Ethiopian 737 Max 8 crash and Fallout

[I love to travel]

A friend who has flown the 777 and 787, and is an ETPS graduate (test pilot), describes the 787 as the 767 MAX.

Well if I am interpreting your comment correctly to mean the 787 is an accident waiting to happen that is the scariest thing I have read this week.

 

[jb747]

Well if I am interpreting your comment correctly to mean the 787 is an accident waiting to happen that is the scariest thing I have read this week.

No, he just means that it isn't the "Dreamliner" that it's made out to be.

 

[Berlin]

No, he just means that it isn't the "Dreamliner" that it's made out to be.

Thank science, I also at first interpreted this comment as a statement about the safety of the 787

But the whole “Dreamliner” blurb has been Marketing 1.01 from the start. Quite smartly done so (quite curiously, pretty much exactly the opposite of the outrageously bad PR work that Boeing is doing on the Max) as it really has made it into many a media outlet and passenger vocabulary. And to the everyday person, “Dreamliner” sounds defo much sexier than 787-900 or similar

 

[Quickstatus]

29 October JT610 crash, 10 March ET302 crash. Time elapsed approx 15 weeks.
Does Boeing actually have a MCAS 2.0 solution?.

After JT610, the UA section of the ALPA (Airline pilot association) disagreed with their counterparts from AA and WN.
UA(ALPA) said JT610 was a result of the pilots not flying the plane because existing remedies were available to the pilots.
AA/WN(ALPA) said Boeing should have disclosed the existence of MCAS.

After ET610 UA(ALPA) maintained confidence in their pilots' ability to fly the 737Max, and pointed to the lack of experience in the ET crew, specifically the FO 300 hours.

The Ethiopian report says the pilots followed the Boeing procedure, but did not publicly state the pilots reactivated the Stabiliser electrical trim which reconnected the Stabiliser to MCAS.

While Boeing has a major task to correct a system which can put an aircraft into a nose dive, and convince the world that the MCAS 2.0 is robust don't the UA(ALPA) pilots have a point?

....

Every aircraft design has specific aerodynamic characteristics. Maybe it is better to remove MCAS altogether, but then the pilots would have to familiarise themselves with the pitch up tendency of the aircraft and likely to have to be separately rated to fly the MAX, not just the 737 group. Is this better?

 

[OATEK]

"The Ethiopian report says the pilots followed the Boeing procedure, but did not publicly state the pilots reactivated the Stabiliser electrical trim which reconnected the Stabiliser to MCAS."

Wasn't the aircraft already pitching down, hence the desperate effort to bring power to getting it back in trim. In that case turning the power back on to the stabilisers may only have hastened the end, as they had felt they couldn't keep it in the air.

 

[serfty]

Every aircraft design has specific aerodynamic characteristics. Maybe it is better to remove MCAS altogether, but then the pilots would have to familiarise themselves with the pitch up tendency of the aircraft and likely to have to be separately rated to fly the MAX, not just the 737 group. Is this better?

You then remove one of the MAX's selling points - "no need to retrain pilots" (other than 1 one hour Video session).

 

[juddles]

......

After ET610 UA(ALPA) maintained confidence in their pilots' ability to fly the 737Max, and pointed to the lack of experience in the ET crew, specifically the FO 300 hours......

This issue about "experience" could be taken another way:

The whole MCAS erroneous control is a completely new thing to the 737 family. Not only would an "experienced" 737 pilot have no more clue on how to fight it than a newer pilot, they would perhaps be even at more risk due to the fact that a "737" they were flying was doing things that no 737 they had flown for so many years has ever done before? .

 

[jb747]

"The Ethiopian report says the pilots followed the Boeing procedure, but did not publicly state the pilots reactivated the Stabiliser electrical trim which reconnected the Stabiliser to MCAS."

Wasn't the aircraft already pitching down, hence the desperate effort to bring power to getting it back in trim. In that case turning the power back on to the stabilisers may only have hastened the end, as they had felt they couldn't keep it in the air.

