also be unwise to suggest all “full service” (whatever that means these days) carriers do include such features.

 

[33kft]

Adding to the above, it would be unwise to suggest that just because no Max 8 with dual AoA sensors and a disagree light have crashed as yet, that they would not do so in the same circumstances (whatever they are, in ET's case as we do not know yet).

 

[QF WP]

{Mod Hat on} Can already see 2 tangents commenced in the last 20-odd post, let's get back on topic...{Mod Hat off}

I think the black boxes, once fully assessed, will give a lot of rich information.

Boeing Black Box Data Shows Similarities Between Ethiopian and Lion Air Crashes

When the 737 went down in Indonesia and MCAS came under suspicion, Boeing repeatedly said emergency procedures should have been sufficient for the pilots to save the craft if the system had malfunctioned.

Even so, the company hastily informed pilots about MCAS — and then said it was working on software changes. It promised to release them around the end of last year, according to pilots at Southwest and American Airlines.

But the software fix has not happened yet. Boeing now promises to release the revisions in the next several weeks.

“While investigators continue to work to establish definitive conclusions,” it said in its statement Sunday, “Boeing is finalizing its development of a previously announced software update and pilot training revision that will address the MCAS flight control law’s behavior in response to erroneous sensor inputs.”

 

[woodborer]

From experience working with redundant systems in a completely different industry (IT), two does not maketh a quorum. 1 sensor is absolute, 2 can disagree and only 3 can isolate a single faulty sensor. That's without even considering the rabbit hole of what happens if 2 sensors are faulty.

If they disagree, a light illuminates and the humans flying the plane have to sort it out. This isn't as controversial as some people are making out, although fair to say any redundancy that you can build in cost effectively is a good thing, but you know, back to my earlier point about 4 engine aircraft....

But in this case, you still have an MCAS, that you haven't been told about, doing stuff....

 

[jb747]

It actually sounded EXACTLY like ordering a car in that article. But I agree, that doesn't make it right. As a customer, I'd certainly prefer if my airline has purchased all the available safety and navigation options.

Almost everything is an option. All of the electronics, the engines, fuel tanks, brakes, floor loadings. If you can think of it, it's probably an option. And like your car, the price of options can easily exceed the base price of the vehicle.

From experience working with redundant systems in a completely different industry (IT), two does not maketh a quorum. 1 sensor is absolute, 2 can disagree and only 3 can isolate a single faulty sensor. That's without even considering the rabbit hole of what happens if 2 sensors are faulty.

If they disagree, a light illuminates and the humans flying the plane have to sort it out. This isn't as controversial as some people are making out, although fair to say any redundancy that you can build in cost effectively is a good thing, but you know, back to my earlier point about 4 engine aircraft....

A light illuminates. Such an easy line. When this sort of thing starts going wrong, it's not normally just one warning, but very likely a multitude. Mix in lights, EICAS messages (assuming the 737 has caught up with EICAS), and aural warnings, and very little is simple. QF30 threw up 25 simultaneous EICAS message. QF32 over 50 ECAMs...plus a few lights.

BTW, a four engined aircraft is over twice as likely to suffer an engine failure...though it normally matters a bit less.

When an Airbus gets confused, it reverts to alternate or direct law. It stops any computerised games, and simply hands the aircraft back. The MAX? Well, perhaps not....

Adding to the above, it would be unwise to suggest that just because no Max 8 with dual AoA sensors and a disagree light have crashed as yet, that they would not do so in the same circumstances (whatever they are, in ET's case as we do not know yet).

Very true. But, I thought all of the MAXes actually have dual AoA sensors. The option is for a third sensor, and/or for dual displays. The two items are separate. The concept of a system that uses trim to override pilot inputs, without a sensible cutout is the stupid issue here. The vast majority of airliners currently flying have no AoA display, and to be honest, most pilots would have limited ability to use one anyway.

 

[JB expat]

Just pointing out that ET is not a LCC.

