Ethiopian 737 Max 8 crash and Fallout

[QF WP]

EY are telling it the way it was, an experienced Captain with a lower experienced FO, who had enough hours (according to the airlines policy), to be flying the plane. I'm comfortable with the pairing.

I'm uncomfortable with a new software program taking over the decision making processes, particularly at low altitude and creating inputs that put it into the ground. Perhaps it will be found that it's done it twice, only time will tell. Give me 2 pilots who can assess an issue and decide the inputs needed to fly the plane safely due to all their training. MCAS sounds like it needs some new algorithms.

 

[Quickstatus]

EY are telling it the way it was, an experienced Captain with a lower experienced FO, who had enough hours (according to the airlines policy), to be flying the plane. I'm comfortable with the pairing.

I'm uncomfortable with a new software program taking over the decision making processes, particularly at low altitude and creating inputs that put it into the ground. Perhaps it will be found that it's done it twice, only time will tell. Give me 2 pilots who can assess an issue and decide the inputs needed to fly the plane safely due to all their training. MCAS sounds like it needs some new algorithms.

The tweet about 350hrs was a correction from previous reports that the FO was 200hrs. While everyone has to start somewhere I would be very hesitant to step into an aircraft operated by a 350hr pilot - generally speaking

To be fair,until the report is released, I don’t know what the pilots did or whether that combination of experience made any differerence. The 350hr pilot may have done everything right.

 

[33kft]

I'm uncomfortable with a new software program taking over the decision making processes, particularly at low altitude and creating inputs that put it into the ground.

Assuming that is what happened, which also assumes the flaps were retracted as they were on the Lion Air flight. It also assumes the AoA sensor was feeding bad info as on Lion Air which then causes the auto trim inputs (or that the MCAS just malfunctioned altogether, but if so why MCAS and not some other aviation component?). And also assumes that the pilots didn't turn off stabilizer trim as the previous pilots of the Lion Air plane had done in the same circumstance.

It may well be that all of this happened. It may also not. It could be a blocked pitot tube caused bad airspeed readings or some other cause entirely and the only way to find out is when BEA release their findings.

 

[woodborer]

Rumours that FAA will sign off on remedial 737max8 software imposing MCAS trim hardlimits on March 25.

However FAA approved MCAS V1 so is it the appropriate body to approve MCAS V2?

Some talk that Canada and the EU are going to do their own independent assessment of the changes.

 

[33kft]

I would be very hesitant to step into an aircraft operated by a 350hr pilot - generally speaking

You most likely have. The proportion of flights that you might have flown where the FO was 350hrs or thereabouts we'll never know.

 

[bigjobs]

Should I be feeling better after reading this?:

View attachment 157715

They probably have multiple flights each day that are crewed in the same manner ...

 

[ozfflyer]

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/bu...-a-day-before-it-crashed-20190320-p515sq.html

sounds more & more like poor pilot training.

How hard is it to turn off a faulty system ?

 

[Berlin]

sounds more & more like poor pilot training.

Does it? First comes the shoddy software, then withholding this information from the airlines and pilots and then a lack of training. And even the latter seems to have only happened because Boeing wanted it this way. So no, I'd say it "sounds more and more" like Boeing taking the easy route to catch up with Airbus.

 

[ozfflyer]

Does it? First comes the shoddy software, then withholding this information from the airlines and pilots and then a lack of training. And even the latter seems to have only happened because Boeing wanted it this way. So no, I'd say it "sounds more and more" like Boeing taking the easy route to catch up with Airbus.

did you read the news article ?

 

[travelislife]

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/bu...-a-day-before-it-crashed-20190320-p515sq.html

sounds more & more like poor pilot training.

How hard is it to turn off a faulty system ?

They didn’t actually know the system existed from everything I have read. From the article the 3rd pilot trouble shooted it by disconnecting the power to the motors. It seems smart, but doesn’t sound like he actually knew what the problem was. I could be way off the mark, and one of the pilots on here will be able to provide much better input.

 

[stm1sydney]

Well, he knew the problem was runaway trim, for which the response (whatever the cause, MCAS or otherwise) is to flick the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches. And that is exactly the same with the 737NG and the 737MAX, and is a procedure that every 737 pilot will have trained for. Apparently.