They don’t actually need to get it back in trim, just close enough that the elevators have enough authority to raise the nose. The way the MCAS works (apparently), the pilots’ electric trim would override the MCAS until a few seconds after you stopped trimming, at which point MCAS would start again. In theory at least, you could stick in a large amount of nose up trim via the normal switches, and at that point turn off the stab. Pilots don’t normally (if ever) put in huge amount of trim, they tend to apply a couple of seconds worth at known points (i.e. a go around) and the rest of the time just tiny blips. Turning the power back on may have unintentionally hastened the end, but I can see how it would have led to a good resolution too.

You then remove one of the MAX's selling points - "no need to retrain pilots" (other than 1 one hour Video session).

And this particular selling point has caused the 737 to be overall behind both competitors and the rest of the Boeing range. It could have had the 767/757 coughpit decades ago. The 777 coughpit could have been in the NG. But no, it has been a strange mix of screens and ancient switches. Not only should the MAX get decent training, but it should not be on the same endorsement as the rest of the 737s. A MAX pilot should not fly the others...same as the 747-400 pilots did not fly the Classic.

This issue about "experience" could be taken another way:

The whole MCAS erroneous control is a completely new thing to the 737 family. Not only would an "experienced" 737 pilot have no more clue on how to fight it than a newer pilot, they would perhaps be even at more risk due to the fact that a "737" they were flying was doing things that no 737 they had flown for so many years has ever done before? .

Perhaps. But a more experienced pilot might have jumped to the procedure sooner. He may have ensured that he had some level of nose up trim at the point of disconnect. His FO would likely have been quicker with support. In the Ethiopian accident, both pilots were inexperienced. Not only was the FO extremely low hours overall, but the captain had virtually no time in the left hand seat. The mix can be quite devastating. Inexperienced FOs can have the effect of reducing the coughpit to a one man show. AV has told us that this (runaway trim) is done in the sim, but for an FO with a total time that’s so low, how many times would he have seen a trim runaway? Once? Twice?

Why was the aircraft going so fast? Was the power never reduced?

 

[Quickstatus]

"The Ethiopian report says the pilots followed the Boeing procedure, but did not publicly state the pilots reactivated the Stabiliser electrical trim which reconnected the Stabiliser to MCAS."

Wasn't the aircraft already pitching down, hence the desperate effort to bring power to getting it back in trim. In that case turning the power back on to the stabilisers may only have hastened the end, as they had felt they couldn't keep it in the air.

Yes it may have given them a slightly better than zero chance than “grasp and hold”. Still don’t understand why Boeing didn’t emphasise that an erroneous MCAS activation has
1) the potential effect of inputting massive movements to Stabiliser - (potentially 10 seconds at a time - pilots don’t trim like that).
2) That corrective trim may need to be massive amounts in the opposite direction and not little bits of trim as pilots usually input and
3)that the trim wheel is potentially unsuitable for this massive trim amounts.
4) Manual electric trim may still be necessary

You then remove one of the MAX's selling points - "no need to retrain pilots" (other than 1 one hour Video session).

Assumptions generally have fatality as one possible outcome in the airline industry.,

.....

Then the other issue is 2x Erroneous AoA in very new aircraft. One AoA vane was replaced the previous day (JT610). Will be interesting to see what the fault is. Maybe it’s not in the AoA vane hardware...

 

[juddles]

...

Perhaps. But a more experienced pilot might have jumped to the procedure sooner. He may have ensured that he had some level of nose up trim at the point of disconnect. His FO would likely have been quicker with support. In the Ethiopian accident, both pilots were inexperienced. Not only was the FO extremely low hours overall, but the captain had virtually no time in the left hand seat. The mix can be quite devastating. Inexperienced FOs can have the effect of reducing the coughpit to a one man show. AV has told us that this is done in the sim, but for an FO with a total time that’s so low, how many times would he have seen a trim runaway? Once? Twice?

Why was the aircraft going so fast? Was the power never reduced?

I think that it all got down to two pilots trying to respond in seconds to something they fundamentally misunderstood. As others have said, after the Lion Air disaster, all 737 Max pilots had a notion, but to me this second catastrophe is in ways worse than the first - they battled knowing that they were suddenly battling an un-understood foe

 

[jb747]

29 October JT610 crash, 10 March ET302 crash. Time elapsed approx 15 weeks.
Does Boeing actually have a MCAS 2.0 solution?.