It would be unwise to suggest all LCC’s don’t include optional safety features, and it would also be unwise to suggest all “full service” (whatever that means these days) carriers do include such features.

That’s a very good point. So what is the flying public supposed to do in terms of making informed decisions?

And I agree. This is exactly like a car. Ex - Anti lock brakes used to be an extra (maybe they still are but they seem more standard than when they first came into existence) - I lived in NYC and never thought to ask a taxi if they had such. But definitely would like to know that the plane I was on had the latest safety systems.

Am curious to see what they ultimately determine to be the cause and/or the points

OH - and can planes be retrofitted - if they make something mandatory - all MAX 8's that are in use (grounded) will have to be recalled/repaired I guess - how does that work?

 

[Berlin]

Almost everything is an option. All of the electronics, the engines, fuel tanks, brakes, floor loadings. If you can think of it, it's probably an option. And like your car, the price of options can easily exceed the base price of the vehicle.

Wow. I knew about the engines but everything else is a revelation to me. And there's probably no way for the flying public to find out which airlines buy which options or is there? The engine types are usually known but the breaks?

 

[jb747]

So what is the flying public supposed to do in terms of making informed decisions?

Realistically, the flying public cannot make informed decisions about flying.

Your analogy about anti lock brakes was interesting though. When they first appeared, it seemed that it allowed the more stupid of the road users to actually drive even closer to the car in front. Reaction time simply never entered into their mental equations. In this instance, as you make aircraft inherently safer, and more automated, it's allowed those running airlines to reduce pilot training and experience to the point that many are no longer actually pilots (AF447). The sad part is that when automation fails, it's invariably a bag of pooh that gets dropped into the pilots laps.

and can planes be retrofitted - if they make something mandatory - all MAX 8's that are in use (grounded) will have to be recalled/repaired I guess - how does that work?

It can be refitted. But it will likely take time and cost...

 

[CaptJCool]

I read the comments from the bloggers on the article in The Age...

Oh for the days where the driver drove and rode the brakes.....
Many liken it to driving without brakes, a calamity in the waiting
Optional extras suggest cosmetics enhancements not core safety

What particularly bothered me after the first Lion Air crash was the bleeding obvious “this is a brand new jet”. Why is it crashing ?

IMHO
The bigger engines changed the core balance of flying the jet integrated with the new systems for this and that containing introduced bugs which weren’t picked up in bug testing plus new services marketed as “just like the old model” poorly comprehended as it wasn’t identical (and any driver would know a different car model places it’s features (eg cruise control) in different spots on the “dashboard”) by until then well trained pilots meant catastrophe...

(Having bought into a brand new apartment complex, I went through all this breakdown stud and wondered how something so new could be so wonky so soon)

It would seem Boeing are like builders base contract price and you pay ‘through the nose’ for variations.
In this case of refusal, we’ll throw in a free ‘nose-dive’...

 

[JB expat]

2 minutes ago I received an email update that Australia is considering "software as a medical device" - in terms of regulating the software in line with the classification of the device itself (how important the device is to the life of the patient), whereas currently: all SaMDs (software as medical device) would be classified as Class I medical devices, being the lowest risk classification. This is the case regardless of the risk a particular piece of software may pose to the patient, which may vary greatly depending on the software's functionality, whether the software would change over time if it incorporates AI or machine learning, and the disease or condition for which the software is intended to be used.

To the point above, software isn't just software running on a machine at one's desk - software is basically flying planes but look at what pilots have to go through to fly a commercial jet...equivalent standards (in concept) should be applied to software before it is allowed to operate a commercial jet. Looks like the medical community is acknowledging how prevalent & significant software can be to a person's well-being/life - wonder what will happen with aviation...and if different countries impose different standards.

 

[p--and--t]

Realistically, the flying public cannot make informed decisions about flying.

Someone has a knack for quote of the day on a regular basis!!!!

It is totally impossible for a member of the public to book a flight and know whether they will land safely at the end.