 

[woodborer]

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/bu...-a-day-before-it-crashed-20190320-p515sq.html

sounds more & more like poor pilot training.

How hard is it to turn off a faulty system ?

Training issues, Regulatory oversight issues, certification process issues, poor systems design, faulty safety assessment. How about all of these things?

If you need a hero to save the day, ask yourself, "why did I need a hero?"

 

[33kft]

If you need a hero to save the day, ask yourself, "why did I need a hero?"

And if you need a villain? (seems one has already been found)

 

[travelislife]

Well, he knew the problem was runaway trim, for which the response (whatever the cause, MCAS or otherwise) is to flick the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches. And that is exactly the same with the 737NG and the 737MAX, and is a procedure that every 737 pilot will have trained for. Apparently.

Interesting. Thanks. For some reason I from my reading it was that the Max was different. And that MCAS (not installed on the NG?) wasn't overridden in the standard way similar trim override would be in the NG? Or am I confusing different elements?

 

[jb747]

Interesting. Thanks. For some reason I from my reading it was that the Max was different. And that MCAS (not installed on the NG?) wasn't overridden in the standard way similar trim override would be in the NG? Or am I confusing different elements?

You are quite correct. MCAS activation does present itself differently to a runaway trim. In most cases with a Boeing, moving the controls in the opposite direction will deactivate the trim, giving you time to find and activate the cutoff switches. MCAS does not stop if you move the yoke against it. It will stop for a few seconds if you trim against it.

Whilst fighting the aircraft for control, finding a couple of cutout switches is likely to be anything but simple.

https://www.canberratimes.com.au/bu...-a-day-before-it-crashed-20190320-p515sq.html

sounds more & more like poor pilot training.

No, it sounds more and more like very poor hardware design, that was partially fixed by badly thought out and implemented software, which in turn was not tested for function with degraded inputs. Yes, it might have been catchable with better training, but Boeing decided that that wasn’t necessary either.

How hard is it to turn off a faulty system ?

It’s apparently defeated two crews, with nobody claiming to have beaten it yet, so perhaps it isn’t all that easy at all....

 

[33kft]

It’s apparently defeated two crews, with nobody claiming to have beaten it yet, so perhaps it isn’t all that easy at all....

The pilots prior to the Lion Air crash certainly claimed to have beaten it (by turning off Stab Trim switches to Off) and unless I am the only person who hasn't read the report that everyone keeps citing that claims the ET aircraft encountered the same issue, I would have to say that is 1 and not 2 crews that have had a confirmed encounter with this situation.

I do feel like a broken record and I certainly don't want to argue with a pilot, but we are a bit ahead of ourselves here.

 

[RooFlyer]

Former Delta pilot and executive nominated to head the FAA: ( OMAAT)

Trump Nominates Former Delta Pilot To Lead FAA - One Mile at a Time

 

[MEL_Traveller]

I do feel like a broken record and I certainly don't want to argue with a pilot, but we are a bit ahead of ourselves here.

Agree. But in the absence of a confirmed finding I think it is wise for the travelling public to avoid the aircraft if they don't want to take unnecessary risks.

It's fine to have the technical debate, it's fine for those who 'want to wait', but that doesn't help 'us' (those who might be buying tickets).

'Waiting' achieves nothing to diminish the risk. Not flying an aircraft (or airline, depending on the incident in question) does.

 

[33kft]

Sure, this isn't about the grounding of the aircraft (which has already happened). This is entirely about attributing the cause of the crash to the cause of another crash based on some similarities. Correlation is not causation.

 

[jb747]

I do feel like a broken record and I certainly don't want to argue with a pilot, but we are a bit ahead of ourselves here.

In blaming MCAS? Possibly. Nevertheless it has brought to light a bunch of engineering decisions, that are so suspect that even if this second accident was not caused by MCAS, that I would not be prepared to fly on the MAX.

On the subject of pilot hours...apparently the captain was newly promoted, so it will be interesting to read his command hours. 8,000 hours makes for an experienced FO, but it’s not much on the command side. 350 is still trivia.