After JT610, the UA section of the ALPA (Airline pilot association) disagreed with their counterparts from AA and WN.
UA(ALPA) said JT610 was a result of the pilots not flying the plane because existing remedies were available to the pilots.
AA/WN(ALPA) said Boeing should have disclosed the existence of MCAS.

I think, at that point, that the UA (ALPA) were talking through the wrong end. Of course an American pilot would have been able to fly it. They are all Chuck Yeager.

After ET610 UA(ALPA) maintained confidence in their pilots' ability to fly the 737Max, and pointed to the lack of experience in the ET crew, specifically the FO 300 hours.

The experience issue is valid, but it still does not mean the aircraft would have been flyable.

The Ethiopian report says the pilots followed the Boeing procedure, but did not publicly state the pilots reactivated the Stabiliser electrical trim which reconnected the Stabiliser to MCAS.

There is a comment about the later use of electric trim, and also continued MCAS activity. That implies the stab switches were turned back on.

While Boeing has a major task to correct a system which can put an aircraft into a nose dive, and convince the world that the MCAS 2.0 is robust don't the UA(ALPA) pilots have a point?

To a degree. But, remember that Boeing had not tested MCAS runaway due to AoA problems at all.... If they had, perhaps we’d be talking about some Boeing test pilots.

Every aircraft design has specific aerodynamic characteristics. Maybe it is better to remove MCAS altogether, but then the pilots would have to familiarise themselves with the pitch up tendency of the aircraft and likely to have to be separately rated to fly the MAX, not just the 737 group. Is this better?

If you remove MCAS, apparently the MAX isn’t certifiable.

 

[juddles]

....


If you remove MCAS, apparently the MAX isn’t certifiable.

That is the total issue here. An airframe/engine combo that needs such.

 

[woodborer]

While Boeing has a major task to correct a system which can put an aircraft into a nose dive, and convince the world that the MCAS 2.0 is robust don't the UA(ALPA) pilots have a point?

They have a points, or they have a good dose of false bravado.

Not sure anyone knows whether they could or not. We don't have a simulator to see. What we do know, is that no-one seems to have described how to recover from the situation.

 

[woodborer]

Forgive me, but using the term "greed' is IMHO not correct. The airline industry is about trying to survive in a cutthroat industry. Extremely competitive game.

The underlying issue is the ability and preference of most travelers to book on online price and price alone. Fundamentally this whole series of factors of commercial pressures is due to pax pressure, not "greed".

I would say it is more reflective of the tension between 'regulation' and the 'free market' and the shifts back and forward on that.

 

[juddles]

They have a points, or they have a good dose of false bravado.

Not sure anyone knows whether they could or not. We don't have a simulator to see. What we do know, is that no-one seems to have described how to recover from the situation.

What I am seeing is that in the Ethiopian crash the pilots WERE aware of the new peril, but in the moment they still could not deal with it

 

[woodborer]

What I am seeing is that in the Ethiopian crash the pilots WERE aware of the new peril, but in the moment they still could not deal with it

Given the current level of training - could anyone have dealt with it?

 

[juddles]

Given the current level of training - could anyone have dealt with it?

I think that there have been other instances where some pilots were succesful, but the essence is that it is fighting an absolute monster. How an aircraft can be designed where pilots are unable to stop a fatal crash when they already know that the root cuase is a single faulty sensor - unforgiveable.

 

[juddles]

The Ethiopian pilots may have made errors, but they were working in a scary environment where noone really has answers. I dislike any expressions of lacking in their credentials or airmanship. They got a hand grenade and failed to defeat it, despite possibly heroic attempts.

 

[Quickstatus]

Given the current level of training - could anyone have dealt with it?

Well the poor pilots became essentially defacto test pilots without an ejection seat and parachute. Apparently UA(ALPA) thinks they can, but human factors suggest that the best skills deteriorate in an emergency.

 

[amaroo]

200hrs doesn't seem like much experience..... having just spent 100hrs watching a 16 year old drive - it's bugger all IMHO.