Many thousands of factors determine the result. Was the pilot trained properly, are they drunk, did they have a fight with their missus/insurance/company/boss in the last week, did the re-fueler put the right amount in, will one of 100,000 parts break and cause irretrievable failure, will the weather suddenly turn despite forecasting technology, will an idiot drive onto the runway at the last moment, will the Russians mistake you for an enemy plane, etc etc etc etc etc. Working it all out is as about as useful as spreadsheets determining next weeks lottery result,

 

[juddles]

Realistically, the flying public cannot make informed decisions about flying.....

Your analogy about anti lock brakes was interesting though. .....

Regarding the flying public and their "ability" to make informed decisions, I agree.

As for the ABS or anti-lock braking, this is an area that I would like to discuss, and especially get your opinion. As I see there are both similarities and glaring contrasts.

I am not a pilot, but I can claim some knowledge of vehicles. ABS is essentially a system that automatically stops a wheel from completely ceasing rotation due to braking. Without going into detail, the most effective braking force of a tyre is a teensy bit below when it locks up. (a whole lot of "science" there) But the main benefit of ABS is to counteract the simple physical fact that once a tyre is locked up it loses all ability for any directional control. This fact is not inherently obvious or intuitive. When I got trained in this the instructors knbew this, so they actualy demonstrated it. Repetitive demonstrations of real vehicles locking-up which showed that no matter where the tyres "pointed", they had no directional control.

So ABS is a great system - it does not normally reduce braking ability, but it allows directional control to be maintained. (BTW, it is not perfect. ABS is absolutely dangerous in some situations - like hard braking on gravel roads)

But the huge distinction between ABS and MCAS is that the first was brought in as an improvement, a leap forward, a commercial edge, that was proudly sold as such - MCAS came in as a way for Boeing to satisfy some doubts the FAA had - in essence it was not a DESIRED feature, but rather something that was invented to satisfy a pressing commercial need. It was NOT like ABS in that it was actually not marketed to airlines or pilots.

Both ABS and MCAS have a commonality in that they are systems that are independent of driver/pilot control. There is much discussion now about the issues of pilot training and airlines failing to pay for the extra safety things. But IMHO these contemplations fail to address the real issue. Which is about flawed design and procedural philosophies.

 

[docjames]

Realistically, the flying public cannot make informed decisions about flying.

Not with the current lack of available info, but they certainly could if relevant and appropriate information was made easily available to them.

 

[juddles]

Not with the current lack of available info, but they certainly could if relevant and appropriate information was made easily available to them.

I disagree. For example, this Ethiopian crash. They are a good airline. They have modern aircraft. Noone saw this coming. Who could possibly inform the travelling public? What is this "relevant and appropriate" information you name? Who would furnish this?

 

[jb747]

Not with the current lack of available info, but they certainly could if relevant and appropriate information was made easily available to them.

It's a bit like my knowledge of medicine. I don't even know how much I don't know.

 

[ethernet]

How can Boeing be non-specific about the 'fix'. Last I heard it is NOT just software but also a red light. Now will this red light also be a switch to turn off MCAS? Yeah, its redundant with reinforced training, but given the manual flipping, its probably best given the real life test results. If so it smells like a new instrument, costly training and certification perhaps. Interestingly no word about why the AOA sensors may have wandered off the reservation.(My bet is salt conducting inside the sensor, or ash/frost over photo-receptors) To an untrained eye- it still looks like Boeing is trying to skimp on refits and retain the ability to charge for optional extras. That may not fly in Europe, but it needs to be the same everywhere, now.

 

[Franky]

Fox and Friends News (US) just reporting that the FBI have now been included in the investigations surrounding the 737 Max8 issues, including the certification of the aircraft.

 

[Franky]

And just now from the same source, Garuda has cancelled their planned order of the same aircraft...

 

[Berlin]

And just now from the same source, Garuda has cancelled their planned order of the same aircraft...

Probably for the better, not letting Garuda anywhere near that plane.